6 found
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  1.  30
    The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  2. The Biological Basis of Subjectivity: A Hypothesis.David Rudrauf & Antonio Damasio - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 423-464.
  3. The Paradoxes of Subjectivity and the Projective Structure of Consciousness.Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf & Gregory Landini - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--321.
     
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  4.  8
    The Effect of Meditation on Regulation of Internal Body States.Sahib S. Khalsa, David Rudrauf, Richard J. Davidson & Daniel Tranel - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  5.  18
    Against Neo-Cartesianism: Neurofunctional Resilience and Animal Pain.Phil Halper, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf & Perry N. Fuchs - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):474-501.
    Several influential philosophers and scientists have advanced a framework, often called Neo-Cartesianism (NC), according to which animal suffering is merely apparent. Drawing upon contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind, Neo-Cartesians challenge the mainstream position we shall call Evolutionary Continuity (EC), the view that humans are on a nonhierarchical continuum with other species and are thus not likely to be unique in consciously experiencing negative pain affect. We argue that some Neo-Cartesians have misconstrued the underlying science or tendentiously appropriated controversial views (...)
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  6.  17
    The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness: A Case of Mistaken Identity.Bjorn Merker, Kenneth Williford & David Rudrauf - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-72.
    Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi, by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range (...)
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