When is it right to go to war? The most persuasive answer to this question has always been 'in self-defense'. In a penetrating new analysis, bringing together moral philosophy, political science, and law, David Rodin shows what's wrong with this answer. He proposes a comprehensive new theory of the right of self-defense which resolves many of the perplexing questions that have dogged both jurists and moral philosophers. By applying the theory of self-defense to international relations, Rodin produces a far-reaching critique (...) of the canonical Just War theory. The simple analogy between self-defense and national defense - between the individual and the state - needs to be fundamentally rethought, and with it many of the basic elements of international law and the ethics of international relations. (shrink)

When is it right to go to war? The most persuasive answer to this question has always been 'in self-defense'. In a penetrating new analysis, bringing together moral philosophy, political science, and law, David Rodin shows what's wrong with this answer. He proposes a comprehensive new theory of the right of self-defense which resolves many of the perplexing questions that have dogged both jurists and moral philosophers. By applying the theory of self-defense to international relations, Rodin produces a far-reaching critique (...) of the canonical Just War theory. The simple analogy between self-defense and national defense - between the individual and the state - needs to be fundamentally rethought, and with it many of the basic elements of international law and the ethics of international relations. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a general explanatory model of the liability and lesser evil justifications of harm. Despite their respective provenance in consequentialist and deontological ethics, both justifications are, at root, rich forms of the proportionality relationship between a shared set of underlying normative variables. The nature of the proportionality relationship, and the conditions under which it operates, differ between the two forms of justification. The article explores these differences in detail and the implications they have for the justification (...) of self-defense and war. (shrink)

Can a soldier be held responsible for fighting in a war that is illegal or unjust? The chapters in the book both challenge and defend many deeply held assumptions: about the liability of soldiers for crimes of aggression, about the nature and justifiability of terrorism, about the relationship between law and morality.

This article provides an explanatory account of a central class of moral rights; their normative grounding, the conditions for their possession and forfeiture, and their moral stringency. It argues that interpersonal rights against harm and rights to assistance are best understood as arising from reciprocity relations between moral agents. The account has significant advantages compared with rivals such as the interest theory of rights. By explaining the differential enforceability of rights against harm and rights to assistance, the reciprocity theory helps (...) to refute an argument made by Cecile Fabre that the poor may have a justification for engaging in war against the affluent to compel them to fulfil their duties of assistance to the poor. (shrink)

Important moral dilemmas arise in the context of what I have called jus terminatio and Darrel Moellendorf has called jus ex bello—the norms governing the termination of war. I discuss three dilemmas, showing how they also illuminate proportionality and jus ad bellum: morally accounting for new costs that arise during the course of a war; two variants of the “sunk-cost dilemma” in which an agent is permitted to contribute to a project that is all things considered morally unjust, when that (...) project is morally justified on a forward-looking basis; and the problem of moral hazard in peace negotiations. (shrink)

This essay attempts to develop a new theoretical model for business ethics distinct from the two canonical business‐ethics theories, the stakeholder theory and the shareholder value theory. Milton Friedman argued that because managers are agents of the company's owners, their sole moral responsibility is to maximize owner returns. Thomas Pogge has recently suggested that such a view involves a kind of moral incoherence and that we should reject the efficacy of social arrangements like the principal‐agent relationship in altering moral obligations. (...) Both views fail to give proper account of the dispersal of moral responsibilities in business contexts. We must distinguish “minimal moral obligations” (stemming from justice and rights) from “maximal moral obligations” (stemming from all other moral considerations, including duties of aid, beneficence, and the virtues). Minimal obligations apply to all persons, but maximal obligations can be effected by social arrangements like the owner‐manager relationship. There may be moral obligations incumbent on owners that do not apply to managers. Understanding this distribution of responsibilities enables us to develop a new and attractive model of business ethics––“the ownership model”––which places greater emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of the owners of business than has been traditional in business ethics. (shrink)

Is a nation ever justified in attacking before it has been attacked? If so, under precisely what conditions? This volume of new, specially commissioned chapters provides the most definitive assessment to date of the justifiability of preemptive or preventive military action.

In "The Ethics of America's Afghan War," Richard W. Miller argues that reflecting on whether and how to end the war in Afghanistan exposes serious deficiencies in just war theory. I agree, though for different reasons than those canvassed by Professor Miller.

