O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

Following the manuscript's discovery in 1864, scholars have widely assumed that De Jure Praedae (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty) was written by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) in the period 1604–1606. Yet the conventional dating fails to consider the materiality of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library. By analyzing paper supplies, this article throws new light on the date and manner of the manuscript's composition. The watermarks in the paper, the quire divisions and (...) foliation are considered in combination with relevant textual evidence, such as manuscript references to historical events and any allusions to Ms. BPL 917 in Grotius’ letters and other archival sources. This approach has yielded unforeseen results. Yes, Grotius wrote out the original text in 1604/05, as a fair copy of a previously existing work. Yet he did not stop there. Entire folio-pages were crossed out in Ms. BPL 917 and new ones inserted in the following sequence: - in, or shortly before, January 1607, Grotius deleted f. 63v and 67r and inserted f. 64–66 - between January 1607 and Nov–Dec. 1608, he deleted f. 7v, 19r, 38v, and 43r-v and inserted f. 8–9, 18, and 39–42 - in November–December 1608, he deleted f. 119r–122r and inserted f. 117–118. These revisions were a direct response to the challenges faced by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in this period. Its growing empire in Southeast Asia was under threat from the peace and truce negotiations between the States General and Philip III of Spain and Portugal. Grotius’ revisions of Ms. BPL 917, along with chapter twelve's appearance as Mare Liberum in April 1609, justified the continuation of Dutch empire-building in the East Indies, the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) notwithstanding. Grotius’ rights and contract theories made it perfectly acceptable to conclude a peace or truce in (Western) Europe, yet persist in colonial warfare beyond the Line (i.e. the Tropic of Cancer). In this respect – the (implicit) differentiation between ‘the West and the rest’ in international relations – Grotius’ legacy is still with us today. (shrink)

The possible Stoic origins of the natural rights and natural law theories of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) has been a subject of scholarly debate in recent years. Yet discussions about Grotian sociability tend to focus exclusively on the meaning of appetitus societatis in De Jure Praedae (written in 1604–1608) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), with little reference to the historical context. Insufficient consideration has been given to the intended audience(s) of these works, Grotius’ (...) purpose in writing them, and the possible correlation between his overarching argument and his working methods. This article examines Grotius’ use and abuse of Seneca's philosophical works in De Jure Praedae, commissioned by the directors of the Dutch East India Company (or VOC) in autumn 1604. The brutal murder of Sebald de Weert on the island of Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) in June 1603 is analyzed from a Stoic perspective in Chapter 15 of De Jure Praedae. Following his refusal to hand over Portuguese prisoners, De Weert and his crew were butchered on the beach of Batticaloa by Wilama Dharma Suriya, the ruler of the island's interior. Grotius blamed the victim. VOC commanders in monsoon Asia should suppress any residual loyalty which they might feel towards Christendom. It was imperative to conclude alliances with native rulers against the Iberian colonial powers, regardless of the rulers’ (lack of) faith or their horrific treatment of prisoners. As Grotius noted in Chapter 8 of De Jure Praedae, Seneca distinguished between “two kinds of commonwealth, the world state and the city state.” Spanish and Portuguese violations of the natural law – freedom of trade and navigation in particular – deserved condign punishment for the sake of both the fellowship of mankind and, naturally, the VOC and Dutch Republic. In assessing the uses of Stoicism in De Jure Praedae, much can be learned from the physical characteristics of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library, its sole surviving manuscript copy. Seneca's philosophical works are not cited at all in the original text of Ms. BPL 917, which Grotius copied out in 1604–1605. Instead, quotations from De Ira, De Clementia and De Beneficiis appear in the top and bottom margins of folio-pages or on inserted sheets of paper, which can be dated to 1607–1608. These quotations serve to flesh out an existing argument about the VOC's just war(s) in the East Indies. A case in point is the heavily rewritten Chapter 2. Grotius added quotations from De Clementia at the same time as he reformulated two natural laws on f. 8–9, a folio sheet inserted in or after January 1607. This was no coincidence. Revenging the past misdeeds of the Portuguese, which Grotius had described in great detail in Chapter 11, could no longer be considered the main or only priority of the VOC. Instead, Grotius contended on f. 8–9 that “evil deeds must be corrected” so as to achieve, in Seneca's words, “universal security.” Acting as a kind of global police force, the VOC should punish transgressors of the natural law on account of “that world community” envisioned by the Stoics. The practical consequences were felt during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621). Despite a cessation of arms in Europe, the VOC continued to engage in hostilities in the East Indies. The author of De Jure Praedae supported the Company on this. Like Cicero before him, he had successfully harnessed the Stoa to the cause of empire. (shrink)

