Results for 'Demonstrative'

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  1. What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?Declan Smithies - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.
    Perception enables us to think demonstrative thoughts about the world around us, but what must perception be like in order to play this role? Does perception enable demonstrative thought only if it is conscious? This paper examines three accounts of the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought, which agree that consciousness is essential for demonstrative thought, but disagree about why it is. First, I consider and reject the accounts proposed by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of (...)
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  2.  26
    The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue (...)
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  3.  98
    Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - forthcoming - Topoi:1-19.
    The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).
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  4. Visual Experience & Demonstrative Thought.Thomas Raleigh - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (30):69-91.
    I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely accepted that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ (...)
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  5.  56
    Fallibilism, Demonstrative Thoughts and Russellian Propositions.André Leclerc - 2001 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 5 (1-2):43-54.
    Russellian or singular propositions are very useful in semantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a demonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. I3ased on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling demonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical beliefs. I defend (...)
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  6.  61
    On the Possibility of Conceptually Structured Experience: Demonstrative Concepts and Fineness of Grain.Joseph Shieber - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):383-397.
    In this paper I consider one of the influential challenges to the notion that perceptual experience might be completely conceptually structured, a challenge that rests on the idea that conceptual structure cannot do justice to the fineness of grain of perceptual experience. In so doing, I canvass John McDowell's attempt to meet this challenge by appeal to the notion of demonstrative concepts and review some criticisms recently leveled at McDowell's deployment of demonstrative concepts for this purpose by Sean (...)
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  7.  50
    'Demonstrative' Colour Concepts: Recognition Versus Preservation.Mark Textor - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):234-249.
    Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. (...)
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  8.  59
    Demonstrative Content and the Experience of Properties.Hemdat Lerman - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):489-515.
    John McDowell (in Mind and World) and Bill Brewer (in Perception and Reason) argue that the content of our perceptual experience is conceptual in the following sense. It is of the type of content that could be the content of a judgement – that is, a content which results from the actualization of two (or more) conceptual abilities. Specifically, they suggest that the conceptual abilities actualized in experience are demonstrative abilities, and thus the resulting content is of the type (...)
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  9.  50
    Centering on Demonstrative Thought.Christopher Buford - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147.
    The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought.
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  10. Methodological Discussions Between Expository and Demonstrative Epistemologies in Islamic Thought.Ilyas Altuner - 2011 - International Journal of Human Sciences 8 (2):195-216.
    In the basis of the subject which we try to deal with, it stands two worldviews based on expository and demonstrative epistemologies that formalize the intellectual building of Islamic culture. It seems that the main point here is about discussions between exposition and demonstration. Methodological discussions enlighten how are used on the one hand exposition as religious method and on the other hand demonstration as rational or intellectual method. Keywords: , , , , ,.
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  11. Demonstrative Concepts Without Reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
    Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual.
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  12. Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell.Christopher Peacocke - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):123-133.
  13. Demonstrative Concepts and Experience.Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):397-420.
    A number of authors have argued recently that the content of perceptual experience can, and even must, be characterized in conceptual terms. Their claim, more precisely, is that every perceptual experience is such that, of necessity, its content is constituted entirely by concepts possessed by the subject having the experience. This is a surprising result. For it seems reasonable to think that a subject’s experiences could be richer and more fine-grained than his conceptual repertoire; that a subject might be able, (...)
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  14. Demonstrative Thought.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
    In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is (...)
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  15. Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
    One popular materialist response to the explanatory gap identifies phenomenal concepts with type-demonstrative concepts. This kind of response, however, faces a serious challenge: that our phenomenal concepts seem to provide a richer characterization of their referents than just the demonstrative characterization of 'that quality'. In this paper, I develop a materialist account that beefs up the contents of phenomenal concepts while retaining the idea that these contents contain demonstrative elements. I illustrate this account by focusing on our (...)
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  16. Aristotle's Demonstrative Logic.John Corcoran - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):1-20.
    Demonstrative logic, the study of demonstration as opposed to persuasion, is the subject of Aristotle's two-volume Analytics. Many examples are geometrical. Demonstration produces knowledge (of the truth of propositions). Persuasion merely produces opinion. Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him, a demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously known to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning (...)
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  17.  19
    Kaplan's Sloppy Thinker and the Demonstrative Origine of Indeicals.Carlo Penco & Guido Borghi - 2018 - Quaderni di Semantica:137-157.
