While much literature has sprouted on peer review, this is the first book-length, wide-ranging study that utilizes methods and resources of contemporary philosophy. It covers the tension between peer review and the liberal notion that truth emerges when ideas proliferate in the marketplace of ideas; arguments for and against blind review of submissions; the alleged conservatism of peer review; the anomalous nature of book reviewing; the status of non-peer-reviewed publications; and the future of peer review.

A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In this paper I (...) first argue that such versions of foundationalism end up giving their approval to circular chains and are therefore unmotivated; if circular chains are acceptable, the classic regress argument for foundationalism does not go through. I then consider and reject two other ways in which the foundationalist might motivate his position. At the end of the paper I draw from this discussion a moral concerning the airns of epistemological theorizing. (shrink)

Anyone who labors at academic scholarship knows vividly—perhaps even painfully—how dependent that enterprise is on a system of peer review. A scholar submits a work to a journal, press, or conference committee, or sends a proposal to a foundation; the submission is then evaluated by other professionals. The judgment of these referees determines whether the work is published by the target journal or press, appears on the conference program, or is funded by the desired institution. In many fields the overwhelming (...) majority of submissions are rejected. Careers are thus often made or destroyed by the process. (shrink)

One of the most salient features of epistemology in the past two decades—in fact, perhaps the most salient—is the explosion of literature on how higher-order evidence impacts the rationality of one’s first-order beliefs. Higher-order evidence is, primarily, evidence about what one’s evidence supports. An important concept in the debate is epistemic akrasia. Roughly, the akrates believes: “p, but my evidence does not support p.” Criticisms of epistemic akrasia have focused on certain sorts of mundane examples. They have generally scanted the (...) role that akrasia plays in large classical epistemological issues concerning “Grand Epistemic Narratives,” notably skepticism and relativism. Additionally, akrasia may enter into the enterprise of revisionary metaphysics; and, finally, into the practice of philosophers who hold beliefs in the face of wide peer disagreement. This paper thus illustrates the relevance of epistemic akrasia to important philosophical issues. It leaves us, moreover, with a significant measure of puzzlement. (shrink)

The doctrine that God hardens some agents’ hearts generates philosophical perplexities. Why would God deprive someone of free will and the opportunity to repent? Or is God’s interference compatible with the agent’s free will and his having an opportunity to repent? In this paper, I examine how two Jewish philosophers, Moses Maimonides and Joseph Albo, handled these questions. I analyze six approaches growing out of their writings and argue that a naturalistic interpretation of hardening --- as irreversible habituation --- has (...) advantages over alternative approaches. This account of hardening, however, fits best with the thesis that God does sometimes intervene to improve an agent’s will. (shrink)

From young children, with their guileless, searching questions, to the recently bereaved, trying to make sense of tragic loss, humans wrestle with our relationship to God--and with God's essence, motivations, and power--throughout our lives: Why does God permit catastrophe and senseless tragedy, again and again? Is God's power limited in any way? Can He change the past? Does He know the future? Why does God require prayer? Why does He not provide stronger evidence of His presence? Whom does God consign (...) to hell, and why? Does God change? Suffer? What can we make of the conflicting diversity within world religions, of the many gods of different religious traditions? Such questions engage, confront, and perplex us on a daily basis. In this rich, concise volume, leading philosophers who have long pondered God's nature and ways take on these core problems and present their findings in a manner likely to engage believer and non-believer, general reader and specialist alike. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume present carefully crafted and often creative interpretations of major Jewish texts and thinkers, as well as original treatments of significant issues in Jewish theology and ethics. Conversant with both Jewish philosophy and the methods and literature of analytic philosophy, the author frequently seeks to bring them into dialogue, and in addition taps the philosophical dimensions of Jewish law.. The book opens with a philosophical analysis of biblical narratives. It then investigates the relationship between Judaism (...) and general culture as conceived by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, followed by interpretations of Maimonides' moral theory and his views on human perfection. The remainder of the volume examines both critically and constructively the relationship between religious anthropology and theories of providence; the problem of evil; the challenges that neuroscience poses to religion; law and morality in Judaism; theological dimensions of 9/11; the limits of altruism; concepts of autonomy in Jewish medical ethics; and the epistemology of religious belief. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to James Keller 's criticisms of my Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Levels Gambit.Foundationalists have often claimed that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles in a mediate, empirical fashion, while escaping the charge of vicious circularity that is usually thought to afflict such methods of justification. In my original paper I attacked this foundationalist strategy; I argued that once mediate, empirical justification of epistemic principles is allowed, the foundationalist must also allow (...) circular patterns of justification of the sort that he typically criticizes coherentists for espousing. Here I argue that Keller 's reply only makes matters worse for the foundationalist. At several points, his reply turns out to be inconsistent either with reliabilism or with the foundationalist strategy he is trying to defend. (shrink)

The doctrine that God hardens some agents’ hearts generates philosophical perplexities. Why would God deprive someone of free will and the opportunity to repent? Or is God’s interference compatible with the agent’s free will and his having an opportunity to repent? In this paper, I examine how two Jewish philosophers, Moses Maimonides and Joseph Albo, handled these questions. I analyze six approaches growing out of their writings and argue that a naturalistic interpretation of hardening --- as irreversible habituation --- has (...) advantages over alternative approaches. This account of hardening, however, fits best with the thesis that God does sometimes intervene to improve an agent’s will. (shrink)