Results for 'Deflationism'

560 found
Order:
  1.  79
    Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism.Camil Golub - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  77
    Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.
    Deflationists claim that the truth predicate was introduced into our language merely to full a certain logico-linguistic function. Oddly enough, the question what this function exactly consists in has received little attention. We argue that the best way of understanding the function of the truth predicate is as enabling us to mimic higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. Indeed, one can show that the full simple theory of types is reducible to disquotational principles of truth. Our analysis has important consequences (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3. Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
    Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ‘ is true because Rex is barking’ but reject ‘Rex is barking because is true’. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry : they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4.  52
    Deflationism and Truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181.
    This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking—one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics—and deflationism about truth—one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5.  48
    Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument From Conservativeness.Daniel Waxman - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):429-463.
    Many philosophers believe that a deflationist theory of truth must conservatively extend any base theory to which it is added. But when applied to arithmetic, it's argued, the imposition of a conservativeness requirement leads to a serious objection to deflationism: for the Gödel sentence for Peano Arithmetic is not a theorem of PA, but becomes one when PA is extended by adding plausible principles governing truth. This paper argues that no such objection succeeds. The issue turns on how we (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):23-59.
    I here defend a theory consisting of four claims about ‘property’ and properties, and argue that they form a coherent whole that can solve various serious problems. The claims are (1): ‘property’ is defined by the principles (PR): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property of x iff F’ and (PA): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property’; (2) the function of ‘property’ is to increase the expressive power of English, roughly by mimicking quantification into predicate position; (3) property talk should be understood at (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.Hartry Field - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):249-285.
  8.  73
    Deflationism and Paradox.Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  9.  72
    Deflationism and Referential Indeterminacy.David E. Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):43-79.
    This essay argues that deflationism is incompatible with the phenomenon of referential indeterminacy. This puts the deflationist in the difficult position of having to deny the possibility of what otherwise seems like a manifest and theoretically important phenomenon. Section 1 provides background on deflationism. Section 2 considers an intuitive argument by Stephen Leeds to the effect that deflationism precludes RI; the essay argues that this argument does not succeed. The rest of the essay presents its own, distinct (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10.  91
    Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.
    We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory - a theory which is conservative over its base, but can't be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  11. Semantic Deflationism Deflated.Mahrad Almotahari - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2435-2454.
    Deflationism is the view that certain metaphysical debates are defective, leaving it open whether the defect is best explained in semantic, conceptual, or epistemic terms. Local semantic deflationism is the thesis that familiar metaphysical debates, which appear to be about the existence and identity of material objects, are merely verbal. It’s a form of local deflationism because it restricts itself to one particular area of metaphysics. It’s a form of semantic deflationism because the defect it purports (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  24
    Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?Krzysztof Poslajko - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):709-725.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the interpretivist account of propositional attitudes fails even at the most plausible reading that treats this theory as a version of the deflationary approach to existence coupled with a metaphysical claim about the judgement-dependence of propositional attitudes. It will be argued that adopting a deflationary reading of interpretivism allows this theory to avoid the common charge of fictionalism, according to which interpretivists cannot maintain realism about attitudes as their theory becomes a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  87
    Deflationism and the Success Argument.By Nic Damnjanovic - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.
    Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  14. Deflationism and Tarski’s Paradise.Jeffrey Ketland - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):69-94.
    Deflationsism about truth is a pot-pourri, variously claiming that truth is redundant, or is constituted by the totality of 'T-sentences', or is a purely logical device (required solely for disquotational purposes or for re-expressing finitarily infinite conjunctions and/or disjunctions). In 1980, Hartry Field proposed what might be called a 'deflationary theory of mathematics', in which it is alleged that all uses of mathematics within science are dispensable. Field's criterion for the dispensability of mathematics turns on a property of theories, called (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  15. Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate.Arvid Båve - 2006 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. Weak Deflationism.Matthew McGrath - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):69-98.
    Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of our firmest and most (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  18.  54
    Deflationism Beyond Arithmetic.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1045-1069.
    The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. Deflationism Trumps Pluralism!Julian Dodd - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 298.
  20. Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271-294.
    Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth- predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  21. Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Tennant.Jeffrey Ketland - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):75-88.
    Any (1-)consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a nontrivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  22.  50
    Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):535-549.
    Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  99
    Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):551-582.
    consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a non-trivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called ‘semantical argument’ for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  24.  71
    Deflationism, Creeping Minimalism, and Explanations of Content.David E. Taylor - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):101-129.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25.  46
    Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are).Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 59-77.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we clarify the notion of deflationism, with special attention to deflationary accounts of truth. Seocnd, we argue that one who endorses a deflationary account of truth (or of semantic notions, generally) should be, or perhaps already is, a pretense theorist regarding truth-talk. In §1 we discuss mathematical fictionalism, where we focus on Yablo’s pretense account of mathematical discourse. §2 briefly introduces the key elements of deflationism and explains deflationism about (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  26. Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning.David Löwenstein - 2010 - In Theodora Achourioti, Edgar Andrade & Marc Staudacher (eds.), Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference. Meaning and Truth. Amsterdam, October 1-3, 2009. ILLC Publications. pp. 52-66.
