The aim of the paper is to show that there are actions which are non-intentional. An account is first given which links intentional and unintentional action to acting for a reason, or appropriate causation by an intention. Mannerisms and habitual actions are then presented as examples of behavior which are actions, but which are not done in the course of acting for a reason. This account has advantages over that of Hursthouse's "arational actions," which are allegedly intentional actions done for (...) no reason at all. Finally, one consequence of neglecting non-intentional action is discussed to illustrate its importance. (shrink)

Are today’s wars different from earlier wars? Or do we need a different ethics for old and new wars alike? Unlike most books on the morality of war, this book rejects the ‘just war’ tradition, proposing a virtue ethics of war to take its place. Like torture, war cannot be justified. This book asks and answers the question: “If war is a very great evil, would a leader with courage, justice, compassion, and all the other moral virtues ever choose to (...) fight a war?” A ‘philosophy of co-existence’ is proposed which is much more restrictive than just war theory but not pacifist. War can be correctly chosen by a virtuous leader only in rare ‘supreme emergencies’ when faced with enemies as evil as Hitler. This virtue ethics approach to war is used to find new answers to difficult issues such as humanitarian intervention, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. (shrink)

An extrinsic desire is defined as a desire for something, not for its own sake, but for its supposed propensity to secure something else that one desires. I argue that the notion of ‘extrinsic desire’ is theoretically redundant. I begin by defining desire as a propositional attitude with a desirability characterization. The roles of desire and intention in practical reasoning are distinguished. I show that extrinsic desire does not have its own motivational role. I also show that extrinsic desire is (...) not needed for other roles besides motivation to carry out the means, and is not generated by reason. Finally, I argue that an account of extrinsic motivation in terms of intention is preferable to an account in terms of extrinsic desire. Because of the fundamental differences between extrinsic desire and intrinsic desire, it is more advantageous to distinguish between them as different kinds of mental states: intention and desire. (shrink)

The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary according to the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A more sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, (...) I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional. (shrink)

I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I (...) then clarify the nature of the moral distinction in double effect cases and how it can be used to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of agents rather than the moral status of acts. The agent's blameworthiness is reduced not by his lack of intention but by his desire not to bring about the side-effect, and the 'counterfactual test' can be used to determine whether he desires the effect in acting. In my version, the DDE has its rationale in virtue ethics; it is not liable to abuse as the traditional version is; and it makes more plausible distinctions when applied to standard examples. (shrink)

My paper critiques the comparability requirement that practical reason is limited by the possibility of comparing alternatives. I describe methods of reasoning that are compatible with choice between incomparable options, and discuss a mistake about intention that supports the view that comparing alternatives is the only way to choose rationally. I then explain how a model of rational choice that prescribes the comparison of alternatives invents unacceptable concepts to make comparability possible. Finally, I criticize the assumption of the unity of (...) practical reason that requires that prudential and moral choices are both made by comparing alternatives. It turns out that moral conflicts that are intractable for those who reason with a method of comparison may be resolvable by using moral reasoning that does not involve the comparison of alternatives in terms of a comprehensive value. Making room for such forms of reasoning is preferable to denying incomparability. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss virtue ethics in relation to the rejection of the use of lethal violence. I argue that, given how I apply virtue ethics, a person of good character will have a very strong intrinsic desire to avoid the killing of another human being, so that only in rare circumstances where the alternative to violence is immensely evil would the use of violence to prevent the evil be the morally appropriate choice for the person to make. I (...) first give a brief summary of a neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. Then I explain why I think that a virtuous agent would be strongly averse to killing human beings. I go on to show that this does not mean that such an agent would never use violence on others, only that she would be very reluctant to do so. The circumstances in which she would do so are rare, but cannot be ruled out. For instance, virtuous agents may in very limited cases kill in self-defense despite a strong aversion to killing. The circumstances in which killings take place are found most of all in war, so I close by discussing where the virtue ethics approach to war is positioned in relation to just war theory and pacifism. (shrink)

Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. In this chapter, I show that the examples typically used to support the DDA do not (...) in fact do so. Contrary to the deontological ethics supported by the DDA, I argue that it can be justified to minimize harm by killing a smaller number of people, in preference to letting a greater number die. But unlike for the consequentialist, my position is that the distinction between killing and letting die does have moral significance. I shall examine what other non-consequentialist considerations, besides the appeal to positive and negative rights, could account for the distinction; and suggest a middle position between the deontological and consequentialist approaches to the ethics of killing. (shrink)

