While there is no denying the relevance of ethical knowledge and analytical and cognitive skills in ethics consultation, such knowledge and skills can be overemphasized. They can be effectively put into practice only by an ethics consultant, who has a broad range of other skills, including interpretive and communicative capacities as well as the capacity effectively to address the psychosocial needs of patients, family members, and healthcare professionals in the context of an ethics consultation case. In this paper, I discuss (...) how emotion can play an important interpretive role in clinical ethics consultation and why attention to the role of defense mechanisms can be helpful. I concentrate on defense mechanisms, arguing first, that the presence of these mechanisms is understandable given the emotional stresses and communicative occlusions that occur between the families of patients and critical care professionals in the circumstances of critical care; second, that identifying these mechanisms is essential for interpreting and managing how these factors influence the way that the “facts” of the case are understood by family members; and, third, that effectively addressing these mechanisms is an important component for effectively doing ethics consultation. Recognizing defense mechanisms, understanding how and why they operate, and knowing how to deal with these defense mechanisms when they pose problems for communication or decision making are thus essential prerequisites for effective ethics consultation, especially in critical care. (shrink)

This study's objective is to explore the psychological defense mechanisms of Ukrainian service members as a regulatory system for personality stabilization that influences combat mission effectiveness. The study was carried out during 2019–2020. The respondents were 270 military personnel of the ground forces, who had gained experience in the Anti-Terrorist Operation hostilities in the East of Ukraine in 2017–2020. We used psychodiagnostic methods such as the Lifestyle Index by Plutchik, Kellerman, and Conte; Lazarus’s Coping Test; and Leontiev’s Meaningful (...) Life Orientations Test. Our work confirmed our research hypothesis that psychological defense mechanisms as part of the regulatory system of personality stabilization predetermine the effectiveness of the combat missions performed by military personnel of special branches. Military psychologists can use the results during their official training (psychological training and psycho-corrective measures) in order to acquire among the troops the required effectiveness in combat. Defense mechanisms will also contribute to the observance of military ethics, not least when faced with military immorality on the part of adversaries. (shrink)

: In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as falling along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the relationship with other people and with one’s own environment, to (...) defend one’s own self-describability and, indissolubly, the solidity of one’s own self-conscious being. At a social and collective level, on the other hand, the individual self-protective structures are supported by cultural interventions that organize and intersubjectively “domesticate” our subjectivity and our feeling of being-there. Keywords: Autobiographical Reasoning; Defense Mechanisms; Grief; Narrative Identity; Ontological Insecurity Meccanismi di difesa: dall’individuale al collettivo Riassunto: L’articolo si occupa di costruzione e difesa dell’identità soggettiva come tema all’intersezione di psicologia e antropologia. In questa prospettiva, i meccanismi di difesa si dispongono lungo uno spettro che dal livello individuale conduce a quello collettivo. La mente individuale è la sfera delle difese intrapsichiche e delle manovre interpersonali a cui ognuno di noi fa ricorso, nella relazione con gli altri e col proprio ambiente, per difendere la propria autodescrivibilità e, inscindibilmente, la solidità del proprio essere autocosciente. Al livello sociale e collettivo, invece, le strutture autoprotettive dell’individuo sono sorrette da interventi culturali che organizzano e “addomesticano” intersoggettivamente la nostra soggettività e il nostro sentirci esistere. Parole chiave: Ragionamento autobiografico; Meccanismi di difesa; Cordoglio; Identità narrativa; Insicurezza ontologica. (shrink)

An immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence. By contrast, an epistemic defense mechanism is defined as a structural feature of a belief system which has the same effect of deflecting arguments and evidence. We discuss the remarkable recurrence of certain patterns of immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms in pseudoscience and other belief (...) systems. Five different types will be distinguished and analyzed, with examples drawn from widely different domains. The difference between immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms is analyzed, and their epistemological status is discussed. Our classification sheds new light on the various ways in which belief systems may achieve invulnerability against empirical evidence and rational criticism, and we propose our analysis as part of an explanation of these belief systems’ enduring appeal and tenacity. (shrink)