Following the manuscript's discovery in 1864, scholars have widely assumed that De Jure Praedae was written by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius in the period 1604–1606. Yet the conventional dating fails to consider the materiality of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library. By analyzing paper supplies, this article throws new light on the date and manner of the manuscript's composition. The watermarks in the paper, the quire divisions and foliation are considered in combination with relevant textual evidence, (...) such as manuscript references to historical events and any allusions to Ms. BPL 917 in Grotius’ letters and other archival sources. This approach has yielded unforeseen results. Yes, Grotius wrote out the original text in 1604/05, as a fair copy of a previously existing work. Yet he did not stop there. Entire folio-pages were crossed out in Ms. BPL 917 and new ones inserted in the following sequence:- in, or shortly before, January 1607, Grotius deleted f. 63v and 67r and inserted f. 64–66- between January 1607 and Nov–Dec. 1608, he deleted f. 7v, 19r, 38v, and 43r-v and inserted f. 8–9, 18, and 39–42- in November–December 1608, he deleted f. 119r–122r and inserted f. 117–118.These revisions were a direct response to the challenges faced by the Dutch East India Company in this period. Its growing empire in Southeast Asia was under threat from the peace and truce negotiations between the States General and Philip III of Spain and Portugal. Grotius’ revisions of Ms. BPL 917, along with chapter twelve's appearance as Mare Liberum in April 1609, justified the continuation of Dutch empire-building in the East Indies, the Twelve Years’ Truce notwithstanding. Grotius’ rights and contract theories made it perfectly acceptable to conclude a peace or truce in Europe, yet persist in colonial warfare beyond the Line . In this respect – the differentiation between ‘the West and the rest’ in international relations – Grotius’ legacy is still with us today. (shrink)

Following the manuscript's discovery in 1864, scholars have widely assumed that De Jure Praedae (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty) was written by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) in the period 1604–1606. Yet the conventional dating fails to consider the materiality of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library. By analyzing paper supplies, this article throws new light on the date and manner of the manuscript's composition. The watermarks in the paper, the quire divisions and (...) foliation are considered in combination with relevant textual evidence, such as manuscript references to historical events and any allusions to Ms. BPL 917 in Grotius’ letters and other archival sources. This approach has yielded unforeseen results. Yes, Grotius wrote out the original text in 1604/05, as a fair copy of a previously existing work. Yet he did not stop there. Entire folio-pages were crossed out in Ms. BPL 917 and new ones inserted in the following sequence: - in, or shortly before, January 1607, Grotius deleted f. 63v and 67r and inserted f. 64–66 - between January 1607 and Nov–Dec. 1608, he deleted f. 7v, 19r, 38v, and 43r-v and inserted f. 8–9, 18, and 39–42 - in November–December 1608, he deleted f. 119r–122r and inserted f. 117–118. These revisions were a direct response to the challenges faced by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in this period. Its growing empire in Southeast Asia was under threat from the peace and truce negotiations between the States General and Philip III of Spain and Portugal. Grotius’ revisions of Ms. BPL 917, along with chapter twelve's appearance as Mare Liberum in April 1609, justified the continuation of Dutch empire-building in the East Indies, the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) notwithstanding. Grotius’ rights and contract theories made it perfectly acceptable to conclude a peace or truce in (Western) Europe, yet persist in colonial warfare beyond the Line (i.e. the Tropic of Cancer). In this respect – the (implicit) differentiation between ‘the West and the rest’ in international relations – Grotius’ legacy is still with us today. (shrink)

