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David Horst
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
  1. How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...)
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  2. Absichtliches Handeln.David Horst - 2012 - Mentis.
    In this book, I offer an account of intentional action. The book has two main parts: in the first part, I discuss and criticize the currently prevailing account of intentional action—the Causal Theory of Action (CTA)—and, in the second part, I offer my alternative account. The CTA proposes essentially two conditions for something that you do to be an intentional action: (1) what you do is represented by your intention (or other mental attitudes), and (2) it is caused by your (...)
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  3. Actions and Accidents.David Horst - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325.
    In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential (...)
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    Enkratic Agency.David Horst - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):47-67.
    An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery (...)
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    Enkratic Agency.David Horst - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery (...)
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    Introduction: Special Issue on Agency and Rationality.Sergio Tenenbaum & David Horst - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4).
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    Schwerpunkt: Praktisches Wissen.Andrea Kern & David Horst - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (3):353-356.
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    Handlungen, Absichten Und Praktisches Wissen.David Horst - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (3):373-386.
    In this paper, I argue that in order to understand intentional action we have to understand a distinctive kind of practical knowledge - knowledge that is the cause of what it represents. To do so, I begin by identifying two requirements for an adequate understanding of intentional action: someone who acts intentionally has an intention that is the cause of her action; someone who acts intentionally knows what she is doing. My aim is to show that a theory of intentional (...)
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