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Profile: David Liebesman (University of Calgary)
  1. Simple Generics.David Liebesman - 2011 - Noûs 45 (3):409-442.
    Consensus has it that generic sentences such as “Dogs bark” and “Birds fly” contain, at the level of logical form, an unpronounced generic operator: Gen. On this view, generics have a tripartite structure similar to overtly quantified sentences such as “Most dogs bark” and “Typically, birds fly”. I argue that Gen doesn’t exist and that generics have a simple bipartite structure on par with ordinary atomic sentences such as “Homer is drinking”. On my view, the subject terms of generics are (...)
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  2. Sider on Existence.David Liebesman & Matti Eklund - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):519–528.
    In (2001), (2003), and elsewhere, Ted Sider presents two arguments concerning the existential quantifier which are justly central to the recent discussion of metaontology. What we will call Sider's indeterminacy argument is an attempted reductio of the suggestion that the existential quantifier might be semantically indeterminate. What we will call Sider's naturalness argument is an argument for the claim that the semantic value of the existential quantifier is the most eligible existence-like meaning there is, à la David Lewis' eligibility theory (...)
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  3.  80
    We Do Not Count by Identity.David Liebesman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):21-42.
    It is widely assumed in psychology, philosophy, and linguistics that we count by identity. For example, to count the dogs by identity, we correlate each dog that isn't identical to the rest with a natural number, starting with one and assigning each successive dog the successive natural number. When we run out of distinct dogs, we've yielded a correct count. I argue that this model of counting is incorrect. We do not count by identity.
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  4. Causation and the Canberra Plan.David Liebesman - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):232-242.
    David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure.
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  5.  46
    Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person.David Liebesman - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (3):306-318.
    In the appendix to Naming and Necessity, Kripke espouses the view that necessarily, Sherlock Holmes is not a person. To date, no compelling argument has been extracted from Kripke’s remarks. I give an argument for Kripke’s conclusion that is not only interpretively plausible but also philosophically compelling. I then defend the argument against salient objections.
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  6.  30
    Counting as a Type of Measuring.David Liebesman - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (12).
    There may be two and a half bagels on the table. When there are two and a half, it is false that there are exactly two. As obvious as these claims are, they can’t be accounted for on the most straightforward and familiar views of counting and the semantics of number words. I develop a view on which counting is a type of measuring. In particular, counting involves a specific measure function. I then analyze that function and show how it (...)
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  7.  99
    Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.
    I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for predication. The condition is that a term or term-occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its designatum, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favour the ascription view. I then develop the view and elicit a number of its virtues.
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  8.  54
    Does Vagueness Underlie the Mass/Count Distinction?David Liebesman - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):185-203.
    Does vagueness underlie the mass/count distinction? My answer is no. I motivate this answer in two ways. First, I argue against Chierchia’s recent attempt to explain the distinction in terms of vagueness. Second, I give a more general argument that no such account will succeed.
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  9.  81
    Some Puzzles About Some Puzzles About Belief.David Liebesman - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):608-618.
  10.  61
    Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. [REVIEW]David Liebesman - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):310-314.
  11.  13
    Relations and Order-Sensitivity.David Liebesman - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):409-429.
    I ate my broccoli, though my broccoli did not eat me. The eating relation, like many other relations, differentiates between its arguments. The fact that eating holds between a and b does not entail that it holds between b and a. How are we to make sense of this? The standard view is that relations are sensitive to the order of their arguments. As natural as this view is, it has been the target of a powerful objection from Kit Fine. (...)
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  12.  27
    Converse and Identity.David Liebesman - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):137-155.
    Necessarily, if I ate a slice of pizza, then that slice of pizza was eaten by me. More generally, it is necessarily true that if a relation holds between two objects in some order, its converse holds of the same objects in reverse order. What is the intimate relationship that guarantees such necessary connections? Timothy Williamson argues that the relationship between converses must be identity, on pain of the massive and systematic indeterminacy of relational predicates. If sound, Williamson’s argument overturns (...)
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  13.  44
    Jeffrey C. King, The Nature and Structure of Content. [REVIEW]David Liebesman - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):246-250.
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