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  1. (1 other version)Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.
    In ethics, aesthetics and increasingly in epistemology, a distinction is drawn between thick and thin evaluative concepts. A common characterisation of the distinction is that thin concepts have only evaluative content, whereas thick concepts combine evaluative and descriptive content. Because of this combination, it is again commonly thought that thick concepts have various distinctive powers including the power to undermine the distinction between fact and value. This paper discusses the accuracy of this view of the thick concepts debate, as well (...)
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  2. (1 other version)Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold : As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available arguments establish, or indeed (...)
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  3. Shapelessness and the thick.Debbie Roberts - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
    This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are, I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical) holism and particularism. Nonreductivists are also committed to the claim (...)
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  4. Depending on the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):197-220.
    The claim that the normative depends on the non-normative is just as entrenched in metanormative theory as the claim that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. It is widely held to be a genuine truism, a conceptual truth that operates as a constraint on competence with normative concepts. Call it the dependence constraint. I argue that this status is unwarranted. While it is true that the normative is dependent, it is not a genuine truism, or a conceptual truth, that it (...)
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  5. Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of Mathematics.Debbie Roberts - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
  6. 'It's evaluation, only thicker'.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
  7. Thick epistemic concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  8.  66
    On Eklund on Foot.Debbie Roberts - unknown
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  9. It's Evaluation, Only Thicker.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. Constructivism in Practical Philosophy By James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):814-816.
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  11. 'The Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalism and the Fact-Value Distinction'.Debbie Roberts - 2018 - In Neil Sinclair (ed.), The Naturalistic Fallacy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
  12.  66
    Value, reality, and desire – by Graham Oddie.Debbie Roberts - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):118-122.
  13. 10. George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness (pp. 675-680). [REVIEW]Debbie Roberts, Tom Dougherty, Ian Carter, Anna Stilz & David Shoemaker - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3).
     
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  14.  54
    Review: Pekka Väyrynen, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics. [REVIEW]Debbie Roberts - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):910-915,.
  15.  43
    Väyrynen, Pekka. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 288. $49.95. [REVIEW]Debbie Roberts - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):910-915.