The study investigated the extent to which defensive functioning and defense mechanisms predict clinically meaningful symptomatic improvement within brief psychodynamic psychotherapy for recurrent and chronic depression in an inpatient setting. Treatment response was defined as a reduction in symptom severity of 46% or higher from the baseline score on the Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale. A subsample of 41 patients from an RCT was included. For each case, two sessions of brief inpatient psychodynamic psychotherapy were transcribed and then coded (...) using the Defense Mechanism Rating Scales and the Psychotic Defense Mechanism Rating Scales, an additional scale developed to study psychotic defenses. Results showed that defensive functioning and mature and immature defense changed during psychotherapy and predicted treatment response. Patient’s defenses observed throughout therapy also predicted treatment response at 12-month follow-up. The addition of psychotic defenses allows a better prediction of the treatment response. Overall, these results are in line with previous research and provide further validation of defensive functioning as a predictor of outcomes and a mechanism of change in psychotherapy. (shrink)

Identity Processing Style and Defense Mechanisms To investigate relationships between identity processing styles and patterns of defense mechanisms, 213 participants completed measures of defense-mechanism clusters and styles of negotiating identity conflicts and threats. A self-exploratory, informational identity style was associated with defense mechanisms that control anxiety and threats via internal cognitive maneuvers. In contrast, a diffuse-avoidant identity style was found to be related to maladaptive defensive maneuvers including turning against others and turning aggression (...) inward against oneself, which is related to depressive reactions. A foreclosing, normative identity style was associated with defenses that limit awareness of threatening ideas and information by denial, distortion, and negation. None of these relationships was qualified by age or gender. The findings are discussed in terms of a process model of identity development that emphasizes social-cognitive differences in how individuals construct, maintain, and reconstruct their self-identity. (shrink)

Research on cognitive processes has primarily focused on cognitive control and inhibitory processes to the detriment of other psychological processes, such as defense mechanisms, which can be used to modify aggressive impulses as well as self/other images during interpersonal conflicts. First, we conducted an in-depth theoretical analysis of three socio-cognitive models and three psychodynamic models and compared main propositions regarding the source of aggression and processes that influence its enactment. Second, 32 participants completed the Hostile Expectancy Violation Paradigm (...) in which scenarios describe a hostile vs. non-hostile social context followed by a character's ambiguous aversive behavior. The N400 effect to critical words that violate expected hostile vs. non-hostile intent of the behavior was analyzed. Prepotent response inhibition was measured using a Stop Signal task and DMs were assessed with the Defense Style Questionnaire. Results showed that reactive aggression and HIA were not significantly correlated with response inhibition but were significantly positively and negatively correlated with image distorting defense style and adaptive defense style, respectively. The present article has highlighted the importance of integrating socio-cognitive and psychodynamic models to account for the full complexity underlying psychological processes that influence reactive aggressive behavior. (shrink)

This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between psychology/neuroscience research and economics research in attack-and-defense by stipulating relevant literature, clarifying theoretical structures, and suggesting improvements in experimental designs and possible further investigations.

Objectives: Posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms (PTSD) following past trauma could lead to psychological distress. Little is known, however, about the roles of defense mechanisms and alexithymia may play in the process. The current study aimed to examine the potential impact of alexithymia and defense mechanisms on the relationship between past trauma and distress among Chinese university students. Method: 455 university students completed a set of questionnaires: PTSD Checklists for DSM-5, Toronto Alexithymia Scale, Defense Style Questionnaire, (...) and General Health Questionnaire-28. Results: PTSD following past trauma was associated with increased psychological distress. Alexithymia and defenses (especially immature defense) mediated the path between PTSD and psychological co-morbidities. Conclusions: Following past trauma, people developed PTSD and other psychological symptoms. The severity of these distress symptoms was influenced by the way people defended themselves psychologically, as well as their ability to identify, express, and process distressing emotions. (shrink)