This chapter presents a rights-based explanation of self-defence. A right of defence exists when a subject is at liberty to defend a certain good by performing an action that would otherwise be impermissible. The moral justification for this liberty invokes three considerations: an appropriate normative relation exists between the subject and the end of the right, consisting of either of a right to, or a duty of care towards the good protected; the defensive act is a proportionate, necessary response to (...) an imminent threat of harm; and the object of defensive force has an appropriate degree of normative responsibility for, and the subject is innocent of, the harm threatened. (shrink)

Hohfeld treats liberties as a normative relation between three elements: subject, content, and object. This chapter develops a working explanatory model of defensive rights by adding to these three elements a so-called end of a defensive right, defined as the good or value which a defensive action is intended to preserve or protect. Two of three legs that constitute the justification of self-defence are explored: those that revolve around the relationship between subject and the end of the right, and those (...) that concern the relationship between the content and the end of the right. (shrink)

This chapter presents the third and final leg of a model of defensive rights discussed in the preceding chapter. It explores the ‘moral asymmetry’ problem between defender and aggressor — why the defender is justified in killing an aggressor but not vice versa. It presents specific objections to the initially promising account of self-defence as a forced choice. It argues that an explanation of self-defence cannot be found in the realm of reduced responsibility and necessity. When one kills in self-defence, (...) one is responsible for one’s killing; if the act escapes condemnation, then it must be because killing is, in the circumstances, rightful. (shrink)

This chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that a detailed analysis of the concepts of self-defence and national-defence can help identify and prevent the abuse of these concepts by politicians. By locating the conditions which can justify military action, we can identify the forms of military action which are, if not perfectly justified, close to being just compared to others. The need to rethink for traditional conceptions of international law and international ethics is also (...) raised. (shrink)

I doubt that geostrategic considerations can play the role in moral assessment that Richard Miller believes they do. But the phenomena he is pointing to do illuminate important defects in traditional just war theory.

This introductory chapter discusses the rationale behind the arguments on self-defence presented this volume, specifically, self-defence as a moral response to war and aggression. It is argued that a coherent explanation of self-defence can be constructed around the idea of personal rights. However, the attempt to build a justification for war on the conception of self-defence faces significant obstacles and ultimately fails.

This chapter explores the concept of the right of national self-defence. National self-defence is conceived in international law as a right — a consideration capable of asserting normative force against the consequentialist requirements such as those of peace and security. By locating the notion of national-defence within a framework of ideas generated in the context of personal defensive rights, the Just War Theorist can show how a state’s military action in defending its own sovereign power can be morally justified.

One way to tell the story of contemporary ethics of war is as a gradual expansion of the period of time to which theorists attend in relation to war, from ad bellum and in bello to post bellum and ex bello. Ned Dobos, in his new book, Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, invites us to expand this attention further to the period between wars, which he calls jus ante bellum. In this essay, I explore two significant implications of this shift (...) in normative focus. First, I argue that it opens up an important and productive field of the ethics of military policy-making outside of conflict, including procurement, training, force posture, and military diplomacy. Second, I argue that attending to the relationship between ante bellum and ad bellum considerations contains the seeds of a powerful pacifist argument. (shrink)

This chapter explores the logical structure of rights and the right of self-defence. Drawing on jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s theory of rights, it argues that self-defence is a justification, a feature which explains why a normally prohibited act becomes either not impermissible or is a positive good. The justification of self-defence consists in a simple Hohfeldian liberty to commit homicide. The exceptional nature of the liberty together with its recurring and readily identifiable nature enables it to function as a genuine (...) right within legal and moral normative systems. (shrink)

This chapter examines the right to national-defence where there is no right of personal self-defence; and that the right of national-defence, if it is a genuine right, cannot be grounded in the end of defending the lives of individuals. It is argued that the reductive strategy cannot provide a moral vindication of the right of national-defence. Although all acts of aggression involve at least conditional threats against the lives or central rights of persons, there is no general right to resist (...) conditional threats against the central rights of persons with lethal force. (shrink)

This chapter examines the suggestion that national-defence is a right held by states and is principally grounded in the end of defending the common life of the community, rather than the lives of individual citizens. It argues that grounding national self-defence in an account of the value of common life is as problematic as the attempt to ground it in the end of protecting individual persons. National-defence cannot be reduced to a collective application of personal rights of self-defence, nor explained (...) as a state-held right analogous to personal self-defence. (shrink)

This chapter argues that military action against an aggressive state may be justified as a form of law enforcement rather than self-defence. The establishment of something like a minimal universal state is needed for such a justification to be effective. It is also argued that the justification of any form of military action requires a moral explanation of why the soldiers against whom one fights are appropriate objects of violence.

This collection by leading scholars represents state of the art writings on the ethics of war. Many of the most important and contested controversies in modern war receive comprehensive discussion: the practice of torture, terrorism, assassination and targeted killing, the bombing of civilians in war, humanitarian intervention, and the invasion of Iraq Analytical introduction provides a guide to recent developments in the ethics of war An excellent overview for general readers interested in the current debate and controversies over the ethics (...) of war. (shrink)

The Ethics of War traces how different cultures involved in present conflicts have addressed problems over the centuries. Distinguished authors reflect how the Greco-Roman world, Byzantium, the Christian just war tradition, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and the Geneva Conventions have addressed recurrent ethical issues of war. Cutting edge essays by prominent modern theorists address vital contemporary issues including asymmetric war, preventive war, human rights and humanitarian intervention.