At the beginning of The Principles of Literary Criticism I. A. Richards complained of the chaos of critical theories—a complaint that we hear pretty often, generally from theorists about to add to it, each making his small contribution. Richards' own contribution was a plan for reckoning the merit of poetry in terms of the more or less organised psychological state that it serves to induce in its readers: for poetry, he held, organises our ‘attitudes’—a term that may be taken in (...) different ways. The theoretical picture that Richards connects with it, a vivid enough picture in its way, is of a kind of stock exchange of neural impulses; but perhaps in his practical criticism the word reverts to its ordinary sense. And surely the practical criticism, not the neurological speculation, is what has served to keep Richards' work alive. This is the aspect, at least, to which I shall confine my attention here; my concern is with the use of these and similar concepts in the practical business of criticism. For here we have critical approach, a technique and an orientation, that has in point of fact increasingly established itself. And the fact is one, surely, that aesthetics cannot ignore; a general theory should take notice of practice. But if this is only to add still more to the notorious chaos, I cannot see any alternative course short of abandoning the subject altogether; and that alternative, at least for those who are instinctive theorists and generalisers, is an impossible one. (shrink)

D. Pole, whose Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein appeared in 1958, here makes a new attack on the problem of value-judgement by taking it out of its limited ethical context. Beginning with an examination and criticism of current views that base all moral and other principles on personal choice or decision, he finds a point of departure for his own account of the problem in the claim that rational inquiry of any sort rests on the possibility of evaluation. The place of (...) the one process within the other is then worked out in some detail; and an attempt is made to show how inquiry, as a collective undertaking, involves the progressive search for and establishment of new principles. (shrink)

D. Pole, whose Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein appeared in 1958, here makes a new attack on the problem of value-judgement by taking it out of its limited ethical context. Beginning with an examination and criticism of current views that base all moral and other principles on personal choice or decision, he finds a point of departure for his own account of the problem in the claim that rational inquiry of any sort rests on the possibility of evaluation. The place of (...) the one process within the other is then worked out in some detail; and an attempt is made to show how inquiry, as a collective undertaking, involves the progressive search for and establishment of new principles. (shrink)

“The pattern is new,” T. S. Eliot has written, “at every moment”: for our past and the history of our culture forms a pattern for us, and each new step that we take implies a revaluation of all that has gone before. Professional philosophers are no longer much given to sayings of this sort; they leave it to poets to make them. Yet surely if these words apply anywhere they apply to the history of Philosophy. A new philosophy or a (...) new position in Philosophy, genuinely new, involves the adoption of different categories, a new orientation; it involves the re-writing of its history and a changed outlook on a whole landscape of problems. The perspective is altered, we find; the masses re-group themselves and the relations fall differently into place. (shrink)

'David Pole, in his The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, makes an admirable attempt to clarify the central points of Wittgenstein's philosophy in a straightforward manner. He approaches it from the outside with sympathy and good sense. And since he combines a clear head with a fluent style of writing – a combination that is rare among the initiated – his book will prove an excellent introduction for those who need a succinct account of Wittgenstein's later philosophy without any mystical overtones.' (...) - The Economist 'There is now a real need for a commentary on what must in frankness be admitted to be an exceedingly difficult corpus of philosophy. Mr Pole's little book is a response to that need; if small in bulk, it is rich in ideas... and all students of Wittgenstein will turn to it with gratitude.' - Sunday Times. (shrink)

David Pole; II*—The Excellence of Form in Works of Art, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 13–40, https://doi.org/1.

David Pole; II*—The Excellence of Form in Works of Art, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 13–40, https://doi.org/1.

The work of artists is to make works of art, and of theorists theoretical works. In our ordinary dealings with such things, elusive as ontologists may find them, we seem to know well enough in either instance how we should regard and handle them. Ontological questions are none the less raised: what species of entity may they be? It is a question, I confess, to which I could never respond with much enthusiasm. My own interest in art is more ordinary; (...) I care about paintings and poems, about what serves to make them good or bad, about how we should look at or read them. Yet it may prove after all that the two issues are not wholly unrelated. (shrink)

“The pattern is new,” T. S. Eliot has written, “at every moment”: for our past and the history of our culture forms a pattern for us, and each new step that we take implies a revaluation of all that has gone before. Professional philosophers are no longer much given to sayings of this sort; they leave it to poets to make them. Yet surely if these words apply anywhere they apply to the history of Philosophy. A new philosophy or a (...) new position in Philosophy, genuinely new, involves the adoption of different categories, a new orientation; it involves the re-writing of its history and a changed outlook on a whole landscape of problems. The perspective is altered, we find; the masses re-group themselves and the relations fall differently into place. (shrink)

David Pole; VII—On Practical Reason and Benevolence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 June 1968, Pages 129–144, https://doi.org/10.