This paper argues that the diagnostic import of Adorno's culture industry writings lie in their psychoanalytically rooted claim that contemporary culture is losing its ability to negate and reconfigure experience, due to the modern subject's instrumentalized relationship to culture. Adorno uses psychoanalytic ideas—namely, modified and historicized versions of Freud's theory of the instincts, ego formation, the reality principle, and the superego—to show that changes in the social organization of the psyche, which track the transition from myth to enlightenment, put the (...) ego in a precarious position, torn between a primal fear of nature that drives it to submit to society, and internalized fear of its own internal nature, as well as of losing itself in society. This explains how culture becomes a resource capable of being mobilized by the ego's defense mechanisms of identification and introjection to shore up its own sense of solidity, thereby negating culture's potential for transcendence or transformation. This paper concludes with a coda that suggests that, while rejecting Adorno's metacritique of the reason is not sufficient grounds for rejecting the culture industry, critical theorists like Habermas and Honneth may have other tools at their disposal for contesting its conclusions. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants respond to a multitude of issues, ranging from the cognitive to the emotional. As such, ethics consultants must be prepared to analyze as well as empathize. And yet, there remains a paucity of research and training on the interpersonal and emotional aspects of clinical ethics consultations—the so-called skills in “advanced ethics facilitation.” This article is a contribution to the need for further understanding and practical knowledge in the emotional aspects of ethics consultation. In particular, I draw attention (...) to defense mechanisms: what they are, why they exist, and how we might work with them in the setting of ethics consultation. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrödinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory (...) was that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of the epistemological situation of Quantum Mechanics is the number of interpretations and the many schools of thought, with no consensus on the way to understand the theory. In this article, I introduce a distinction between orthodox interpretations and heterodox interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: the orthodox interpretations preserve all the quantum principles while the heterodox interpretations replace at least one of them. Then, I argue that we have strong empirical and epistemological reasons to prefer (...) orthodox interpretations to heterodox interpretations. The first argument is that all the experiments on the foundations of Quantum Mechanics give a high degree of corroboration to the quantum principles and, consequently, to the orthodox interpretations. The second argument is that the scientific progress needs a consensus: this consensus is impossible with the heterodox interpretations, while it is possible with the orthodox interpretations. Giving the preference to the orthodox interpretations is a reasonable position which could preserve both a consensus on quantum principles and a plurality of views on Quantum Mechanics. (shrink)

Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games (...) of strategy and reveal that (2) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness. This suggests that (3) attack recruits neuroendocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning, and hostile attributions; and that (4) people invest less in attack than defense, and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (5) in intergroup conflict, out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for prosociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts and reduce their waste. (shrink)

Defense of Scientific Hypothesis: From Reproducibility Crisis to Big Data sets out to explain and defend the scientific hypothesis. Alger's mission is to counteract the misinformation and misunderstanding about the hypothesis that even seasoned scientists have concerning its nature and place in modern science. Most biological scientists receive little or no formal training in scientific thinking. Further, the hypothesis is under attack by critics who claim that it is irrelevant to science. In order to appreciate and evaluate scientific controversies (...) like global climate change, vaccine safety, etc., the public first needs to understand the hypothesis. Defense of Scientific Hypothesis begins by describing and analyzing the scientific hypothesis in depth and examining its relationships to various kinds of science. Alger then guides readers through a review of the hypothesis in the context of the Reproducibility Crisis and presents survey data on how scientists perceive and employ hypotheses. He assesses cognitive factors that influence our ability to use the hypothesis and makes practical and policy recommendations for teaching and learning about it. Finally, Alger considers two possible futures of the hypothesis in science as the Big Data revolution looms: in one scenario, the hypothesis is displaced by the Big Data Mindset that forgoes understanding in favor of correlation and prediction. In the other, robotic science incorporates the hypotheses into mechanized laboratories guided by artificial intelligence. But in his illuminating epilogue, Alger envisions a third way, the Centaur Scientist, a symbiotic relationship between human scientists and computers. (shrink)

During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve (...) unique cognitive mechanisms, but none that could not be fully physically implemented. David Chalmers has recently presented a Master Argument to show that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – not just this or that version of it, but any version of it – fails. Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts posited by such theories are either not physicalistically explicable, or they cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to qualia. I argue that it is his Master Argument that fails. My claim is his argument does not provide any new reasons to reject the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. I also argue that, although the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is successful in showing that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy either. (shrink)