The possible Stoic origins of the natural rights and natural law theories of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius has been a subject of scholarly debate in recent years. Yet discussions about Grotian sociability tend to focus exclusively on the meaning of appetitus societatis in De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pacis , with little reference to the historical context. Insufficient consideration has been given to the intended audience of these works, Grotius’ purpose in writing them, (...) and the possible correlation between his overarching argument and his working methods. This article examines Grotius’ use and abuse of Seneca's philosophical works in De Jure Praedae, commissioned by the directors of the Dutch East India Company in autumn 1604.The brutal murder of Sebald de Weert on the island of Ceylon in June 1603 is analyzed from a Stoic perspective in Chapter 15 of De Jure Praedae. Following his refusal to hand over Portuguese prisoners, De Weert and his crew were butchered on the beach of Batticaloa by Wilama Dharma Suriya, the ruler of the island's interior. Grotius blamed the victim. VOC commanders in monsoon Asia should suppress any residual loyalty which they might feel towards Christendom. It was imperative to conclude alliances with native rulers against the Iberian colonial powers, regardless of the rulers’ faith or their horrific treatment of prisoners. As Grotius noted in Chapter 8 of De Jure Praedae, Seneca distinguished between “two kinds of commonwealth, the world state and the city state.” Spanish and Portuguese violations of the natural law – freedom of trade and navigation in particular – deserved condign punishment for the sake of both the fellowship of mankind and, naturally, the VOC and Dutch Republic.In assessing the uses of Stoicism in De Jure Praedae, much can be learned from the physical characteristics of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library, its sole surviving manuscript copy. Seneca's philosophical works are not cited at all in the original text of Ms. BPL 917, which Grotius copied out in 1604–1605. Instead, quotations from De Ira, De Clementia and De Beneficiis appear in the top and bottom margins of folio-pages or on inserted sheets of paper, which can be dated to 1607–1608. These quotations serve to flesh out an existing argument about the VOC's just war in the East Indies. A case in point is the heavily rewritten Chapter 2. Grotius added quotations from De Clementia at the same time as he reformulated two natural laws on f. 8–9, a folio sheet inserted in or after January 1607. This was no coincidence. Revenging the past misdeeds of the Portuguese, which Grotius had described in great detail in Chapter 11, could no longer be considered the main or only priority of the VOC. Instead, Grotius contended on f. 8–9 that “evil deeds must be corrected” so as to achieve, in Seneca's words, “universal security.” Acting as a kind of global police force, the VOC should punish transgressors of the natural law on account of “that world community” envisioned by the Stoics. The practical consequences were felt during the Twelve Years Truce . Despite a cessation of arms in Europe, the VOC continued to engage in hostilities in the East Indies. The author of De Jure Praedae supported the Company on this. Like Cicero before him, he had successfully harnessed the Stoa to the cause of empire. (shrink)

