51 found
Order:
See also
Profile: David Widerker (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan)
  1. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2003 - Ashgate.
    This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   42 citations  
  2. Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
  3. Fischer Against the Dilemma Defence: The Defence Prevails.David Widerker & Stewart Goetz - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):283-295.
    In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  4. A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.
    In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2015 - In Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 94-115.
    Abstract -/- Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situation is a matter of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.David Widerker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.
  7.  56
    Farewell to the Direct Argument.David Widerker - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316.
  8. Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):222 - 224.
  9.  43
    Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions.David Widerker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):113-118.
    Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt’s well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent’s decision to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer’s argument has consequently led various philosophers to develop libertarian accounts of freedom which try to dispense with the avoidability constraint on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  10. The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof.Ira M. Schnall & David Widerker - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):25-36.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. On an Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (January):37-41.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  12.  46
    Blameworthiness, Non-Robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations.David Widerker - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.
  13. Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look.David Widerker - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  14.  88
    A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
    Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  15.  36
    Metaphilosophy and Free Will.Yakir Levin, David Widerker & Richard Double - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):630.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  21
    Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 53--73.
  17. Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples.David Widerker - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  18.  70
    Agent-Causation and Control.David Widerker - 2005 - Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  19.  24
    The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall - 2014 - In David Palmer (ed.), David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106. Oxford University Press. pp. 88-106.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, Seth Shabo, Michael (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  36
    Avoidability And Libertarianism: A Response To Fischer.David Widerker - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 39:95-102.
  21.  72
    Zimmerman on Moral Responsibility, Obligation and Alternate Possibilities.David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):285 - 287.
  22. Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) - 2003 - Ashgate.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23.  36
    A Problem for the Eternity Solution.David Widerker - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2):87-95.
  24.  13
    The Extensionality Argument.David Widerker - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):457-468.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25.  1
    Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):222.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26.  51
    Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):462-480.
  27.  85
    Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts.David Widerker - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) - 2003
  29. In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  33
    Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.David Widerker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  1
    On an Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  51
    Action Sentences.David Widerker - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (2):269 - 291.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  24
    Two Fallacious Objections to Adams' Soft/Hard Fact Distinction.David Widerker - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):103 - 107.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  27
    Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom.David Widerker - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):242-254.
  35.  17
    Davidson on Singular Causal Sentences.David Widerker - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (3):223 - 242.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  3
    Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann.David Widerker - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):242-254.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  1
    ``Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge&Quot.Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
  38. Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  5
    Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look.David Widerker - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):181-201.
  40.  22
    Contra Snapshot Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2):95 - 102.
    Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  6
    Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility by Bernard Berofsky. [REVIEW]David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):98-104.
  42.  8
    Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism.David Widerker - 1992 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 43:95-100.
    Recently, Colin McGinn has argued that Kripke's Cartesian argument against the mind-body identity thesis is not effective against anomalous monism. This paper attempts to show that the Cartesian has at his disposal an argument that is stronger than that formulated by Kripke, and one that cannot be rebutted by the anomalous monist in the way suggested by McGinn. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to the sort of identity theory one would have to subscribe to in order to resist (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  18
    Epistemic Opacity Again.David Widerker - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.
  44.  6
    In Defense of Davidson's Identity Thesis Regarding Action Individuation.David Widerker - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (3):281-288.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  12
    A Note on Sharvy.David Widerker - 1973 - Philosophia 3 (4):449-452.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  2
    Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
  47. Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.) - 2002 - Ashgate Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Avoidability and Libertarianism: A Response to Fischer.David Widerker & Charlotte Katzoff - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):415-421.
    Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: Fischer’s first response is unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; the version of libertarianism (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. ``Contra Snapshot Ockhamism&Quot.David Widerker - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39:95-102.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. David Palmer (Ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 88-106.David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall - 2014
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 51