Private detectives and deception as official work -- Building believable lies -- Justifying work-related deceptions -- The shadow world of unofficial deception -- Subterranean education and training -- Deception as social currency -- Goofing off and getting along -- The everyday ethics of workplace lies -- Appreciating deception in thinking about organizations.

In order to make Mukund Lath’s thoughts on music and identity accessible to a broader audience, and to call attention to links between Hindustānī musical theory and classical Indian philosophical notions, Lath’s paper “Identity Through Necessary Change: Thinking About ‘Rāga-Bhāva,’ Concepts and Characters” is being republished here with an introduction by David Shulman and explanatory notes. Mukund Lath argues that identity is usually understood as something that remains the same despite change. His endeavor is to explore an alternative to this (...) convention. The case study for Lath’s philosophical exploration is rāga music, i.e. Hindustānī classical music. He argues that the identity of the rāga is maintained not despite change, but owing to the necessary change in every execution of “the same” rāga. But how are we to even start thinking about a notion of identity that embraces rather than rejects change, a notion of identity that is based on and is rooted in change, not in stability or perpetuity? Lath explores this alternative and its consequences for the notion of identity at large. (shrink)

In the years since its twin publication in 2001 and 2003 , Textures of Time has attracted a great deal more attention outside the United States than in the American academy. This, we suggest, is because its ideas and approach are rather at odds with the dominant trends in the area of “postcolonial studies.” In this response to three critical essays that engage with the book—by Rama Mantena, Sheldon Pollock, and Christopher Chekuri—we begin by setting out our principal hypotheses as (...) well as the evidentiary structure of the book, which draws mostly on vernacular materials from South India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The former includes the claim that South India between roughly 1600 and 1800 possessed considerable and diverse historiographical traditions, though these histories came couched in a variety of genres, rendering them difficult for the uninitiated to recognize at first; the latter requires us to develop the significance of the concepts of “texture” as well as of “subgeneric markers” that help distinguish texts with a historical intention from those that are nonhistorical but have the same generic location. Our response then goes on to discuss why theoretical or sastric texts in India do not themselves explicitly theorize the distinctions we make. Here, we posit a contrast between “embedded” and “explicated” concepts in the “emic” sphere, suggesting that “texture” belongs to the first category. We explicitly distinguish our views from the poststructuralist language adopted by Pollock in his critique of Textures, and the more predictable postcolonial vision of Chekuri. We once more emphasize the need to take the vernacular historiography seriously, and to refine our reading practices, rather than overly depending on normative materials in Sanskrit, or on a prefabricated theoretical schema that derives from a stylized view of the nature of the transformations produced by colonial rule. (shrink)

In the years since its twin publication in 2001 and 2003, Textures of Time has attracted a great deal more attention outside the United States than in the American academy. This, we suggest, is because its ideas and approach are rather at odds with the dominant trends in the area of “postcolonial studies.” In this response to three critical essays that engage with the book—by Rama Mantena, Sheldon Pollock, and Christopher Chekuri—we begin by setting out our principal hypotheses as well (...) as the evidentiary structure of the book, which draws mostly on vernacular materials from South India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The former includes the claim that South India between roughly 1600 and 1800 possessed considerable and diverse historiographical traditions, though these histories came couched in a variety of genres, rendering them difficult for the uninitiated to recognize at first; the latter requires us to develop the significance of the concepts of “texture” as well as of “subgeneric markers” that help distinguish texts with a historical intention from those that are nonhistorical but have the same generic location. Our response then goes on to discuss why theoretical or sastric texts in India do not themselves explicitly theorize the distinctions we make. Here, we posit a contrast between “embedded” and “explicated” concepts in the “emic” sphere, suggesting that “texture” belongs to the first category. We explicitly distinguish our views from the poststructuralist language adopted by Pollock in his critique of Textures, and the more predictable postcolonial vision of Chekuri. We once more emphasize the need to take the vernacular historiography seriously, and to refine our reading practices, rather than overly depending on normative materials in Sanskrit, or on a prefabricated theoretical schema that derives from a stylized view of the nature of the transformations produced by colonial rule. (shrink)