The possible Stoic origins of the natural rights and natural law theories of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) has been a subject of scholarly debate in recent years. Yet discussions about Grotian sociability tend to focus exclusively on the meaning of appetitus societatis in De Jure Praedae (written in 1604–1608) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), with little reference to the historical context. Insufficient consideration has been given to the intended audience(s) of these works, Grotius’ (...) purpose in writing them, and the possible correlation between his overarching argument and his working methods. This article examines Grotius’ use and abuse of Seneca's philosophical works in De Jure Praedae, commissioned by the directors of the Dutch East India Company (or VOC) in autumn 1604. The brutal murder of Sebald de Weert on the island of Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) in June 1603 is analyzed from a Stoic perspective in Chapter 15 of De Jure Praedae. Following his refusal to hand over Portuguese prisoners, De Weert and his crew were butchered on the beach of Batticaloa by Wilama Dharma Suriya, the ruler of the island's interior. Grotius blamed the victim. VOC commanders in monsoon Asia should suppress any residual loyalty which they might feel towards Christendom. It was imperative to conclude alliances with native rulers against the Iberian colonial powers, regardless of the rulers’ (lack of) faith or their horrific treatment of prisoners. As Grotius noted in Chapter 8 of De Jure Praedae, Seneca distinguished between “two kinds of commonwealth, the world state and the city state.” Spanish and Portuguese violations of the natural law – freedom of trade and navigation in particular – deserved condign punishment for the sake of both the fellowship of mankind and, naturally, the VOC and Dutch Republic. In assessing the uses of Stoicism in De Jure Praedae, much can be learned from the physical characteristics of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library, its sole surviving manuscript copy. Seneca's philosophical works are not cited at all in the original text of Ms. BPL 917, which Grotius copied out in 1604–1605. Instead, quotations from De Ira, De Clementia and De Beneficiis appear in the top and bottom margins of folio-pages or on inserted sheets of paper, which can be dated to 1607–1608. These quotations serve to flesh out an existing argument about the VOC's just war(s) in the East Indies. A case in point is the heavily rewritten Chapter 2. Grotius added quotations from De Clementia at the same time as he reformulated two natural laws on f. 8–9, a folio sheet inserted in or after January 1607. This was no coincidence. Revenging the past misdeeds of the Portuguese, which Grotius had described in great detail in Chapter 11, could no longer be considered the main or only priority of the VOC. Instead, Grotius contended on f. 8–9 that “evil deeds must be corrected” so as to achieve, in Seneca's words, “universal security.” Acting as a kind of global police force, the VOC should punish transgressors of the natural law on account of “that world community” envisioned by the Stoics. The practical consequences were felt during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621). Despite a cessation of arms in Europe, the VOC continued to engage in hostilities in the East Indies. The author of De Jure Praedae supported the Company on this. Like Cicero before him, he had successfully harnessed the Stoa to the cause of empire. (shrink)

The theory of justice that Hugo Grotius developed in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace, 1625) set itself against a certain reading of Aristotle, according to which justice is conceived of as a mean between taking too much and taking too little. I argue that we can best understand the implications of Grotius' mature conception by considering the ends to which he had deployed this Aristotelian notion in his earlier work. Grotius came to perceive (...) that his earlier understanding of justice too easily ruled out the sorts of humanitarian concerns that could have a moderating effect. (shrink)

Roman property law and Roman contract law as well as the property centered Roman ethics put forth by Cicero in several of his works were the traditions Grotius drew upon in developing his natural rights system. While both the medieval just war tradition and Grotius's immediate political context deserve scholarly attention and constitute important influences on Grotius's natural law tenets, it is a Roman tradition of subjective legal remedies and of just war which lays claim to a foundational role with (...) regard to his conception of subjective natural rights. Grotius made use of Roman law and Roman ethics in order to submit a normative case for a rights-based just war in the East Indies. His conception of a law of nature was originally conceived to apply a theory of compensatory justice to the high seas of Southeast Asia, envisaged as a natural state lacking political authority. Eventually, however, this argument was to reveal its anti-absolutist implications, and contributed—by virtue of its applicability to individuals, private entities and commonwealths alike—to the emergence of a rights-based constitutionalism. This article discusses Grotius's early treatise De iure praedae commentarius and its offshoot Mare liberum, which already contained an inchoate version of subjective natural rights, as well as the elaborate natural rights doctrine which can be found in Grotius's early Theses LVI and in the Defensio capitis quinti maris liberi, a defense of the fifth chapter of Mare liberum, written around 1615 and directed against the Scottish jurist William Welwod's attack on Mare liberum. (shrink)