This article reports the results of a survey, by mailed questionnaire, of the attitudes, values and practices of doctors in Singapore with respect to the doctor-patient relationship. Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 475 doctors (261 general practitioners and 214 medical specialists), out of which 249 (52.4%) valid responses were completed and returned. The survey is the first of its kind in Singapore. Questions were framed around issues of medical paternalism, consent and patient autonomy. As the doctors were (...) exposed to Western ethical concepts in their training, we were not surprised to find that they would mostly allow patients some say in decision-making and keep patients reasonably informed. In respecting patient autonomy, they would usually seek to influence patient choice by persuasion. However, the residual "Asian-ness" of doctors in Singapore gives rise to some inconsistencies between values and practices. Many doctors still believe that a number of their patients are incapable of rational choice. There is some lack of openness in telling patients the whole truth. When patients choose to refuse treatment, many doctors are prepared to involve family members in making a consensus decision. Doctors were also asked how they made ethical judgements in the face of dilemmas, and how they would like disputes with patients to be resolved. By and large, the doctors prefer to make their own judgements rather than to rely on rules. They also wish to keep the law courts out of disputes with patients, preferring less public ways of settling disputes. (shrink)

This book brings together in one volume some of the very latest developments in moral psychology that were presented at a major American conference in 2004. Moral psychology is a broad area at the intersection of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind and action. Essays in this collection deal with most of the central issues in moral psychology that are of interest to a large number of philosophers today, including important questions in normative ethical theory, meta-ethics, and applied ethics.

In this paper, I examine the conflicts between autonomy and justice. The problem of justice in healthcare concerns both micro-allocation and macro-allocation. The latter has to do with distributive justice: who should get what healthcare resources at whose expense. The current debate about healthcare reform brings up two competing models of distributive justice from political philosophy. The libertarian theory holds to the ideal of individual responsibility and choice, viewing taxation for the purpose of providing goods to those who cannot afford (...) them as a form of unjustified coercion. The liberal theory holds that society should ensure that all members are provided with basic goods that correct for inequalities that deprive them of human dignity. Even though both theories value individual choice, these theories provide opposing answers to the question of whether taxes should be collected and used for the purpose of ensuring universal access to healthcare. In my paper, I show that neither theory can respect patient choice in healthcare and achieve distributive justice. Libertarians ignore the realities of the healthcare system and why a free market where patients choose and pay for what they want cannot exist. Liberals face the problem that the choices that patients make can lead to over-consumption of healthcare at the expense of other goods important to society. (shrink)

This is a book review of "The Ethics of War and Peace" by Nigel Dower.

In this paper, I discuss an example from Buchanan of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). I first refute objections to the intuitive permissibility of the killing described in the example. After explaining why the killing is intentional, I evaluate Buchanan's solution to the ‘problem of intending death’. According to Buchanan, what justifies a physician in intentionally bringing about a patient's death by AVE is a principle that embodies the values of patient self-determination and well-being. I argue that these two considerations are (...) not sufficient for justifying AVE. The motive of the physician matters, but it is his desire rather than his intention that is relevant. An ethical physician may bring about intentionally the death of his patient if in forming his intention, he began with an appropriate desire to keep the patient alive as well as a legitimate desire to prevent prolonged suffering, with the latter outweighing the former. The ethical physician also desires to respect the choice of his patient wherever possible. On my account, the physician should be guided by the virtues and goals of his profession rather than by strict ‘all-or-nothing’ principles. I defend my account by describing the advantages of my account, and dismissing possible objections. (shrink)

This book is a rich blend of analyses by leading experts from various cultures and disciplines. A compact introduction to a complex field, it illustrates biotechnology's profound impact upon the environment and society. Moreover, it underscores the vital relevance of cultural values. This book empowers readers to more critically assess biotechnology's value and effectiveness within both specific cultural and global contexts.

In Chinese Confucian medical ethics, the principle of autonomy has not been recognized. Instead, the basic values of medical practice are compassion and humaneness. Patient autonomy however lies at the foundation of Western medical ethics in general and research ethics in particular. In the modern world of biotechnology, what happens when medical research is carried out in an East Asian society? Should the society adopt principles of Western medical ethics? Or can resources to ensure ethical research be found in Confucian (...) ethics? I consider answers to these questions in the context of a recent case of unethical research in Singapore. (shrink)

Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity (...) as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature – one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent. (shrink)

