56 found
Order:
Disambiguations
David E. Over [41]David Over [14]David P. Over [1]
  1. Rationality in Reasoning: The Problem of Deductive Competence.Jonathan Evans & David E. Over - unknown - Current Psychology of Cognition 16 (1-2):3-38.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  2.  47
    New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.
  3.  70
    Uncertainty and the de Finetti Tables.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):308-328.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these systems for natural language (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  4.  3
    Rationality and Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-194.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  5.  4
    Bayesian Reasoning with Ifs and Ands and Ors.Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  6.  92
    Betting on Conditionals.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
    A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  7.  6
    Uncertain Deduction and Conditional Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  8.  3
    New Normative Standards of Conditional Reasoning and the Dual-Source Model.Henrik Singmann, Karl Christoph Klauer & David Over - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  9.  29
    New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning: An Introduction to the Special Issue Edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over.Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):249-265.
  10.  65
    The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence.David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  11.  8
    Deduction From Uncertain Premises.Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over - 1995 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48 (3):613-643.
    We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne. These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  12.  42
    Reasoning to and From Belief: Deduction and Induction Are Still Distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
  13.  45
    Reasoning and Rationality.K. Manktelow & David E. Over - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):199-219.
  14.  72
    Betting on Conditionals.Guy Politzer, David P. Over & Jean Baratgin - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
    A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B, and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B. The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional – true, false, or void for indicative conditionals and win, lose or void for conditional (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15.  24
    Scope Ambiguities and Conditionals.David Over, Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):284-307.
  16.  33
    Probabilities, Beliefs, and Dual Processing: The Paradigm Shift in the Psychology of Reasoning.Shira Elqayam & David Over - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):27-40.
    In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  17.  8
    When Can We Say ‘If’?Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
  18.  9
    Suppositions, Extensionality, and Conditionals: A Critique of the Mental Model Theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Simon J. Handley - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  19.  30
    Reasoning From Uncertain Premises: Effects of Expertise and Conversational Context.Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over - 2001 - Thinking and Reasoning 7 (4):367 – 390.
    Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  20.  23
    The Probability of Iterated Conditionals.Janneke Wijnbergen‐Huitink, Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (4):788-803.
    Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth-table task, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21.  6
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  22.  7
    Rationality in the Selection Task: Epistemic Utility Versus Uncertainty Reduction.Jonathan Evans & David E. Over - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.
    M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  23.  38
    Categorical Induction From Uncertain Premises: Jeffrey's Doesn't Completely Rule.Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Steven A. Sloman & David E. Over - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (4):405-431.
    Studies of categorical induction typically examine how belief in a premise (e.g., Falcons have an ulnar artery) projects on to a conclusion (e.g., Robins have an ulnar artery). We study induction in cases in which the premise is uncertain (e.g., There is an 80% chance that falcons have an ulnar artery). Jeffrey's rule is a normative model for updating beliefs in the face of uncertain evidence. In three studies we tested the descriptive validity of Jeffrey's rule and a related probability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24.  5
    The Psychology of Uncertainty and Three-Valued Truth Tables.Jean Baratgin, Guy Politzer, David E. Over & Tatsuji Takahashi - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Psychological research on people’s understanding of natural language connectives has traditionally used truth table tasks, in which participants evaluate the truth or falsity of a compound sentence given the truth or falsity of its components in the framework of propositional logic. One perplexing result concerned the indicative conditional if A then C which was often evaluated as true when A and C are true, false when A is true and C is false but irrelevant“ (devoid of value) when A is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  28
    The New Paradigm and Mental Models.Jean Baratgin, Igor Douven, Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Mike Oaksford, David Over & Guy Politzer - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (10):547-548.
  26. Deontic Reasoning.Ken I. Manktelow & David E. Over - 1995 - Perspectives on Thinking and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Peter Wason.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd Hove,, UK.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  27.  12
    Understanding Conditionals in the East: A Replication Study of Politzer Et Al. With Easterners.Hiroko Nakamura, Jing Shao, Jean Baratgin, David E. Over, Tatsuji Takahashi & Hiroshi Yama - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  32
    Uncertain Premises and Jeffrey's Rule.David E. Over & Constantinos Hadjichristidis - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):97-98.
    Oaksford & Chater (O&C) begin in the halfway Bayesian house of assuming that minor premises in conditional inferences are certain. We demonstrate that this assumption is a serious limitation. They additionally suggest that appealing to Jeffrey's rule could make their approach more general. We present evidence that this rule is not limited enough to account for actual probability judgements.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  29.  43
    Probability and Choice in the Selection Task.David W. Green, David E. Over & Robin A. Pyne - 1997 - Thinking and Reasoning 3 (3):209-235.