    In this paper we give some suggestions from etymology on the contrast between Kaplan’s direct reference theory and a neo-Fregean view on indexicals. After a short summary of the philosophical debate on indexicals (§1), we use some remarks about the hidden presence of a demonstrative root in all indexicals to derive some provisional doubts concerning Kaplan’s criticism of what he calls “sloppy thinker” (§2). To support those doubts, we will summarise some etymological data on the derivation of the so-called (...)
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  18. The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference.Susanna Siegel - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-21.
    Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
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  19. The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):34-60.
    : ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we (...)
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  20. Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference.Athanassius Raftopoulos & Vincent Muller - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
    The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...)
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  21.  48
    The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.
    What determines the reference of first-person thoughts—thoughts that one would express using the first-person pronoun? I defend a model on which our ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves do, in much the way that our ways of gaining knowledge of objects in the world determine the reference of perceptual demonstrative thoughts. This model—the Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought—can be motivated by reference to independently plausible general principles about how reference is determined. But it faces a serious objection. There (...)
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  22.  5
    Demonstrative Concepts and Experience.Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):397-420.
    A number of authors have argued recently that the content of perceptual experience can, and even must, be characterized in conceptual terms. Their claim, more precisely, is that every perceptual experience is such that, of necessity, its content is constituted entirely by concepts possessed by the subject having the experience. This is a surprising result. For it seems reasonable to think that a subject’s experiences could be richer and more fine-grained than his conceptual repertoire; that a subject might be able, (...)
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  23. Three Views of Demonstrative Reference.Marga Reimer - 1992 - Synthese 93 (3):373 - 402.
    Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) are rejected as implausible; the third (originally proposed by Kaplan (...)
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  24.  14
    Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Scrutability Argument Against Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    According to the scrutability argument against physicalism, an a priori gap between the physical and conscious experience entails a lack of necessitation and the falsity of physicalism. This paper investigates the crucial premise of the scrutability argument: the inference from an a priori gap to a lack of necessitation. This premise gets its support from modal rationalism, according to which there are important, potentially constitutive, connections between a priori justification and metaphysical modality. I argue against the strong form of modal (...)
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  25. The Demonstrative Theory of Quotation.Stefano Predelli - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):555-572.
    This essay proposes a systematic semantic account of Davidson’s demonstrative theory of pure quotation (Davidson Theory and decision, 11: 27–40, 1979) within a classic Kaplan-style framework for indexical languages (Kaplan 1977). I argue that Davidson’s informal hints must be developed in terms of the idea of ‘character-external’ aspects of meaning, that is, in terms of truth-conditionally idle restrictions on the class of contexts in which quotation marks may appropriately be used. When thus developed, Davidson’s theory may correctly take into (...)
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  26. Intentions, Gestures, and Salience in Ordinary and Deferred Demonstrative Reference.Allyson Mount - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):145–164.
    In debates about the proper analysis of demonstrative expressions, ostensive gestures and speaker intentions are often seen as competing for primary importance in securing reference. Underlying some of these debates is the mistaken assumption that ostensive gestures always make the demonstrated object maximally salient to interlocutors. When we abandon this assumption and focus on an object’s mutually-recognized salience itself, rather than on how the object came to be salient, we can work towards a more promising analysis with a uniform (...)
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  27. Demonstrative Induction: Its Significant Role in the History of Physics.Jon Dorling - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):360-372.
    It is argued in this paper that the valid argument forms coming under the general heading of Demonstrative Induction have played a highly significant role in the history of theoretical physics. This situation was thoroughly appreciated by several earlier philosophers of science and deserves to be more widely known and understood.
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  28.  32
    The Demonstrative and Identity Theories of Quotation.Paul Saka - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (9):452-471.
    The Demonstrative Theory holds that quoted matter is logically external to the quoting sentence, that quotation marks are (demonstratively) referential, and that quotation marks are grammatically required for autonomous mentioning. In contrast, the Identity Theory holds that quoted matter is integral to its quoting sentence, that quotation marks serve merely as disambiguating punctuation, and that mentionings need not be quotation-marked. I support the Identity Theory by pointing out fallacies in the arguments for demonstrative theories and by considering empty (...)
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  29.  81
    Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference.P. D. Magnus - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303-315.