In my Racialization: A Defense of the Concept, I argue that ‘race’ fails as an analytic category and that we should think in terms of ‘racialization’ and ‘racialized groups’ instead (Hochman 2019c). I define these concepts and defend them against a range of criticisms. In Rethinking Racialization: The Analytical Limits of Racialization, Deniz Uyan critiques my “theory of racialization” (Uyan 2021). However, I do not defend a theory of racialization; I defend the concept of racialization. I argue that racialization (...) is a useful idea, but I do not advance a theory to explain or predict the phenomena it describes. While Uyan’s critique therefore misses its mark, it raises important questions about the explanatory scope of the racialization concept. Ironically, I may be even more skeptical of the prospects of any general theory of racialization than Uyan. I argue that while we ought to develop theories to explain particular instances of racialization, we should not develop a general theory of racialization, because it is simply too varied in the agents that drive it, their intents, the mechanisms through which it operates, and the outcomes it produces. While hope for any general theory of racialisation should be abandoned, I argue that the racialisation concept is still extremely useful. It offers a necessary alternative to race realist concepts, allowing us to point to the wide-ranging effects of belief in race without falsely implying that race itself is real. Uyan does not focus on my arguments against racial realism. However, the theoretical failures and normative risks of racial realism motivate my defense of the racialization concept. In this paper, I reiterate my arguments against racial realism and offer further defense of the concepts of ‘racialization’ and ‘racialized group’. (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis of methodological mechanism, the claim that to be committed to mechanism is to adopt a certain methodological postulate, i.e. to look for causal pathways for the phenomena of interest. We argue that methodological mechanism incorporates a minimal account of understanding mechanisms, according to which a mechanism just is a causal pathway described in the language of theory. In order to argue for this position we discuss a central example of a biological mechanism, the mechanism (...) of cell death, known as apoptosis. We argue that this example shows that our philosophically deflationary account is sufficient in order to have an illuminating account of mechanisms as the concept is used in biology. (shrink)

In, Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several arguments against this approach. In the present paper we attempt to answer the main (...) questions presented by Arenhart and Krause. We will argue, firstly, that the obstacles presented by them are based on a specific metaphysical stance, which we will characterize in terms of what we call the Orthodox Line of Research. Secondly, that this is not necessarily the only possible line, and that a different one, namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research provides a different perspective in which the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions can be regarded as a valuable prospect that could be used by different interpretations of quantum mechanics. Finally, we provide a set of specific answers to the main problems raised by Arenhart and Krause in order to clarify our line of research as well as the original perspective introduced by the PAQS. (shrink)

Newtonian mechanics has a container conception of space. Space is regarded as an empty receptacle in which all material bodies exist. For a long time, most defenders of this view claimed that it must be mind-dependent. Anton Marty is the first modern philosopher to argue both that physical space is mind-independent and that it has the features characteristic of Newtonian physical space. Moreover, he works out a number of metaphysical implications of this view. Therefore, Marty ought to be given a (...) prominent place in the history of conceptions of space. As shown by Graham Nerlich, a container conception can be defended even after the twentieth-century revolutions in physics. By bringing Marty and Nerlich together, the paper claims that a container conception of space/space-time should even today be taken seriously in the philosophy of physics. (shrink)

The existence of “local implicatures” has been the topic of much recent debate. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this debate by asking what we can learn from three puzzles, namely, the cancellation of such implicatures by or both, their behavior in the complement clauses of negative factive verbs such as sorry, and their behavior in root and embedded questions. Two basic approaches to local implicatures have been advanced: a fully pragmatic account in which local implicatures result (...) from conventional Gricean principles and a semantic account according to which the generation of implicatures is interwoven with compositional, grammatical mechanisms. We argue that the lesson to be learned from our three case studies is that some kind of approach along the latter, grammatical line is necessary to account for the data. (shrink)