    Two experiments using a realistic version of the selection task examined the relationship between participants' probability estimates of finding a counter example and their selections. Experiment 1 used everyday categories in the context of a scenario to determine whether or not the number of instances in a category affected the estimated probability of a counter-example. Experiment 2 modified the scenario in order to alter participants' estimates of finding a specific counter-example. Unlike Kirby 1994a, but consistent with his proposals, both studies (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  30.  13
    Editorial: From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought.Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Conditionals and Non-Constructive Reasoning.David Over, Jonathan Evans, & Elqayam & Shira - 2010 - In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32.  22
    Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate.David E. Over (ed.) - 2003 - Psychology Press.
    In this collection, leading experts evaluate the status of this controversial field, providing a critical analysis of its main hypotheses These hypotheses have ...
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33.  2
    Corrigendum: Bayesian Reasoning with Ifs and Ands and Ors.Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. From Massive Modularity to Metarepresentation: The Evolution of Higher Cognition.David E. Over - 2003 - In Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press. pp. 121--144.
  35.  25
    If.Jonathan Evans & David Over - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    'If' is one of the most important words in the English language, being used to express hypothetical thought. The use of conditional terms such as 'if' distinguishes human intelligence from that of all other animals. In this volume, Jonathan Evans and David Over present a new theoretical approach to understanding conditionals. The book draws on studies from the psychology of judgement and decision making, as well as philosophical logic.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  36.  8
    Contingency, Causation, and Adaptive Inference.David E. Over & David W. Green - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (3):682-684.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37.  30
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  38.  15
    Special Issue On: Dual Process Theories of Human Thought: The Debate. [REVIEW]Laura Macchi, David Over & Riccardo Viale - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):1-2.
    This is an excerpt from the contentThere has been increasing interest in recent years in dual process theories of human thought. This special issue of Mind and Society reflects this interest, some criticisms of these theories, and the major topics that have been discussed and debated as a result. There is the basic topic of how the postulated dual processes should be defined in the first place. Do these processes have essential defining features that can be distinguished from less central (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39.  29
    Explicit Representations in Hypothetical Thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.
    Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  35
    Ecological Issues: A Reply to Todd, Fiddick, & Krauss.David E. Over - 2000 - Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):385 – 388.
  41.  22
    Conditional Truth: Comment on Byrne and Johnson-Laird.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):5.
  42.  13
    The Logic of Natural Sampling.David E. Over - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):277-277.
    Barbey & Sloman (B&S) relegate the logical rule of the excluded middle to a footnote. But this logical rule is necessary for natural sampling. Making the rule explicit in a logical tree can make a problem easier to solve. Examples are given of uses of the rule that are non-constructive and not reducible to a domain-specific module.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. The Mind Bursary.Frank Cioffi Obscurantism, G. A. Equality, Keith Graham, Peter Carruthers, Cynthia MacDonald, Paul Snowden, Howard Robinson, David Over, Paul Guyer & Ralph Walker - 1990 - Mind 99:394.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  7
    Feature Centrality and Property Induction.Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Steven Sloman, Rosemary Stevenson & David Over - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (1):45-74.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  2
    A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.David E. Over - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (3):357-363.
  46.  11
    Deduction and Degrees of Belief.David Over - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361-362.
  47.  23
    Reaching a Decision: A Reply to Oaksford.David W. Green & David E. Over - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):187-192.
    In his commentary, Oaksford makes two main claims: (1) that the externalisation method used by Green, Over, and Pyne (1997) enforces the correlation observed between probability estimates and selection, and (2) that these estimates support the prediction of a downward revision of P(p) when P(p) > P(q). In this reply, we rebut claim 1 by describing the instructions more comprehensively, and claim 2 by reiterating the importance of making certain theoretical distinctions which Oaksford does not make. Our interest is the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  13
    The Rationality of Evolutionary Psychology.David E. Over - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press. pp. 187--207.
  49.  99
    Whole Mind Theory: Massive Modularity Meets Dual Processes.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.
  50.  18
    Dual Frames for Causal Induction: The Normative and the Heuristic.Ikuko Hattori, Masasi Hattori, David E. Over, Tatsuji Takahashi & Jean Baratgin - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):292-317.
    Causal induction in the real world often has to be quick and efficient as well as accurate. We propose that people use two different frames to achieve these goals. The A-frame consists of heuristic processes that presuppose rarity and can detect causally relevant factors quickly. The B-frame consists of analytic processes that can be highly accurate in detecting actual causes. Our dual frame theory implies that several factors affect whether people use the A-frame or the B-frame in causal induction: among (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 56