The present article explores the historical sections of Grotius's De iure praedae Commentarius bearing the following fundamental but very important questions in mind: What did Grotius actually know about the Portuguese Estado da Índia at the time of drafting the treatise between 1604 and 1606/8? What did he know about the Luso-Asian trading regime or Asian trading practices at large? Using the published correspondence of Grotius, archival documentation, manuscript fragments as well as unpublished reading notes and drafts, a (...) case will be made that he had in fact few sources at his fingertips. This insight serves fundamentally to refute older assumptions, expounded notably by Robert Fruin and C.H. Alexandrowicz, that the young Grotius conducted independent research in the VOC company archives, or had immersed himself with Asian maritime codes or commercial practices. (shrink)

A travers la métaphore du " Narcisse " du Caravage, l'auteur nous retrace les dérives de la culture visuelle et numérique contemporaine, en nous livrant les principales matrices philosophiques, sociales et métapolitiques de l'" occidentalo-scopie ", à savoir le mental scopique de l'Occident hypermoderne, dans lequel s'est opéré depuis la Renaissance jusqu'à nos jours une vaste mutation du "regardant" collectif et individuel. Selon l'auteur, il s'agit bien ici de la grimace du regard "occidental" contemporain, à savoir l'image spéculaire et déformante (...) qui a de la sorte aliéné et soumis l'ensemble de l'épistémè de la modernité occidentale à une pulsion scopique généralisée. (shrink)

In the present volume, the significance of judgment for the understanding and evaluation of the interpretandum is analyzed. It is a complex endeavor in which existing forms of interpretation are examined and improved from the standpoint of the current state of research. Subjective interpretative approaches are corrected by recourse to a commonly understood truth and are judged from the standpoint of the commitment and consensus of scholars. Even if a work or an interpretandum has been understood and interpreted differently and (...) pluralistically, this does not mean that all presented and existing interpretations are equally valid, acceptable, and defensible. Therefore, it is important and necessary in any process of understanding to strive for a proper assessment of the work or interpretandum. The contributions are from the conference held at the University of Zadar, Relevance of Hermeneutic Judgment. (shrink)

The article challenges the first premise of?speculative realism?, according to which, with Kant, the contact with the outside world was lost. Instead, it will be shown that the possibility of realism received its major impulse from two grand figures of German Idealism, from Kant as a precursor of the Romantic period and from Hegel as its, albeit critical, philosophical culmination. Based on three possible relations of knowledge to its outside, three ontologies will be distinguished, the ontology of immediacy, stretching from (...) rationalists to the last empiricists, Kant?s ontology of totalization, and, finally, Hegel?s?ontology of release? or?de-totalization?. As opposed to Descartes?s thing being constantly doubted in its existence, as opposed to Malebranche?s occasion being invariably induced by God, as opposed to Leibniz?s monad being an immediate embodiment of an idea, as opposed to Berkeley?s object vanishing when not perceived, and as opposed to Hume?s world lacking necessity, Kant philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of ideas produced by God and outside the constancy of the human gaze. Kant secured the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs and procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel?s absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. It was not until Hegel?s logic of indifference of the notion to its immediate content that an egress of the circle of Kant?s totalization was made possible. nema. (shrink)

As an alternative to speculative realism, this book claims that realism is not a stance that became impossible with Kant but instead represents a concomitant phenomenon of modern reason, however obscure. The realist stance can be claimed only at the precarious pinnacle of the dialectic of totalization and release, where the overarching activity of the subject switches into a mode of de-totalizing release of the world from the constraints of consciousness and language.

Estrategias de comprensión integral del proceso salud/enfermedad: aportes desde la perspectiva de vivienda saludable.