Cognitive Penetration holds that cognitive states and processes, specifically propositional attitudes (e.g., beliefs), sometimes directly impact features of perceptual experiences (e.g., the coloring of an object). In contrast, more traditional views hold that propositional attitudes do not directly impact perceptual experiences, but rather are only involved in interpreting or judging these experiences. Understandably, Cognitive Penetration is controversial and has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I focus on defending it from the latter kind of objection and in doing (...) so, highlight important features of Cognitive Penetration mechanisms and effects. I first sketch promising criteria for Cognitive Penetration and then address widespread Replication and Demonstration worries about purported instances of it. Next, I present one of the most compelling Cognitive Penetration studies and address specific objections against it and others. I demonstrate that each of these objections misunderstands important features of either Cognitive Penetration mechanisms or the specific studies to which they are applied. Ultimately, I conclude that multiple key studies are not undermined by these objections and con- tinue to provide support for Cognitive Penetration. Correcting these misunderstandings bolsters empirical support for Cognitive Penetration and contributes to a better understand- ing of the mechanisms involved in perceptual processing. (shrink)

We show that Kubota and Levine’s characterization of the HPSG-based theory of non-constituent coordination proposed in Yatabe Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar, CSLI, Stanford, pp 325–344, 2001) and later works is inaccurate, and that the theory in question does not require any ad hoc mechanisms to account for the long-known fact that right-node raising and left-node raising can affect semantic interpretation. In the course of demonstrating this, we fill in some details of this (...) HPSG-based theory that were left unspecified in the previous literature, and we also present novel accounts of split-antecedent relative clauses and of respectively interpretation that are consistent with the theory. Furthermore, we argue that the phenomenon of summative agreement may provide a reason to prefer this theory over CG-based theories like Kubota and Levine’s. (shrink)

The idea that only complex brains can possess genuine representations is an important element in mainstream philosophical thinking. An alternative view, which I label ‘liberal representationalism’, holds that we should accept the existence of many more full-blown representations, from activity in retinal ganglion cells to the neural states produced by innate releasing mechanisms in cognitively unsophisticated organisms. A promising way of supporting liberal representationalism is to show it to be a consequence of our best naturalistic theories of representation. However, (...) several philosophers and scientists have recently argued against this strategy. In the paper I counter these objections in defense of liberal representationalism. (shrink)

Cognitive Penetration holds that cognitive states and processes, specifically propositional attitudes (e.g., beliefs), sometimes directly impact features of perceptual experiences (e.g., the coloring of an object). In contrast, more traditional views hold that propositional attitudes do not directly impact perceptual experiences, but rather are only involved in interpreting or judging these experiences. Understandably, Cognitive Penetration is controversial and has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I focus on defending it from the latter kind of objection and in doing (...) so, highlight important features of Cognitive Penetration mechanisms and effects. I first sketch promising criteria for Cognitive Penetration and then address widespread Replication and Demonstration worries about purported instances of it. Next, I present one of the most compelling Cognitive Penetration studies and address specific objections against it and others. I demonstrate that each of these objections misunderstands important features of either Cognitive Penetration mechanisms or the specific studies to which they are applied. Ultimately, I conclude that multiple key studies are not undermined by these objections and continue to provide support for Cognitive Penetration. Correcting these misunderstandings bolsters empirical support for Cognitive Penetration and contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms involved in perceptual processing. (shrink)

This book offers a thorough technical elaboration and philosophical defense of an objectivist informational interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which its novel content is located in its kinematical framework, that is, in how the theory describes systems independently of the specifics of their dynamics. -/- It will be of interest to researchers and students in the philosophy of physics and in theoretical physics with an interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Additionally, parts of the book may be (...) used as the basis for courses introducing non-physics majors to quantum mechanics, or for self-study by those outside of the university with an interest in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic (...) naturalized epistemology by refuting Plantinga's replies to two important criticisms of his argument. /// La epistemología naturalizada naturalista combina el naturalismo ontológico con la epistemología naturalizada. El naturalismo ontológico sostiene que no existe nada más que seres espacio-temporales inmersos en un marco espacio-temporal. La epistemología naturalizada sostiene que la naturaleza del conocimiento se caracteriza por su compromiso con el externismo, y la idea de que el conocimiento consiste en creencias generadas de manera confiable mediante mecanismos cognitivos que operan en un entorno adecuado. Alvin Plantinga ha propuesto un muy discutido argumento biológico evolucionista contra la epistemología naturalizada naturalista. En este artículo defiendo esta epistemología refutando las réplicas de Plantinga a dos críticas importantes a su argumento. (shrink)