A non-ad hoc, general theory of anthropic reasoning can be constructed based on Bostrom's Strong Self-Sampling Assumption that we should reason as if the current moment of our life were a randomly selected member of some appropriate reference class of observer-moments. We do not need to use anything other than standard conditionalization of a hypothetical prior based upon the SSSA in order to estimate probabilities. But we need to make the SSSA precise. We specify exactly what is and what is (...) not an observer, how to choose a reference class and how to select a prior probability distribution that can be used when selecting randomly from the reference class. There are both collective Dutch Book and relative frequency arguments in favor of our rules for choosing priors and reference classes. In order to handle examples like Bostrom's Lazy Adam scenario, a causal anthropic decision theory is developed. (shrink)

When reasoning about self-locating belief, one should reason as if one were a randomly selected bit of information. This principle can be considered to be an application of Bostrom's Strong Self-Sampling Assumption\cite{Bostrom} according to which one should reason as if one were a randomly selected element of some suitable reference class of observer-moments. The reference class is the class of all observer-moments. In order to randomly select an observer-moment from the reference class, one first randomly chooses a possible world $w$ (...) and then selects an observer-moment $z$ from world $w$. The probability that one selects $z$ given that one has chosen $w$ should be proportional to the amount of information that $z$ is capable of representing. There are both wagering arguments and relative frequency arguments that support our theory of anthropic reasoning. Our theory works best when the amount of information represented is finite. The infinite case is represented as a limit of a finite cases. We can learn from experience how best to represent the infinite case as a limit of finite cases and also learn from experience whether our theory or some other theory is the superior theory of anthropic reasoning. In order to test which theory is best, we use standard Bayesian methodology: We just need prior probabilities for the theories that are being tested and then we only have to use Bayes' rule. (shrink)

Sanskrit poeticians make the visionary faculty of pratibhā a necessary part of the professional poet’s make-up. The term has a pre-history in Bhartṛhari’s linguistic metaphysics, where it is used to explain the unitary perception of meaning. This essay examines the relation between pratibhā and possible theories of the imagination, with a focus on three unusual theoreticians—Rājaśekhara, Kuntaka, and Jagannātha Paṇḍita. Rājaśekhara offers an analysis of pratibhā that is heavily interactive, requiring the discerning presence of the bhāvaka listener or critic; he (...) also positions pratibhā in relation to Bildung (vyutpatti) and practice. For Kuntaka, pratibhā, never an ex nihilo creation by a poet, serves as the basis for the peculiar forms of intensified insight and experience that constitute poetry; these may also involve the creative scrambling and re-articulation of the object in terms of its systemic composition. At times, Kuntaka’s pratibhā comes close to a strong notion of imaginative process. But the full-fledged thematization of the imagination, and of pratibhā as its support and mechanism, is best seen in the seventeenth-century debates preserved for us by Jagannātha. A link is suggested between the discourse of poetic imagination in Jagannātha and similar themes that turn up in Indo-Persian poets such as Bedil. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall provide a simple argument for the thirder analysis of the usual version of Sleeping Beauty\c and the hslfer analysis of a bare-bones version of the scenario. This argument depends upon a calculation of relative frequencies when the Sleeping Beauty experiment is repeated, but it is crucial that we be dealing with independent repetitions of the same experiment. The versions of repeated Sleeping Beauty discussed in the literature violate the independence requirement.

In sixteenth-century South India, the notion of the imagination was strongly thematized as perhaps the defining aspect of the human mind. We examine one striking example, an allegorical play called the Bhāvanā-puruṣottama by Ratnakheta Srinivasa Dīkṣita. Here we see a king searching frantically for his own imagination, the young woman Bhāvanā with whom he is in love, while she, for her part, is absorbed in the uneven and rather frustrating processes of imagining him. The two lovers could be said mutually (...) to determine one another’s existence. On the other hand, imagination, for this poet, is not a matter of discovering something new but of perceiving something that is already there and, by perceiving it, enhancing or intensifying its presence and its activity. At the same time, the imagination focuses on singularities, however elusive: in this period, the general faculty of imagination has become a highly personal matter. (shrink)