The supreme emergency exemption proposed by Michael Walzer has engendered controversy because it permits violations of the jus in bello principle of discrimination when a state is faced with imminent defeat at the hands of a very evil enemy. Traditionalists among just war theorists believe that noncombatants should never be deliberately targeted in war whether or not there is a supreme emergency. Pacifists on the other hand reject war as immoral even in a supreme emergency. Unlike Walzer, neither just war (...) traditionalists nor pacifists make a special case for supreme emergencies. In this paper, I borrow Walzer’s concept to provide support for a different ethics of war that limits war to supreme emergencies. In non-supreme emergency situations, I agree with pacifists in rejecting war even if just war requirements are satisfied. But in supreme emergencies, I agree with just war traditionalists that war can be legitimately fought provided that moral constraints that protect noncombatants are respected. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the difference between decision-making by soldiers and commanders, compared with leaders of the nation. Decision-making in the armed forces is prudential reasoning concerned with the best means to achieve given military objectives. I argue that those in the military cannot rationally make the moral choice to risk the lives of their own soldiers or jeopardize their mission in order to protect the lives of enemy civilians. This does not vindicate the realists who deny that morality (...) applies to war. Moral constraints set out in war conventions foster the illusion that by following rules of war, soldiers and their leaders have done all anyone needs to do in terms of moral choice concerning war. Political leaders should instead engage in moral reasoning by considering other means besides war, even the option of changing objectives. Such reasoning differs from prudential reasoning not in scope but in type. (shrink)

There are two contrasting paradigms for dealing with terrorists: war and law enforcement. In this paper, I first discuss how the just war theory assesses the military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. I argue that the ethical problems with the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 concern principles of jus ad bellum besides just cause. I show that the principles of right intention, last resort, proportionality and likelihood of success were violated. Furthermore, both (...) jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination were not satisfied in targeting terrorists in places where civilians not linked to them live. The law enforcement that takes place in liberal democracies is fully respectful and protective of innocent lives. Crime is dealt with by apprehending lawbreakers and putting them on trial if possible, and by keeping criminal elements on the loose away from potential victims. Good law enforcement also includes acting to remove causes of crime. I examine how this model applies to the problem of terrorism and address objections concerning the impossibility of eliminating terrorism, the slowness of success, and the possibility that there are “nut cases” who hate America no matter what. (shrink)

This introduction by the editor to the essays in Moral Psychology Today describes what philosophy of action is about, followed by brief synopses of each essay in the volume.

This is a book review of Forgiveness and Revenge by Trudy Govier.

Philosophical problems with the concept of wronging someone in bringing the person into existence, especially the non-identity problem, have been much discussed in connection with forms of assisted reproduction that carry risks of harms either greater than or not otherwise present in natural reproduction. In this essay, I discuss the meaning of claims of wrongful life, distinguishing them from claims of wrongful disability. Attempts to conceptualize wrongful disability in terms of either the harmed existence of the offspring, or the possibility (...) of less harmful alternatives, are found unsatisfactory. A contractualist approach that provides an account of wronging that is independent of harming is considered. Finally, I present a new approach that necessitates an account of reasons for procreation that could justify harm to the offspring. These reasons are not the kind that require or prohibit actions of certain types, but reflect what the agent sees as intrinsically valuable in acting. (shrink)

What do philosophers have to say about war beyond appeal to the just war doctrine? I suggest that they should concern themselves with the harmful consequences of war for the people who experience it. The ancient Greek tragedian Euripides was a moral philosopher of his time who wrote the plays Hecuba and The Trojan Women from the perspective of the losers in the Trojan War. There are striking parallels to the U.S. war in Iraq that began in 2003. Lessons that (...) can be learned from Euripides include how good people learn to hate, how aggression has its own logic of necessary brutality, how each side is unable to recognize how much they are like their enemies, how the desire to end a war quickly disregards the cost to civilians, and how irrational the fear of the enemy can be. (shrink)

The ethics of gene patenting is concerned with whether human genes are the kind of thing that is appropriate for patenting, and whether it is ethical to do so. Is genetic technology a special case compared to other medical technology that have been patented? Much of the debate has revolved around the benefits and harms of allowing gene sequences to be patented. In this paper, I am concerned with a non-consequential consideration: Can someone patent my genes? If genes are the (...) common property of humankind, are genes patentable? I present an objection to the patenting of processes used to manipulate our genes that have the potential to change human nature. Should not all members of the human species have a say regarding genetic engineering that can be used to irreversibly change what makes each one a human? I conclude with an examination of how genetic research may be democratically controlled. (shrink)