One central tenet of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis , and the consensus view among biologists until now, is that all genetic mutations occur by “chance” or at “random” with respect to adaptation. However, the discovery of some molecular mechanisms enhancing mutation rate in response to environmental conditions has given rise to discussions among biologists, historians and philosophers of biology about the “chance” vs “directed” character of mutations . In fact, some argue that mutations due to a particular kind of (...) mutator mechanisms challenge the Modern Synthesis because they are produced when and where needed by the organisms concerned. This paper provides a defense of the Modern Synthesis’ consensus view about the chance nature of all genetic mutations by reacting to Jablonka and Lamb’s analysis of genetic mutations and the explicit Lamarckian flavor of their arguments. I argue that biologists can continue to talk about chance mutations according to what I call and define as the notion of “evolutionary chance,” which I claim is the Modern Synthesis’ consensus view and a reformulation of Darwin’s most influential idea of “chance” variation. Advances in molecular genetics are therefore significant but not revolutionary with respect to the Modern Synthesis’ paradigm. (shrink)

Some psychologists aim to secure a role for psychological explanations in understanding contemporary social disparities, a concern that plays out in debates over the relevance of the Implicit Association Test. Meta-analysts disagree about the predictive validity of the IAT and about the importance of implicit attitudes in explaining racial disparities. Here, I use the IAT to articulate and explore one route to establishing the relevance of psychological attitudes with small effects: an appeal to a process of “accumulation” that aggregates small (...) effects into large harms. After characterizing mechanisms of accumulation and considering some candidate examples, I argue that such mechanisms suggest how a contemporary attitude with small effects could figure in the explanation of large disparities, but they do not vindicate the importance of such an attitude since such mechanisms are typically also determined by competing causes. I close by sketching several strategies for advancing a defense of the relevance of attitudes with small effects. (shrink)

Aquinas' first proof for God's existence is usually interpreted as a metaphysical argument immune to any objections coming from empirical science. Connections to Aquinas' own historical understanding of physics and cosmology are ignored or downplayed. Nature and Nature's God proposes a natural philosophical interpretation of Aquinas' argument more sensitive to the broader context of Aquinas' work and yielding a more historically accurate account of the argument. Paradoxically, the book also shows that, on such an interpretation, Aquinas' argument is not only (...) consistent with modern science, but actually confirmed by the history of science, from classical mechanics through 19th century thermodynamics to contemporary cosmology. The first part of the book considers Aquinas' argument in its historical context, exploring the key principles that everything in motion is moved by something else and that an infinite regress of causes is impossible. The structure of the First Way is analyzed and the argument is connected both with Aquinas' Third Way-a new interpretation of which is also proposed-and Aquinas' second proof from motion in the Summa contra Gentiles. To complete the account of what natural philosophy-prior to metaphysics-can demonstrate about God, a chapter on Aquinas' teleological argument (the Fifth Way) is also included. The second part of the book tracks the history of modern science from Copernicus to today, showing how Aquinas' argument fared at each major turn. The first chapter shows how Newton's understanding of inertia and conservation of momentum supports the idea that motion cannot continue forever without God's causality, and integrates a modern understanding of inertia and gravity with the principles of Thomistic natural philosophy. The second chapter considers the first and second laws of thermodynamics, showing how they too support Aquinas' contention that motion cannot continue forever without God's causality. This chapter also discusses statistical mechanics and contemporary cosmology, demonstrating that science continues to support Aquinas' unmoved mover argument. The final chapter turns to modern biology as well as cosmological fine-tuning to show that modern science also continues to support Aquinas' teleological argument. The result is not only a satisfying defense of Aquinas' natural philosophical proofs for God's existence, but a primer on the broader project of integrating Thomistic natural philosophy with modern science. (shrink)

This paper explores some connections between competing conceptions of scientific laws on the one hand, and a problem in the foundations of statistical mechanics on the other. I examine two proposals for understanding the time asymmetry of thermodynamic phenomenal: David Albert's recent proposal and a proposal that I outline based on Hans Reichenbach's “branch systems”. I sketch an argument against the former, and mount a defense of the latter by showing how to accommodate statistical mechanics to recent developments in (...) the philosophy of scientific laws. (shrink)

