Results for 'Delusion'

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  1.  36
    Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence From Experience.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):920-947.
    ABSTRACTEmpiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of (...)
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  2. Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution.Eugen Fischer - 2011 - Routledge.
    _Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy_ provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems (...)
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  3. On Delusion.Jennifer Radden - 2010 - Routledge.
    Delusions play a fundamental role in the history of psychology, philosophy and culture, dividing not only the mad from the sane but reason from unreason. Yet the very nature and extent of delusions are poorly understood. What are delusions? How do they differ from everyday errors or mistaken beliefs? Are they scientific categories? In this superb, panoramic investigation of delusion Jennifer Radden explores these questions and more, unravelling a fascinating story that ranges from Descartes’s demon to famous first-hand accounts (...)
     
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  4. Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Mind and Language. Blackwell. pp. 168-183.
    Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capacity in schizophrenia. I argue that (...)
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  5. Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.Andy Egan - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that (...)
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  6. Delusion, Rationality, Empathy.Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.
  7. Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  8. Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.Tim Bayne - unknown
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can (...)
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  9.  59
    Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
    In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue (...)
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  10.  16
    Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.
    Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capacity in schizophrenia. I argue that (...)
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  11.  43
    Capgras Delusion: A Window on Face Recognition.Hadyn D. Ellis & Michael B. Lewis - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (4):149-156.
  12.  96
    Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science).Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) - 2008 - Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  13. Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology.Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):203-221.
    To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. “Motivated” delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful (...)
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  14. Delusion, Dissociation and Identity.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  15.  11
    Expressivism About Delusion Attribution.Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):59-77.
    In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to expressivism in meta-ethics. Just as meta-ethical expressivism accounts for certain key features of moral discourse, so does this expressivism account for certain key features of delusion attribution. And just as meta-ethical expressivism undermines factualism about moral properties, so does this expressivism, if correct, show that certain (...)
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  16.  2
    Delusion Formation through Uncertainty and Possibility-blindness.José María Ariso - 2019 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 52:29-50.
    Algunos autores han intentado considerar los delirios como certezas –entendidas en el sentido de Wittgenstein– debido a las similitudes que parecen existir entre sus respectivos estatus epistemológicos. Sin embargo, dicho intento ha sido criticado con agudeza, entre otras razones, porque el contenido de los delirios choca frontalmente con el contenido de las certezas, por lo que los delirios no pueden ser comprendidos debido a los cambios en las relaciones de significado. Pero es evidente que, aunque los delirios no se puedan (...)
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  17.  3
    Delusion, Rationality, Empathy: Commentary on Martin Davies Et Al.Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):159-162.
  18.  34
    Hierarchical Bayesian Models of Delusion.Daniel Williams - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 61:129-147.
  19.  45
    The Fregoli Delusion: A Disorder of Person Identification and Tracking.Robyn Langdon, Emily Connaughton & Max Coltheart - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):615-631.
    Fregoli delusion is the mistaken belief that some person currently present in the deluded person's environment is a familiar person in disguise. The stranger is believed to be psychologically identical to this known person even though the deluded person perceives the physical appearance of the stranger as being different from the known person's typical appearance. To gain a deeper understanding of this contradictory error in the normal system for tracking and identifying known persons, we conducted a detailed survey of (...)
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  20. White Delusion and Avidyā: A Buddhist Approach to Understanding and Deconstructing White Ignorance.Emily McRae - 2019 - In Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections.
    In Buddhist contexts, avidyā refers not only to a lack of knowledge but also (and primarily) to an active misapprehension of reality, a warped projection onto reality that reinforces our own dysfunction and vice. Ignorance is rarely innocent; it is not an isolated phenomenon of just-not-happening-to-know-something. It is maintained and reinforced through personal and social habits, including practices of personal and collective false projection, strategic ignoring, and convenient “forgetting.” This view of avidyā has striking similarities to philosophical analyses of white (...)
     
