Raw (pragmatic) and potential (theoretical) power is seen as the key to press freedom in various global settings. Because the locus of power determines the locus of freedom, the authors suggest a model to understand where the raw and potential power resides within a matrix consisting of the State, the Media Elite, the Journalists, or the People. Numerous questions concerning accountability and ethics are raised concerning the practical application of a model that purports to overcome cultural biases inherent in traditional (...) theories of press and society. (shrink)
Is a Marxist society liable to be an oppressive one? To ask this question is immediately to pose two others: what is meant by Marxism; and what counts as an oppressive society? To take these questions in reverse order, by an oppressive society I shall mean one in which, other things being equal, people do not possess basic civil liberties. Examples of basic civil liberties include, but are not limited to, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and, (...) if the society has a political system, the freedom to participate in that system. An example of what I mean by basic civil liberties is the system of basic liberties discussed by Rawls; the United States Bill of Rights is another example. (shrink)
Abstract Ludwig von Mises argued that (1) economic calculation under socialism is impossible, and that (2) the lack of calculation would entail chaos and starvation. In these pages, Bryan Caplan has accepted the first claim but rejected the second, and has argued further that in real?world attempts to implement socialism, it was the lack of incentives, not the absence of economic calculation, that was responsible for economic chaos. I suggest, against Caplan's interpretation, that by ?chaos? Mises meant the lack of (...) calculation, rather than some further state of affairs entailed by this lack. So interpreted, Mises's argument escapes the brunt of Caplan's criticisms. (shrink)
In an ingenious argument, Ng and Singer claim to show that it is possible to derive the general principle of utility from another principle, Weak Majority Preference, which many who are not utilitarians would be prepared to accept. WMP does indeed sound acceptable: ‘For a community of N individuals choosing between two possibilities, X and Y, if no individual prefers Y to X, and at least individuals prefer X to Y, then X increases social welfare and is preferable’. But from (...) this seemingly innocuous rule, Ng and Singer maintain, quite substantial results follow if one takes account the well-established fact of intransitive indifference owing to the existence of finite sensibility. (shrink)
Abstract The learning associated with the hidden curriculum is likely to be unconscious. This raises questions about the moral standing of the hidden curriculum, which seems to violate two basic rights of the pupils: (1) the right to decide for themselves what they wish to study; (2) the right to be aware of the forces that have influenced them. Seeing as hidden curricula are unavoidable components of all education, this raises questions about the morality of education itself. It is thus (...) the task of the school to raise the hidden curriculum to the consciousness of the pupils, in order to protect them from its influence. ?Raising the hidden curriculum to consciousness? can be interpreted in different ways. The strategies associated with the relevant interpretations are problematic. However, their implementation is essential for the moral education of the pupils. (shrink)
David Basinger, in ‘Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought’, has claimed that whether the concept of God's middle knowledgeis coherent ‘cannot be dismissed lightly or ignored by those interested in classical Christian thought. For what is at stake is the very coherence of Christian theism itself’.
N. M. L. Nathan's argument that IDP utilitarianism, if universally adopted, is inconsistent, does not succeed. The argument requires that if an IDP utilitarian has only self-regarding desires, then none of these desires can be informed. This rests on a partial misuse of the expression satisfaction of desire. For an individual attempting to realize his self-regarding desires, the satisfaction of the satisfaction of a desire is unmeaning. The naming of an object of the desire is an intrinsic part of the (...) phrase satisfaction of desire. Further, contrary to Nathan's claim, this suggestion does not trivialize IDP utilitarianism. (shrink)