Social boundaries separate us fromthem. Explaining the formation, transformation, activation, and suppression of social boundaries presents knotty problems. It helps to distinguish two sets of mechanisms: (1) those that precipitate boundary change and (2) those that constitute boundary change. Properly speaking, only the constitutive mechanisms produce the effects of boundary change as such. Precipitants of boundary change include encounter, imposition, borrowing, conversation, and incentive shift. Constitutive mechanisms include inscription–erasure, activation–deactivation, site transfer, and relocation. Effects of boundary change (...) include attack–defense sequences. These mechanisms operate over a wide range of social phenomena. Key Words: social boundary • mechanisms. (shrink)

This chapter asks the following question: What are the conditions, within and fostered by contemporary educational institutions, for social justice to be grounded philosophically and put into concrete action? In answer- ing this question, I argue that a defense of the liberal arts is a plausible candidate for grounding the possibility of “social justice,” understood as fulfilling an obligation to another in virtue of their intrinsically being owed that obligation. The liberal arts are not merely mechanical, special- ized disciplines; (...) instead, they embody a philosophical anthropology in which human beings are responsible, reflective and contemplative indi- viduals capable of intrinsically meaningful actions. It is to this end that I argue that Josef Pieper’s defense of the Geisteswissenschaften (liberal arts), and the philosophical anthropology which underlies it, is a plausi- ble way to ground social justice. I begin this chapter by outlining what the liberal arts are and how they have been challenged implicitly and explic- itly. I then outline a specific consequence of this explicated in Bryan Met- calfe’s dissertation Pedagogy of Mythos (2013). Having done this, I outline Pieper’s defense of the liberal arts, offer objections to his defense and respond to them. In the end, I conclude that while Pieper’s defense grounds a requisite philosophical anthropology for social justice, a contemporary defense of the liberal arts will always be needed, especially given contem- porary “sophistry.” I finish this chapter in the hope that this always- contemporary defense can be done with an aim to change, while main- taining peaceful, civil discourse. (shrink)

This chapter asks the following question: What are the conditions, within and fostered by contemporary educational institutions, for social justice to be grounded philosophically and put into concrete action? In answer- ing this question, I argue that a defense of the liberal arts is a plausible candidate for grounding the possibility of “social justice,” understood as fulfilling an obligation to another in virtue of their intrinsically being owed that obligation. The liberal arts are not merely mechanical, special- ized disciplines; (...) instead, they embody a philosophical anthropology in which human beings are responsible, reflective and contemplative indi- viduals capable of intrinsically meaningful actions. It is to this end that I argue that Josef Pieper’s defense of the Geisteswissenschaften (liberal arts), and the philosophical anthropology which underlies it, is a plausi- ble way to ground social justice. I begin this chapter by outlining what the liberal arts are and how they have been challenged implicitly and explic- itly. I then outline a specific consequence of this explicated in Bryan Met- calfe’s dissertation Pedagogy of Mythos (2013). Having done this, I outline Pieper’s defense of the liberal arts, offer objections to his defense and respond to them. In the end, I conclude that while Pieper’s defense grounds a requisite philosophical anthropology for social justice, a contemporary defense of the liberal arts will always be needed, especially given contem- porary “sophistry.” I finish this chapter in the hope that this always- contemporary defense can be done with an aim to change, while main- taining peaceful, civil discourse. (shrink)

We argue that the robustness analysis of idealized models can have confirmational power. This responds to concerns recently raised in the literature, according to which the robustness analysis of models whose idealizations are not discharged is unable to confirm the causal mechanisms underlying these models, and the robustness analysis of models whose idealizations are discharged is unnecessary. In response, we make clear that, where idealizations sweep out, in a specific way, the space of possibilities— which is sometimes, though not (...) always, the case—they can be holistically discharged. In turn, this can be used to show that the robustness analysis of idealized models can have confirmational force after all. (shrink)

