In this paper, I reply to Sharon Street’s objection against quasi-realism, according to which this theory is subject to a problem of unexplained coincidence between the normative truths and our evaluative attitudes. I argue that this problem cannot be applied to quasi-realism because the necessary element for it to be applied is missing in this theory: an ontological commitment towards robust normative entities. This lack of commitment allows quasi-realists to argue for a minimalist conception of normative truths, and to escape (...) the scope of the problem of unexplained coincidence. (shrink)

Michael Ridge’s Impassioned Belief is part of an important new wave in metaethics: hybrid theories. Ridge is a pioneer of hybrid expressivism; his own version is called “ecumenical expressivism.” His book is not only a collection of papers published in the last ten years. It covers more topics, and he also proposes some important improvements to his theory. Ridge’s work is an expansive one; in this review I shall limit myself to present what I consider to be the most important (...) aspects of Ridge’s book.Ridge’s thesis is, in a sense, quite simple: normative judgments express hybrid mental states. According to Ridge, hybrid theories are in better position to explain what looks like both belief-like and desire-like features of normative judgments; these features are responsible for what Ridge calls the Janus-faced aspect of normative judgments. Normative judgments have belief-like features in the sense that it is possible to know that p is wrong, that we can believe that p is wrong, etc. An .. (shrink)

Julia Markovits’ Moral Reason is a defense of internalism about moral reasons and a desire-based account of reasons for action. Even though she defends this position, she does not consider herself committed to relativism and to a desire-based understanding of what reasons there are. Indeed, it is crucial to make a distinction between two kinds of inquiry about reasons for action. On one side, we find “analytic inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons are. On the other, we (...) find “substantive inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons there are (pp. 1–11). According to Markovits, a desire-based defense on the analytic side does not imply a desire-based defense on the substantive side.Internalism and externalism are the most prominent views about reasons for action. Markovits understands internalism as the theory according to which what reasons we have do depend fundamentally on what ends we already have. On the other hand, externalism is understood as the theory acco .. (shrink)