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Profile: David Faraci (Georgetown University)
  1. Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
    Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from (...)
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  2.  70
    Huck Vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)Symmetry of Praise and Blame.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy:7-27.
    Presentation and discussion of two new experimental studies surveying intuitions about cases of moral ignorance due to childhood deprivation. Discussion of resulting asymmetry between negative and positive cases and proposal of speculative hypothesis to explain results, The Difficulty Hypothesis.
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  3.  22
    To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners.David Faraci & Peter Martin Jaworski - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):697-709.
    There is currently a stalemate over the correct approach to legal liability. To take a prominent example, it remains a point of contention whether land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers. Many of those who insist that land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers maintain this for purely economic or pragmatic reasons. In contrast, those on the other side frequently defend their view on the grounds that, in such trespass cases, owners are not morally (...)
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  4.  72
    A Hard Look at Moral Perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
    This paper concerns what I take to be the primary epistemological motivation for defending moral perception. Offering a plausible account of how we gain moral knowledge is one of the central challenges of metaethics. It seems moral perception might help us meet this challenge. The possibility that we know about the instantiation of moral properties in something like the way we know that there is a bus passing in front of us raises the alluring prospect of subsuming moral epistemology under (...)
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  5. First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality.Christian Coons & David Faraci - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
    In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal (...)
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  6.  38
    Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?David Faraci - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 125 (3):531-537.
    There is a common view, dating back at least to Hume, that property rights presuppose scarcity. This paper is a critical examination of that thesis. In addition to questioning the thesis, the paper highlights the need to divorce the debate over this thesis from the debate over Intellectual Property (IP) rights (the area where it is most frequently applied). I begin by laying out the thesis’ major line of defense. In brief, the argument is that (1) property rights are legitimate (...)
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  7.  46
    Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox.David Faraci - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):751-755.
    In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory. His argument is as follows: Mackie’s is an abductive argument that error theory is the best explanation for divergence in moral practices. Since error theory will likewise be the best explanation for similar divergences in possible worlds (...)
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  8.  47
    David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. [REVIEW]David Faraci - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):259-267.