    It is widely held that truth and reference play an indispensable explanatory role in theories of meaning. By contrast, so-called deflationists argue that the functions of these concepts are merely expressive and never explanatory. Robert Brandom has proposed both a variety of deflationism — the anaphoric theory —, and a theory of meaning — inferentialism — which doesn’t rely on truth or reference. He argues that the anaphoric theory counts against his (chiefly referentialist) rivals in the debate on meaning (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28.  30
    The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):505-522.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In particular, “is true” is explained as a “prosentence.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: As pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their semantic content from previously introduced sentences. So, if Jim says, “The candidate is going to win the election,” and Bill (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality.Andrew Thomas - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):113-122.
    A common objection against deflationism is that it cannot account for the fact that truth depends on reality. Consider the question ‘On what does the truth of the proposition that snow is white depend?’ An obvious answer is that it depends on whether snow is white. Now, consider what answer, if any, a deflationist can offer. The problem is as follows. A typical deflationary analysis of truth consists of biconditionals of the form ‘The proposition that p is true iff (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30.  4
    Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena.N. Tennant - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):551-582.
    Any consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a non-trivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  31. Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps.Patrick Greenough - 2010 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist?Jared Warren - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (1):108-121.
    Some philosophers are metaphilosophical deflationists for metasemantic reasons. These theorists take standard philosophical assertions to be defective in some manner. There are various versions of metasemantic metaphilosophical deflationism, but a trap awaits any global version of it: metasemantics itself is a part of philosophy, so in deflating philosophy these theorists have thereby deflated the foundation of their deflationism. The present article discusses this issue and the prospects for an adequate response to the trap. Contrary to most historical responses, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth.Matthew McGrath - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34. Deflationism (About Theories of Truth).Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.
    In this article, I provide a general account of deflationism. After doing so, I turn to truth-defla- tionism, where, after first describing some of the species, I highlight some challenges for those who wish to adopt it.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  35.  78
    Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists?Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36.  87
    A Deflationist Approach to Indeterminacy and Vagueness.Ken Akiba - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):69 - 86.
    Deflationists cannot make sense ofthe notion of referential indeterminacybecause they deny the existence of substantivereference. One way for them to make sense ofthe objective existence of linguisticindeterminacy is by embracing theworldly view ofindeterminacy, the view that indeterminacyexists not in reference relations but in the world itself. On this view,the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is dividedinto temporal slices and alethicpossible worlds. Supervaluationism proves tobe neutral with respect to the debate betweenthe worldly view and the referential (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  38. Rejecting Ethical Deflationism.Jacob Ross - 2006 - Ethics 116 (4):742-768.
    One of the perennial challenges of ethical theory has been to provide an answer to a number of views that appear to undermine the importance of ethical questions. We may refer to such views collectively as “deflationary ethical theories.” These include theories, such as nihilism, according to which no action is better than any other, as well as relativistic theories according to which no ethical theory is better than any other. In this article I present a new response to such (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  39.  56
    Deflationism, Pluralism, Expressivism, Pragmatism.Simon Blackburn - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 263.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40.  61
    Deflationism: The Basics.Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court. pp. 1--1.
  41. Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning.Anil Gupta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):654-666.
    This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland.Neil Tennant - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):89-96.
    I am not a deflationist. I believe that truth and falsity are substantial. The truth of a proposition consists in its having a constructive proof, or truthmaker. The falsity of a proposition consists in its having a constructive disproof, or falsitymaker. Such proofs and disproofs will need to be given modulo acceptable premisses. The choice of these premisses will depend on the discourse in question.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  43. Thought, Thoughts, and Deflationism.Vann McGee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3153-3168.
    Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logical uses, so it cannot play a significant theoretical role in scientific inquiry or causal explanation. Focusing on Christopher Hill as exemplary deflationist, the present paper takes issue with the negative thesis, arguing that, without making use of the notion of truth conditions, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44.  74
    Understanding Deflationism.Scott Soames - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):369–383.
  45.  95
    Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.
    The aim of this paper is to look at what a parallel deflationist program might be in the theory of knowledge and examine its prospect. In what follows I will simplify matters slightly by focussing on empirical knowledge rather than knowledge in general, though most of what I have to say ought to be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to knowledge in general. Moreover,note that it is not my aim to offer a full defense of a particular deflationist theory of knowledge, which (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46.  74
    Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
  47. New Wave Deflationism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 45--58.
    For many, the paradigm of a deflationary theory of truth is the redundancy theory, which is typically taken to consist of two claims: namely (i) that sentences containing the truth predicate are synonymous with sentences not containing the truth predicate (and so the truth predicate is redundant) and (ii) that there is no property of truth.1 The redundancy theory is not an attractive theory of truth since neither of its claims is particularly plausible on its own, and the combination of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  48.  26
    Deflationism on Scientific Representation.Chuang Liu - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 93--102.
  49.  59
    Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Cieslinski.N. Tennant - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):437-450.
    I clarify how the requirement of conservative extension features in the thinking of various deflationists, and how this relates to another litmus claim, that the truth-predicate stands for a real, substantial property. I discuss how the deflationist can accommodate the result, to which Cieslinski draws attention, that non-conservativeness attends even the generalization that all logical theorems in the language of arithmetic are true. Finally I provide a four-fold categorization of various forms of deflationism, by reference to the two claims (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. T-Schema Deflationism Versus Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem.Christopher Gauker - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):129–136.
    I define T-schema deflationism as the thesis that a theory of truth for our language can simply take the form of certain instances of Tarski's schema (T). I show that any effective enumeration of these instances will yield as a dividend an effective enumeration of all truths of our language. But that contradicts Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. So the instances of (T) constituting the T-Schema deflationist's theory of truth are not effectively enumerable, which casts doubt on the idea that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 560