Hegels Theorie des äußeren Staatsrechts in seinen "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" weist ausdrücklich Kants Idee eines Völkerbundes in der Schrift "Zum ewigen Frieden" als unrealistisch zurück; es gebe "keinen Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und auch diese nur zufälligerweise." Beide Konzepte – die Unausweichlichkeit auch gewaltsamer Konfrontationen der Staaten bei Hegel, die Möglichkeit ihrer rechtlichen Integration bei Kant – bilden den Gegenstand dieses Buchs. In den Beiträgen des Bandes geht es nicht nur um die Rekonstruktion der Theorien (...) Hegels und Kants, sondern auch um ihr Weiterdenken unter den heutigen Bedingungen der Globalisierung und asymmetrischer Kriege. Mit Beiträgen von: Samir Arnautovic, Andreas Arndt, Werner Becker, Hans-Georg Bensch, Paul Cruysberghs, Kazimir Drilo, Walter Jaeschke, Jean-François Kervegan, Heinz Kimmerle, Igor Mikecin, Vladimir Milisavljevic, Zvonko Posavec, Vahidin Preljevic, Andrzej Przylebski, Davor Rodin, Leo Šešerko und Jure Zovko. (shrink)

In seiner Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes hat Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel die Grundlagen einer Anthropologie und Psychologie entwickelt, die den Menschen im Blick auf Vernunft und Freiheit bestimmt. Was auf den ersten Blick hoffnungslos antiquiert zu sein scheint, gewinnt Brisanz und Aktualität dadurch, dass Hegel seine Auffassung in eindringlichen Auseinandersetzungen mit scheinbar widersprechenden Phänomenen begründet und den subjektiven Geist im Zusammenhang seiner natürlichen, gesellschaftlichen sowie geschichtlichen Bestimmtheit reflektiert. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes gehen auf eine Tagung zurück, welche von der (...) Hegel-Gesellschaft Zadar in Verbindung mit der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft e.V. vom 23. bis 27. Februar 2011 an der Universität Zadar organisiert wurde. Auf der Grundlage einer historischen und systematischen Rekonstruktion der Hegelschen Anthropologie und Psychologie wird Hegels Konzept auch im Blick auf aktuelle philosophische Problematiken diskutiert, um Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes in ihrer thematischen Vielfalt für die gegenwärtigen Diskussionen zu erschließen. (shrink)

Schlegels Theorie des Verstehens nimmt Grundgedanken der modernen philosophischen Hermeneutik vorweg. Entwickelt hat Schlegel seine 'hermeneutische Kritik' im Anschluss an die Textkritik und Hermeneutik der damaligen Altertumswissenschaft (F. A. Wolf). Mit seiner 'hermeneutischen Kritik' werden der kunstlerische Schaffensprozess und der Existenzvollzug des Menschen sowie die positive Rolle des Nichtverstehens thematisiert - Aspekte, die nicht ohne Nachwirkung auf die postromantische Entwicklung der Hermeneutik geblieben sind.

Staat und Kultur treten erst zu Hegels Lebzeiten in ein Verhaltnis, das spater mit dem Begriff Kulturstaat bezeichnet werden wird. Auch gebraucht Hegel den Terminus Kultur, den Herder gerade erst im modernen Sinne gepragt hatte, so gut wie nicht. Dennoch gehort Hegel zweifellos zu denjenigen Denkern, die das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kultur der Sache nach verhandelt und neu bestimmt haben. Grundlage hierfur ist sein Begriff des Geistes, der alle Merkmale des modernen Kulturbegriffs in sich schliesst: die Umformung der Natur, (...) die Gesellschaftlichkeit und die Geschichtlichkeit. Der Staat ist zentrales Element des geistigen Prozesses und daher selbst Bestandteil von Kultur, aber nach Hegel auch deren elementare Voraussetzung. Hierdurch ist das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kultur bei Hegel hoch komplex gestaltet und mitunter im Einzelnen auch schwer zu bestimmen und spannungsreich.". (shrink)

Concept and interpretation are key philosophical terms that have played a major part in shaping modern thinking from the beginning of the modern age through post-modernity. The papers in this volume examine the historical dimensions of concept and interpretation as an approach, method, and thinking process, and also inquire critically about their relevance today, thereby taking general inventory of thinking in the modern age.

At the heart of Hegel s Aesthetics is the idea of the beautiful as unity. This unity turns fragile once the mind's self-awareness becomes conceptual and extends beyond sensory illusion. Focusing the philosophy of art on the idea of the beautiful raises a set of systematic problems, which are discussed with regard to Hegel s Aesthetics, its historical contexts, and its reception.".

