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David M. Armstrong [58]David Malet Armstrong [8]
  1. Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  2. A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  3.  76
    Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm - 1984 - Blackwell.
  4. How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?David M. Armstrong - 2007 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
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  5. The Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
  6.  45
    Perception And The Physical World.David M. Armstrong - 1961 - Humanities Press.
  7. The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  8. Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  9.  51
    The Nature of Mind and Other Essays.David M. Armstrong - 1968 - Humanities Press.
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  10.  85
    The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others.David Malet Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
  11. What is Consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press.
  12. The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 175--185.
  13. Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.
  14. Qualia Ain't in the Head.David M. Armstrong - 1996 - Psyche 2 (1):31--4.
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  15. Smart and the Secondary Qualities.David M. Armstrong - 1987 - In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell.
     
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  16. What Makes Induction Rational?David Malet Armstrong - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (4):503-11.
  17. The Causal Theory of the Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell University Press.
     
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  18.  75
    Dispositions Are Causes.David Malet Armstrong - 1969 - Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  19. The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism.David Malet Armstrong - 1968 - Analysis 29 (2):48--9.
    The paper tries to rebut an objection to materialism. Anti-Materialists have argued that mental processes do not appear to be mere physical processes in the brain, And that secondary qualities such as sounds do not appear to be mere vibrations in the air. So materialists must admit that introspection and perception involve at least the illusion of the falsity of materialism. Using the headless woman illusion as a model, It is shown how the illusion is generated, And that it is (...)
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  20. Three Types of Consciousness.David M. Armstrong - 1979 - In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69). pp. 235.
  21.  67
    In Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception.David M. Armstrong - 2004 - Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):19-26.
  22. Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.
    A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
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  23. Searle's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness.David M. Armstrong - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.
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  24. Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I.David M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  25.  55
    The Causal Theory of Properties.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  26. The 'Thermometer' View of Knowledge.David M. Armstrong - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  27. Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. II.David M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  28.  35
    Properties.David M. Armstrong - 1992 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 14--27.
  29.  92
    The Headless Woman and the Defense of Materialism.David M. Armstrong - 1968 - Analysis 29:48-49.
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  30.  57
    Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson.David M. Armstrong - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  31. Dispositions as Categorical States.David M. Armstrong - 1996 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. pp. 15--18.
  32. C. B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality and Conditionals.David Malet Armstrong - 1989 - In J. Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind and Reality; Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 7-15.
     
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  33.  53
    Metaphysics and Supervenience.David M. Armstrong - 1982 - Critica 42 (42):3-17.
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  34.  81
    Illusions of Sense.David M. Armstrong - 1955 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
  35.  79
    Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism.David M. Armstrong - 1959 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
  36.  27
    Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals.David M. Armstrong - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285-286.
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  37.  23
    Discussion: Berkeley's New Theory of Vision.David M. Armstrong - 1956 - Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1):127-129.
    Most of the New Theory of Vision is an argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's question.// re primacy of vision in spatial perception: "most rational philosopher on this topic is Berkeley, whose New Theory of Vision presents in cogent detail the argument" (from Bennett 1966, p. 30, in note cites 41ff.).// Berkeley's criticisms of Locke: "If we really abstract from colour and hardness and all that 'belongs to sensation', so far from being left with 'pure' notions of extension and (...)
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  38.  72
    Max Deutscher and Perception.David M. Armstrong - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.
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  39.  49
    Vérifacteurs pour des vérités modales.David M. Armstrong - 2002 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (4):491-507.
    Revenant sur la question des vérifacteurs, D. Armstrong demande ici d'abord comment concilier le maximalisme et la relation de nécessitation. L'A. examine quel sens métaphysique donner à la notion d'implication, et s'il y a un sens à admettre une contingence de re. Il traite à ce niveau des possibilités pures, examine le cas des aliens chez David Lewis, puis pose la question de savoir s'il est contingent de dire qu'il y a de l'être plutôt que rien. L'exposé le conduit à (...)
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  40.  54
    Vesey on Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.
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  41.  37
    Vesey on Sensations of Heat.David M. Armstrong - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):359-362.
  42.  51
    Incorrigibility, Materialism, and Causation.David M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.
  43. Discussion: Reply to Van Fraassen.David M. Armstrong - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:224-229.
  44. John Searle and His Critics.David M. Armstrong - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  45. Colour Realism and the Argument From Microscopes.David M. Armstrong - 1969 - In R. Brown & C. D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press. pp. 301-323.
  46.  19
    Reacting to Meinong.David M. Armstrong - 1995 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:615-627.
    1. Some reasons are given for rejecting the view that there are entities that do not exist. 2. It is suggested, nevertheless, that this view has some plausibility when we consider unrealized empirical possibilities. 3. Even if non-existent entities are rejected, there remains Meinong's distinction between object and objectives, roughly: things and facts. The author would analyze objects in terms of objectives, yielding a world of facts.
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  47. Brain and Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1979 - (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69).
     
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  48.  10
    Immediate Perception.David M. Armstrong - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. pp. 23--35.
  49.  9
    Priroda Duha.David M. Armstrong - 1993 - Theoria 36 (3-4):69-80.
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  50. Perception, Sense-Data, and Causality.David Malet Armstrong - 1979 - In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.
     
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