There are two contrasting paradigms for dealing with terrorists: war and law enforcement. In this paper, I first discuss how the just war theory assesses the military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. I argue that the ethical problems with the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 concern principles of jus ad bellum besides just cause. I show that the principles of right intention, last resort, proportionality and likelihood of success were violated. Furthermore, both (...) jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination were not satisfied in targeting terrorists in places where civilians not linked to them live. The law enforcement that takes place in liberal democracies is fully respectful and protective of innocent lives. Crime is dealt with by apprehending lawbreakers and putting them on trial if possible, and by keeping criminal elements on the loose away from potential victims. Good law enforcement also includes acting to remove causes of crime. I examine how this model applies to the problem of terrorism and address objections concerning the impossibility ofeliminating terrorism, the slowness of success, and the possibility that there are “nut cases” who hate America no matter what. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a special volume of the journal, Philosophy in the Contemporary World, on "War, Peace, and Ethics" which contains ten original essays on a wide range of topics.

This is a book review of "Who’s Afraid of Human Cloning?" by Gregory Pence.

I compare the distribution of jobs and research opportunities in academic philosophy with how American society distributes economic rewards. In both cases, there is gross inequality and lack of upward mobility. Luck always plays a role in hiring decisions and the acceptance of papers by journals, but the entrenchment of luck has led to elitism which is unhealthy for the profession of philosophy, just as it is for the capitalist economy. I suggest some revolutionary steps to bridge the gap between (...) the two tiers of philosophers. (shrink)

In "After Anscombe," I argue that, although Bratman's account of intention "has provided a conceptual tool for many directions of research in philosophy and cognitive psychology," it cannot do the work in ethics that moral philosophers, especially Kantians, use it for. This can be shown by considering the problems in using intention to make a moral distinction in cases of double effect. If so, Bratman's is not the same concept of intention that Anscombe had in mind when she wrote her (...) book. I show that Ancombe's account of intention is a much broader concept, with deeper historical roots. This does not mean that Bratman's concept of intention should be abandoned. Rather, we need to make a distinction between desire and intention that is implicit in Anscombe's account. That is, the aspects of intention that make her concept suited for ethics do not belong to Bratman's narrower concept and should be attributed to a concept that can be distinguished from intention. Evidence for what the latter concept is can be found in Aquinas' account of intentio from which the concept of intention has borrowed its name. Intentio for Aquinas is an act of will in regard to the end, whereas Bratman's intention is of the means that are chosen in practical reasoning. Intentio seems to be an intrinsic desire for the end. If this is right, then it is desire that is relevant for ethics, and not intention in its modern use. Recognition that desire and not intention is the relevant concept for ethics, in both Anscombe's and Aquinas' accounts of human agency, dovetails perfectly with their ethical theories, for it is Aristotle's ethics that has guided both philosophers in their ethical writings. After all, Aristotelian virtue ethicists are concerned with moral evaluation of the agent's character, which consists in a set of dispositions to seek ends that are desired for their own sake. (shrink)

This article employs a sociological analysis of the changing role and mission of higher education from that of a ?public good? to that of a service industry. In this regard, the rise of modern universities as corporate enterprises in the recent decades has often neglected the important dimension of education as a process of enlightenment, with its ethical and moral dimensions. The author tries to put into perspective the relevance of searching for an ?ethical university? by proposing to integrate the (...) important notion of Enlightenment as formulated by Kant, Newman's idea of the university and other similar western ideals, with the eastern ideas of the Confucian Classic The Great Learning, in order to suggest how the quest for an ?ethical university? might materialize in the future. (shrink)

In re-examining the concepts of desire, intention, and trying, David K. Chan brings a fresh approach toward resolving many of the problems that have occupied philosophers of action for almost a century. This book not only presents a complete theory of human agency but also, by developing the conceptual tools needed to do moral philosophy, lays the groundwork for formulating an ethics that is rooted in a clear, intuitive, and coherent moral psychology.

I evaluate one intuitive argument for, and one against, the use of lethal drones by the United States in its War on Terror. The Lesser Evil Argument appeals to those who think it perverse to reject weapons that enable a more limited use of force. But if harms on all sides and longer-term consequences are considered, the argument is much less persuasive. The Targeted Killing Argument is intuitive to those who consider drone strikes against terrorist suspects named in intelligence reports (...) to violate the rules of war. I reject the claim that it would be acceptable to carry out targeted killings because of necessity. Finally, I consider how radical asymmetry encourages terrorism against civilians, and how drone operators have the status of executioners, not warriors. (shrink)

This book brings together in one volume some of the very latest developments in moral psychology that were presented at a major American conference in 2004. Moral psychology is a broad area at the intersection of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind and action. Essays in this collection deal with most of the central issues in moral psychology that are of interest to a large number of philosophers today, including important questions in normative ethical theory, meta-ethics, and applied ethics.