Standardisation is increasingly seen as a means to insert ethics in innovation processes. We examine the institutionalisation of responsible innovation in de jure standardisation as this is an important but unexplored research area. In de jure standardisation, stakeholders collaborate in committees to develop standards. We adopt the anticipation, inclusion, reflexivity, and responsiveness responsible innovation framework as our theoretical lens. Our study suggests that responsible standardisation processes should embody forms of these four dimensions. We investigate the institutionalisation of these (...) dimensions and identify 96 factors that can motivate, hinder, or facilitate responsible standardisation. Factors were found through in-depth interviews with managers of a standard developing organisation. These are subsequently validated/rejected using surveys completed by committee representatives. The results suggest that the social desirability of standards is not self-evident. This study could pave the way for future research on responsible standardisation processes, complementing research on legitimacy, responsible innovation, and standardisation. (shrink)

Das "Hegel-Jahrbuch" ist das Jahrbuch der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft. die 1953 von Wilhelm Raimund Beyer in Nürnberg gegründet wurde. Es erscheint seit 1961und wurde bis 1984 von W. R. Beyer, seither vom jeweils amtierenden Vorstand der Gesellschaft herausgegeben. Seit 1994 erscheint das Jahrbuch im Akademie Verlag. Es dokumentiert die Beiträge der Internationalen Hegel-Kongresse, die alle zwei Jahre zu wechselnden Schwerpunktthemen stattfinden.

A drastic resolution of the quantum paradoxes is proposed, combining (I) von Neumann's postulate that collapse of the state vector is due to the act of observation, and (II) my reinterpretation of von Neumann's quantal irreversibility as an equivalence between wave retardation and entropy increase, both being “factlike” rather than “lawlike” (Mehlberg). This entails a coupling of the two de jure symmetries between (I) retarded and (II) advanced waves, and between Aristotle's information as (I) learning and (II) willing awareness. (...) Symmetric acceptance of cognizance as a source of retarted waves, and of will as a sink of advanced waves, is submitted as a central “paradox” of the Copernican or Einsteinian sort, out of which new light is shed upon previously known paradoxes, such as the EPR paradox, Schrödinger's cat, and Wigner's friend. Parapsychology is thus found to creep into the picture. (shrink)

Recent work has brought to prominence the idea that some utterances contain occurrences of noun phrases that not only corefer, but do so in a particularly guaranteed or explicit way—call such occurrences ‘de jure coreferential’. Studies of de jure coreference have considered both the characteristics of the relation, and its explanation. Pinillos (154(2):301–324, 2011) argues that de jure coreference is non-transitive, and uses this as part of his argument for a new semantic primitive explaining de jure (...) coreference. In this paper, I draw attention to a neglected distinction between de jure coreference and another kind of coreference with which it might easily be confused. I then consider Pinillos’s claim that de jure coreference is non-transitive, and conclude that even using Pinillos’s definition of de jure coreference, it is far from straightforward that he has demonstrated the non-transitivity of de jure coreference. I question whether Pinillos’s characterisation of de jure coreference is adequate, and offer a plausible alternative characterisation. I show that on this new characterisation, there is no evidence that the relation is non-transitive. (shrink)

Soames thinks the dependencies show up in the semantics if they are generated by variable binding. That will only partially overlap with Pinillos's ambitions for the notion of de jure codesignation. This chapter contributes towards 'domesticating' the kind of predicates that fans of de jure codesignation are friendly to, that is, making them seem less alien and somewhat less 'magical'. It surveys a novel kind of semantic structure that has been posited by Mark Richard, Kit Fine, Ángel Pinillos, (...) and others. It focuses on anaphora, especially cases that cannot be handled by a 'bound‐variable' analysis, and distinguishes our target view from other treatments of anaphora. The chapter discusses the semantics of attitude reports and discusses two kinds of complex anaphoric dependency. It explains a difference in how functions in a programming language can be sensitive to the identity of their operands. (shrink)