11 found
  1. Matter, motion, and Humean supervenience.Denis Robinson - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4):394 – 409.
    This paper examines a doctrine which David Lewis has called 'Humean Supervenience' (hereafter 'HS'), and a problem which certain imaginary cases seem to generate for HS. They include rotating perfect spheres or discs, and flowing rivers, imagined as composed of matter which is perfectly homogeneous right down to the individual points. Before considering these examples, I shall introduce the doctrine they seem to challenge.
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  2. Can amoebae divide without multiplying?Denis Robinson - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):299 – 319.
  3. Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
  4. Re-identifying matter.Denis Robinson - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (3):317-341.
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    Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
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    Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree?: Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism.Denis Robinson - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):512-36.
    This paper explores a variety of kinds of apparent disagreement of which it may be held that they involve failure to disagree in that, at least in some broad sense, the disputants use the same words to express different meanings or concepts. It is argued that it is hard to rebut the claim that some apparent disagreements about personal identity fall into a particular sub-category of this broad type. I conclude both that a "constrained" relativism which I call "quasi-relativism" is (...)
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  7. Moral functionalism, ethical quasi-relativism, and the canberra plan.Denis Robinson - 2009 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
  8. Identities, Distinctnesses, Truthmakers, and Indiscernibility Principles.Denis Robinson - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):145-183.
    After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly substantive but false, and explore (...)
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    Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree?Denis Robinson - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):512-536.
    I hold a view I call “Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism,” PIQR for short.
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  10. Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival.Denis Robinson - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-32.
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
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  11. Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism about Rules.Denis Robinson - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...)
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