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  21. Three Challenges From Delusion for Theories of Autonomy.K. W. M. Fulford & Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-74.
    This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of (...)
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  22.  42
    Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder.Richard Dawkins - 1998 - Houghton Mifflin.
    Did Newton "unweave the rainbow" by reducing it to its prismatic colors, as Keats contended? Did he, in other words, diminish beauty? Far from it, says Dawkins--Newton's unweaving is the key too much of modern astronomy and to the breathtaking poetry of modern cosmology. Mysteries don't lose their poetry because they are solved: the solution often is more beautiful than the puzzle, uncovering deeper mystery. (The Keats who spoke of "unweaving the rainbow" was a very young man, Dawkins reminds us.) (...)
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  23.  37
    Felt Presence: Paranoid Delusion or Hallucinatory Social Imagery?☆.Tore Nielsen - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):975-983.
    Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon—social imagery—that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and (...)
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  24.  88
    Rationality and Schizophrenic Delusion.Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.
    The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning procedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, however, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theory of schizophrenic delusion and propose that (...)
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  25. The Doxastic Status of Delusion and the Limits of Folk Psychology.José Eduardo Porcher - 2018 - In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense: Explaining the Relation Between Madness and Social Values. New York: Springer.
    Clinical delusions are widely characterized as being pathological beliefs in both the clinical literature and in common sense. Recently, a philosophical debate has emerged between defenders of the commonsense position (doxasticists) and their opponents, who have the burden of pointing toward alternative characterizations (anti-doxasticists). In this chapter, I argue that both doxasticism and anti- doxasticism fail to characterize the functional role of delusions while at the same time being unable to play a role in the explanation of these phenomena. I (...)
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  26.  3
    Imagination, Hallucination and Delusion.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.
  27.  27
    Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1.5.Pieter Sjoerd Hasper - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (3):252 - 284.
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  28.  59
    Moral Delusion.Rodger Beehler - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):313 - 331.
    My question is whether a prevalent conception of morality can admit the existence of moral delusion. The conception of morality I refer to is that of a set of rules, or principles, ‘accepted’ or ‘assented’ to by persons, which stipulate that certain kinds of human act or behaviour are permitted, or required, while other kinds are to be avoided. This conception of morality can be found virtually everywhere, outside as much as within philosophy, in anthropology, sociology, political studies, history, (...)
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  29. A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage (...)
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  30.  92
    Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion.Garry Young - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played (...)
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  31.  54
    On Ramsey's 'Silly Delusion' Regarding Tractatus 5.53.Kai Wehmeier - 2009 - In Giuseppe Primiero & Shahid Rahman (eds.), Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic. College Publications.
    We investigate a variant of the variable convention proposed at Tractatus 5.53ff for the purpose of eliminating the identity sign from logical notation. The variant in question is what Hintikka has called the strongly exclusive interpretation of the variables, and turns out to be what Ramsey initially (and erroneously) took to be Wittgenstein's intended method. We provide a tableau calculus for this identity-free logic, together with soundness and completeness proofs, as well as a proof of mutual interpretability with first-order logic (...)
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  32.  45
    Sources of Delusion in Analytica Posteriora 1.5.Pieter Sjoerd Hasper - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.
    Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...)
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  33. The God Delusion: Phenomenon.Richard Dawkins - 2007 - Free Inquiry 27:11-12.
     
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  34. The God Delusion: Introducing the Paperback.Richard Dawkins - 2007 - Free Inquiry 27:12-14.
     
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  35.  65
    60 Population: Delusion and Reality.Amartya Sen - forthcoming - Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions.
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  36. When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
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  37.  21
    Confabulation and Delusion: A Review of Hirstein's Brain Fiction. [REVIEW]Robyn Langdon - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):785 – 802.
  38. Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.J. Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
  39. Dawkins' God Less Delusion.J. Angelo Corlett - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):125 - 138.
    A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.
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  40.  29
    Dawkins’ Godless Delusion.J. Angelo Corlett - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):125-138.
    A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.
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  41.  16
    Confabulation and Delusion.Max Coltheart & Martha Turner - 2009 - In William Hirstein (ed.), Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 173.
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  42.  8
    Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):679-704.
    An examination of alien abduction belief can inform how we ought to approach constructing explanations of monothematic delusion formation. I argue that the formation and maintenance of alien abduct...
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  43. Metaphysical Delusion.Fraser Cowley - 1991 - Prometheus Books.
     
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  44. Psychotic Delusion and the Insanity Defense.John Whelan Jr - 2009 - Public Affairs Quarterly 23 (1):27-48.
    I attempt to describe and defend an alternative definition of insanity. I claim that my definition follows from an adequate general understanding of legal excuse and that it describes correctly the question that jurors in the recent Andrea Yates case and others like it ought to be faced with. My essay has three parts. In the first, I briefly criticize M'Naghten- and Durham-inspired insanity statutes. In the second, I sketch and defend a general understanding of legal excuse and try to (...)
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  45. The Classification, Definition, and Ontology of Delusion.José Eduardo Porcher - 2016 - Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatología Fundamental 19 (1):167-181.
    Although delusion is one of the central concepts of psychopathology, it stills eludes precise conceptualization. In this paper, I present certain basic issues concerning the classification and definition of delusion, as well as its ontological status. By examining these issues, I aim to shed light on the ambiguity of the clinical term ‘delusion’ and its extension, as well as provide clues as to why philosophers are increasingly joining the ranks of psychiatrists, psychologists, and neuroscientists in the effort (...)
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  46.  26
    Phenomenology of the Technical Delusion in Schizophrenics.Alfred Kraus - 1994 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 25 (1):51-69.
    Technical delusions are highly significant for the diagnosis of schizophrenia. What can we learn from the content and the formal aspects of this kind of delusion about the primary schizophrenic experiences underlying the technical delusion and about its meaning and purpose for the patient? In a phenomenological investigation of six schizophrenics, comparing their experiences in technical delusion with the normal experience of technical phenomena, I describe the patient's relationship to himself, to his world, and to others and (...)
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  47.  50
    Belief as Delusional and Delusion as Belief.Jennifer Radden - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):43-46.
    Richard Mullen and Grant Gillett (2014) decry the oversimplifications that accompany ‘doxastic’ analyses of delusion analogizing them to belief states; particularly, they object to the recent elevation to the status of paradigmatic the ordinary beliefs often understood, in Bayesian terms, as probabilistic estimates of empirical facts. Such an approach ignores the significance of the delusion for the individual, they emphasize, neglecting the delusional person’s conceptions of self and identity in relation to the world. In support of their plea (...)
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  48. McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. [REVIEW]Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.
  49.  6
    Defining Delusion.G. Lynn Stephens - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):25-25.
  50. Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.
    In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On (...)
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