    It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or (...)
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  30.  52
    What Demonstrative Induction Can Do Against the Threat of Underdetermination: Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli on Spectroscopic Anomalies (1921–24).Michela Massimi - 2004 - Synthese 140 (3):243-277.
    In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem ofthe underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case studyof spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theorieswas apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkalidoublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episodewithin the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the localunderdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories isresolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.
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  31. Weinberg on QFT: Demonstrative Induction and Underdetermination.Jonathan Bain - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):1-30.
    In this essay I examine a recent argument by Steven Weinberg that seeks to establish local quantum field theory as the only type of quantum theory in accord with the relevent evidence and satisfying two basic physical principles. I reconstruct the argument as a demonstrative induction and indicate it's role as a foil to the underdetermination argument in the debate over scientific realism.
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  32.  80
    Demonstrative Concepts.Joseph Levine - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):328-336.
    Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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  33. Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference.Gilbert Plumer - 1980 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):71-94.
    The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing <this> on the model of a predicable (or property).
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  34. Indiscriminable Shades and Demonstrative Concepts.Philippe Chuard - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306.
    Conceptualists have it that the representational content of perceptual experience is determined by the concepts a subject applies in having such an experience. Conceptualists like Bill Brewer [1999] and John McDowell [1994] have laid particular emphasis on demonstrative concepts in trying to account for the fact that subjects can perceive and discriminate very many specific shades of colour in experience. Against this, it has been objected that such demonstrative concepts have incoherent conditions of extension and/or of individuation, due (...)
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  35.  17
    Logic and Demonstrative Knowledge.Douglas M. Jesseph - 2013 - In Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 373--90.
    This chapter examines the views of seventeenth-century British philosophers on the notion of logic and demonstrative knowledge, particularly Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, offering an overview of traditional Aristotelianism in relation to logic and describing Bacon's approach to demonstration and logic. It also analyzes the contribution of the Cambridge Platonists and evaluates the influence of Cartesianism. The chapter concludes that theorizing about logic and demonstrative knowledge followed an arc familiar from other branches of philosophy such as (...)
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  36. Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought. [REVIEW]Naomi Eilan - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433–440.
    Suppose you are a blindsighted subject and an experimenter sitting opposite you says of an object in your functionally blind field ‘that peach looks delicious’. Unless you move your head to encompass the object within your normal field of vision you will not know which object she is talking about. Suppose now she reverts to the strategy used by neurophsychologists who work with blindsighted subjects and simply tells you that there is an object there and asks you either to reach (...)
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  37.  21
    Pure Quotation Is Demonstrative Reference.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (7):361-381.
    In a paper published recently in the Journal of Philosophy, Mario Gómez-Torrente provides a methodological argument for the “disquotational,” Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation. Gómez-Torrente’s previous work has greatly contributed to making this theory perhaps the most widely supported view of pure quotation in recent years, against all other theories including the Davidsonian, demonstrative view for which I myself have argued. Gómez-Torrente argues that rival views make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon.” I aim to turn the methodological tables. (...)
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  38.  24
    Locke's Theory of Demonstration and Demonstrative Morality.Patrick J. Connolly - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):435-451.
    Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke’s stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke’s claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke’s general remarks about demonstration as well (...)
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  39.  63
    How Demonstrative Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):402-418.
    In a very recent paper (2010), Dominic McIver Lopes has claimed that pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. If as I think Lopes is right, this has important consequences for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics divide. For one can exploit Lopes' claim in order to provide one more argument in favour of the well-known contextualist thesis that wide context has not only both a pre- and a post-semantic role, but also a semantic role – to put it (...)
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  40.  43
    A Demonstrative Analysis of 'Open Quotation'.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):534–547.
    A striking feature of Cappelen and Lepore's Davidsonian theory of quotation is the range of the overlooked data to which it offers an elegant semantical analysis. Recently, François Recanati argued for a pragmatic account of quotation, on the basis of new data that Cappelen and Lepore overlooked. In this article I expose what seem to me the weak points in Recanati's alternative approach, and show how proponents of the demonstrative theory can account for the data on which Recanati bases (...)
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  41.  54
    Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?David Pereplyotchik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
    I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts.
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  42. Demonstrative Sense and Rigidity.Vojislav Bozickovic - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (2):123-133.