According to the conventionalist doctrine of space elaborated by the French philosopher-scientist Henri Poincaré in the 1890s, the geometry of physical space is a matter of definition, not of fact. Poincaré’s Hertz-inspired view of the role of hypothesis in science guided his interpretation of the theory of relativity (1905), which he found to be in violation of the axiom of free mobility of invariable solids. In a quixotic effort to save the Euclidean geometry that relied on this axiom, Poincaré extended (...) the purview of his doctrine of space to cover both space and time. The centerpiece of this new doctrine is what he called the ‘‘principle of physical relativity,’’ which holds the laws of mechanics to be covariant with respect to a certain group of transformations. For Poincaré, the invariance group of classical mechanics defined physical space and time (Galilei spacetime), but he admitted that one could also define physical space and time in virtue of the invariance group of relativistic mechanics (Minkowski spacetime). Either way, physical space and time are the result of a convention. (shrink)

Dynamical systems play a central role in explanations in cognitive neuroscience. The grounds for these explanations are hotly debated and generally fall under two approaches: non-mechanistic and mechanistic. In this paper, I first outline a neurodynamical explanatory schema that highlights the role of dynamical systems in cognitive phenomena. I next explore the mechanistic status of such neurodynamical explanations. I argue that these explanations satisfy only some of the constraints on mechanistic explanation and should be considered pseudomechanistic explanations. I defend this (...) argument against three alternative interpretations of the neurodynamical explanatory schema. The independent interpretation holds that neurodynamical explanations and mechanisms are independent. The constitutive interpretation holds that neurodynamical explanations are constitutive but otherwise non-mechanistic. Both the independent and constitutive interpretations fail to account for all the features of neurodynamical explanations. The partial interpretation assumes that the targets of dynamical systems models are mechanisms and so holds that neurodynamical explanations are incomplete because they lack mechanistic details. I contend instead that the targets of those models are dynamical systems distinct from mechanisms and defend this claim against several objections. I conclude with a defense of the pseudomechanistic interpretation and a discussion of the source of their explanatory power in relation to a causal-mechanical description of the world. (shrink)

When summarizing the findings of his 1896 Matter and Memory, Bergson claims: “That every reality has... a relation with consciousness—this is what we concede to idealism.” Yet Bergson’s 1896 text presents the theory of “pure perception,” which, since it accounts for perception according to the brain’s mechanical transmissions, apparently leaves no room for subjective consciousness. Bergson’s theory of pure perception would appear to render his idealistic concession absurd. In this paper, I attempt to defend Bergson’s idealistic concession. I argue that (...) Bergson’s account of cerebral transmissions at the level of pure perception necessarily entails a theory of temporality, an appeal to a theory of time-consciousness that justifies his idealistic concession. (shrink)

Drosophila responds to a septic injury by the rapid synthesis of antimicrobial peptides. These molecules are predominantly produced by the fat body, a functional equivalent of mammalian liver, and are secreted into the hemolymph where their concentrations can reach up to 100 μM. Six distinct antibacterial peptides (plus isoforms) and one antifungal peptide have been characterized in Drosophila and their genes cloned. The induction of the gene encoding the antifungal peptide relies on the spätzle/Toll/cactus gene cassette, which is involved in (...) the control of dorsoventral patterning in the embryo, and shows interesting structural and functional similarities with cytokine‐induced activation of NF‐ϰB in mammalian cells. An additional pathway, dependent on the as yet unidentified imd (for immune‐deficiency) gene, is required for the full induction of the antibacterial peptide genes. Mutants deficient for the Toll and imd pathways exhibit a severely reduced survival to fungal and bacterial infections, respectively. Recent data on the molecular mechanisms underlying recognition of non‐self are also discussed in this review. (shrink)

In epistemology and philosophy of science, there has been substantial debate about truth’s relation to understanding. “Non-factivists” hold that radical departures from the truth are not always barriers to understanding; “quasi-factivists” demur. The most discussed example concerns scientists’ use of idealizations in certain derivations of the ideal gas law from statistical mechanics. Yet, these discussions have suffered from confusions about the relevant science, as well as conceptual confusions. Addressing this example, we shall argue that the ideal gas law is best (...) interpreted as favoring non-factivism about understanding, but only after delving a bit deeper into the statistical mechanics that has informed these arguments and stating more precisely what non-factivism entails. Along the way, we indicate where earlier discussions have gone astray, and highlight how a naturalistic approach furnishes more nuanced normative theses about the interaction of rationality, understanding, and epistemic value. (shrink)