42 found
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  1.  20
    (1 other version)Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) - 2003 - Ashgate.
    Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Contributors -- Preface -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility -- Chapter 2 Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities -- Chapter 3 Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities -- Chapter 4 In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing -- Chapter 5 Responsibility, Indeterminism and Frankfurt-style Cases: A Reply to (...)
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  2. (1 other version)Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  3.  87
    Frankfurt on 'Ought implies Can' and alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):222.
  4. Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions.David Widerker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):113-118.
    Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt’s well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent’s decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer’s argument has consequently led various philosophers to develop libertarian accounts of freedom which try to dispense with the avoidability constraint (...)
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  5.  82
    Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.David Widerker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.
  6. Fischer against the dilemma defence: the defence prevails.David Widerker & Stewart Goetz - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):283-295.
    In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...)
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  7.  33
    (1 other version)On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.
  8.  82
    Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 53--73.
  9.  38
    Farewell to the Direct Argument.David Widerker - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316.
  10. A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
    Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main (...)
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  11. On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2015 - In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 94-115.
    Abstract -/- Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situation is a matter of (...)
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  12. (1 other version)Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further look.David Widerker - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202.
  13.  22
    Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
  14. In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):1-14.
    Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have (...)
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  15. A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.
    In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.
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  16.  85
    Blameworthiness, non-robust alternatives, and the principle of alternative expectations.David Widerker - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.
  17. Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examples.David Widerker - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
  18. The Direct Argument and the burden of proof.Ira M. Schnall & David Widerker - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):25-36.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.
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  19.  26
    (1 other version)``Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge".Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
  20. Avoidability And Libertarianism: A Response To Fischer.David Widerker - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 39:95-102.
  21.  55
    Agent-Causation and Control.David Widerker - 2005 - Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  22.  19
    Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility.David Widerker - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):98.
  23.  40
    The extensionality argument.David Widerker - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):457-468.
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  24.  77
    A problem for the eternity solution.David Widerker - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2):87-95.
  25.  56
    Two fallacious objections to Adams' soft/hard fact distinction.David Widerker - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):103 - 107.
  26. Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest (...)
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  27. Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom.David Widerker - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):242-254.
  28. Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft facts.David Widerker - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue (...)
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  29. Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) - 2002 - Ashgate Press.
     
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  30.  97
    Zimmerman on Moral Responsibility, Obligation and Alternate Possibilities.David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):285 - 287.
  31.  83
    (1 other version)The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall - 2014 - In David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall (eds.), David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106. pp. 88-106.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, Seth Shabo, Michael (...)
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  32.  30
    A note on Sharvy.David Widerker - 1973 - Philosophia 3 (4):449-452.
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  33. Action sentences.David Widerker - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (2):269 - 291.
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  34.  18
    Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism.David Widerker - 1992 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1):95-100.
    Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist (...)
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  35.  43
    Contra Snapshot Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2):95 - 102.
    Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction (...)
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  36. ``Contra Snapshot Ockhamism".David Widerker - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39:95-102.
     
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  37.  53
    Davidson on singular causal sentences.David Widerker - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (3):223 - 242.
  38. David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106.David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall - 2014
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  39.  48
    Epistemic opacity again.David Widerker - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.
  40.  28
    In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action Individuation.David Widerker - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (3):281-288.
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  41.  41
    Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem Remains.David Widerker - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):333-345.
    Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. (...)
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  42.  19
    Zimmerman on moral responsibility, obligation and alternate possibilities.David Widerker & Alonso Church - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):285-287.
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