    It is often thought that endowing a demonstrative with a Fregean sense leaves no room for maintaining that it is also a rigid designator. In addition, some philosophers claim that indexicals - surely the paradigms of singular reference - pose a serious threat to the Fregean sense/ reference approach as they do not comply with the view that singular terms have Fregean senses. In this paper I argue that neither of these is true.
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  43.  24
    Ostension and Demonstrative Reference.Gheorghe Stefanov - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):7-22.
    Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally strong intuitions according to which, while “this” does usually refer to an object, the gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does not refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is authentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more (...)
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  44.  4
    A Demonstrative Analysis of ‘Open Quotation’.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):534-547.
    : A striking feature of Cappelen and Lepore's Davidsonian theory of quotation is the range of the overlooked data to which it offers an elegant semantical analysis. Recently, François Recanati argued for a pragmatic account of quotation, on the basis of new data that Cappelen and Lepore overlooked. In this article I expose what seem to me the weak points in Recanati's alternative approach, and show how proponents of the demonstrative theory can account for the data on which Recanati (...)
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  45.  5
    Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought.Naomi Eilan - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433-440.
    Suppose you are a blindsighted subject and an experimenter sitting opposite you says of an object in your functionally blind field ‘that peach looks delicious’. Unless you move your head to encompass the object within your normal field of vision you will not know which object she is talking about. Suppose now she reverts to the strategy used by neurophsychologists who work with blindsighted subjects and simply tells you that there is an object there and asks you either to reach (...)
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  46.  24
    Context-Dependent and Epistemic Uses of Attention for Perceptual-Demonstrative Identification.Nicolas J. Bullot - 2005 - In B. Kokinov A. Dey (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. Springer. pp. 69--82.
    Object identification via a perceptual-demonstrative mode of presentation has been studied in cognitive science as a particularly direct and context-dependent means of identifying objects. Several recent works in cognitive science have attempted to clarify the relation between attention, demonstrative identification and context exploration. Assuming a distinction between ‘ demonstrative reference' and ‘perceptual-demonstrative identification', this article aims at specifying the role of attention in the latter and in the linking of conceptual and non conceptual contents while exploring (...)
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  47.  67
    Hume and Descartes on Skepticism with Regard to Demonstrative Reasoning.Graciela De Pierris - 2005 - Análisis Filosófico 25 (2):101-119.
    Commentaries on Hume's Treatise 1.4.1, "Of scepticism with regard to reason," have focused on the argument that an initial lack of certainty concerning the conclusion of an inference gradually diminishes to zero. In my view, Hume offers this famous argument only after, and as corollary to, a far more interesting skeptical argument concerning demonstrative reasoning, which occurs at the very beginning of Treatise 1.4.1. I focus on this neglected argument, point to its Cartesian roots, and draw a distinction between (...)
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  48.  12
    Bridging Uses of Demonstrative Pronouns in German.Patrick Georg Grosz - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (4):367-421.
    The goal of this paper is to revisit the phenomenon of bridging anaphora Thinking: readings in cognitive science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 411–420, 1977) from the perspective of the German demonstrative plural pronoun die ‘they’. I argue that antecedentless die ‘they’ can be analyzed as a novel definite that is licensed by a suitable, contextually given situation and denotes the salient person who stand in a contextually given relation to that situation. Subsequently, I propose a formal semantic implementation (...)
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  49.  4
    Objective Evaluation of Demonstrative Arguments.Emmanuel Trouche, Jing Shao & Hugo Mercier - 2019 - Argumentation 33 (1):23-43.
    Many experiments suggest that participants are more critical of arguments that challenge their views or that come from untrustworthy sources. However, other results suggest that this might not be true of demonstrative arguments. A series of four experiments tested whether people are influenced by two factors when they evaluate demonstrative arguments: how confident they are in the answer being challenged by the argument, and how much they trust the source of the argument. Participants were not affected by their (...)
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    Space and Sense: The Role of Location in Understanding Demonstrative Concepts.Gloria Ayob - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):347-354.
    My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate John Campbell's (2002) characterization of the sense of demonstrative terms and his account of why an object's location matters in our understanding of perceptually-based demonstrative terms. Campbell thinks that the senses of a demonstrative term are the different ways of consciously attending to an object. I will evaluate Campbell's account of sense by exploring and comparing two scenarios in which the actual location of a seen object is different (...)
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