In the intellectual confusion prevailing since the demise of Marxism and “marxism”, the attempt is made to define democracy as a matter of pure procedure, explicitly avoiding and condemning any reference to substantive objectives. It can easily be shown, however, that the idea of a purely procedural “democracy” is incoherent and self-contradictory. No legal system whatsoever and no government can exist in the absence of substantive conditions which cannot be left to chance or to the workings of the (...) “market” but must be posited as objectives of political activity. The confusion results from a deficient understanding of what makes a society and an empty idea of “freedom”. The objective of politics is not happiness, an affair to be left to the individuals, but it certainly is liberty understood as participation in the governance of the polity; it is also the pursuit of the common good, defined as the sum of the prerequisites and facilitations of individual autonomy depending on collective action, and as the realization of commonly agreed collective goals. (shrink)

This book centers on a relatively neglected theme in the scholarly literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought: her support for a new form of government in which citizen councils would replace contemporary representative democracy and allow citizens to participate directly in decision-making in the public sphere. The main argument of the book is that the council system, or more broadly the vision of participatory democracy was far more important to Arendt than is commonly understood. Seeking to demonstrate the (...) close links between the council system Arendt advocated and other major themes in her work, the book focuses particularly on her critique of the nation-state and her call for a new international order in which human dignity and “the right to have rights” will be guaranteed; her conception of “the political” and the conditions that can make this experience possible; the relationship between philosophy and politics; and the challenge of political judgement in the modern world. (shrink)

Traditional conceptions of informed consent seem difficult or even impossible to apply to new technologies like biobanks, big data, or GMOs, where vast numbers of people are potentially affected, and where consequences and risks are indeterminate or even unforeseeable. Likewise, the principle has come under strain with the appropriation and monetisation of personal information on digital platforms. Over time, it has largely been reduced to bare assent to formalistic legal agreements. To address the current ineffectiveness of the norm of informed (...) consent, I suggest that we need a notion of structural injustice (on a distinctive interpretation, elaborated here, which takes account of unequal power and property relations). I then argue that in order to protect and enhance people's freedom, we have to go beyond traditional applied ethics and introduce perspectives from democratic theory and social philosophy. I attempt to show how applications of the ‘all‐affected principle’, together with new forms of democratic participation, deliberation, and representation can helpfully frame the narrower principle of informed consent. There is an important role for what we could call collective consent, and informed consent can only succeed in increasing individual agency if it is situated within enhanced forms of democratic decision‐making. (shrink)

Democratic backsliding and autocratisation tendencies raise the question of what liberal democracy can do to defend itself. Of particular concern are populists, who are often perceived to have an ambiguous commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The defence of liberal democracy has often been conceived in legal terms, for example, with party bans and propaganda restrictions. However, legal means are criticized for being elitist because they are directed against irrational and emotionally driven masses and because they (...) allegedly violate the very values that they are supposed to protect by limiting the democratic freedom of some groups. Instead, critics have proposed cultural and socio-economic means as non-elitist and non-exclusionary alternatives more in line with the values of democracy. This article discusses whether the employment of cultural and socio-economic means against groups – in casu populists – who are perceived as a challenge to liberal democracy can avoid the charge of elitism and exclusion by analysing whether these means are consistent with the publicity constraint. It finds that the use of education and money to defend democracy against such groups relies on a form of elitism and exclusion similar to the one that the defence by legal means is charged with. (shrink)

A political challenge facing constitutional democracies in Africa is the lack of adequate representation and participation of citizens in democratic processes and institutions. This challenge is manifest in the vesting of power solely in, and the exercise of this power by, a sectional group – the majority party – to the exclusion of others; as evinced in the liberal democratic systems extensively practised on the continent. Wiredu proposes as a solution to these challenges the adoption of consensual democracy; an (...) indigenous, non-party democratic system rooted in the traditional African humanist and communitarian conceptions of the individual and the community, in which political decisions are characteristically reached by consensus. In this article, I present a critical exposition of Wiredu’s consensual democracy and defend it against liberal democracy on the one hand, and criticisms levelled against it on the other hand. I also offer some modifications to Wiredu’s theory in a bid to render it more suitable for practice in Africa. (shrink)

In this introductory essay, we outline the relationship between political dissensus and radical democracy, focusing especially on how such a politics might inform the study of business ethics. This politics is located historically in the failure of liberal democracy to live up to its promise, as well as the deleterious response to that from reactionary populism, strong-man authoritarianism, and exploitative capitalism. In the context of these political vicissitudes, we turn to radical democracy as a form of contestation (...) that offers hope in an affirmative, inclusive and sustainable alternative. On this basis we introduce the papers in the special issue as a collective exploration of the ethics and politics of radical democracy as manifesting in dissensus and the subversion of corporate and elite power by alternative democratic practices and realities. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of why democracy is desirable in terms of a relational theory of democracy. The theory draws on concepts from Aristotelian, critical realist, and psychoanalytic theory. From Aristotle it takes the concepts of human flourishing and human virtues; from critical realism it takes the concepts of relational subjects and relational goods; from psychoanalysis it takes the concept of mutuality. The relational theory argues that democracy, particularly deliberative democracy, is desirable because it requires (...) and facilitates the development of citizens with the relational capacity of mutuality. The theory is developed sequentially in the following four theses. (1) The function of government is to promote the flourishing of its citizens. (2) Human flourishing results from citizens having access to relational goods. (3) Access to relational goods requires that citizens possess the relational capacity of mutuality. (4) Deliberative democracy is desirable because it both requires and facilitates mutuality. (shrink)

This work analyzes the fundamental values upon which the new democratic legal order in South Africa is based. It examines the challenges posed by these developments to legal practice and scholarship and concludes that lawyers have adopted an approach of business as usual to the new order.

The list of causalities for wars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is horrendous with an estimated 187 million people dying in the period 1900 to the present day, with approximately 75 mi...

Against the Personification of Democracy, however, takes its cue from classical philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes and Plato, who consider establishing the ...

In Democracy without Shortcuts, Cristina Lafont elaborates the view that participatory deliberation is at the heart of every democracy and that both truth-tracking and mutual justification are the...

Pragmatism, Feminism, and Democracy is James Livingston's virtuoso reflection on the period between 1890 and 1930, a primal scene of American history during which a wave of intellectual currents came together--and fell apart--to reorient society. Tying in critical insights on corporate capitalism, consumer culture, populism, and the American Left, Livingston analyzes the intersections and similarities of pragmatism and feminism to yield an original, provocative blend of historiography, feminist theory, and American intellectual history.

With democracy in mind, promoting students’ cognitive, personal, and social development can inform and shape the mathematics curriculum and classroom practice with the goal of their becoming more capable, self-reflective, and socially aware human beings. Toward that realization, their mathematics experience could include: heuristics, as it provides a natural language for problem solving; habits of mind, so students can think and act with a more developed “reflective intelligence”; and multiple-centers investigations, where collaborations based on shared mathematical interest can be (...) pursued. In this way, their education would be “a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating process” that supports the development of democratic society. (shrink)