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Profile: Denis Zwirn (École Polytechnique)
  1.  45
    Bernard Walliser & Denis Zwirn (2002). Can Bayes' Rule Be Justified by Cognitive Rationality Principles? Theory and Decision 53 (2):95-135.
    The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Bayes' rule but also compatible with others, and weak updating (...)
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  2.  27
    Denis Zwirn & Herv� P. Zwirn (1996). Metaconfirmation. Theory and Decision 41 (3):195-228.
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  3.  4
    Denis Zwirn & Hervé Zwirn (1993). Logique inductive et soutien probabiliste. Dialogue 32 (02):293-.
  4.  34
    Bernard Walliser, Denis Zwirn & Hervé Zwirn (2005). Abductive Logics in a Belief Revision Framework. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):87-117.
    Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction (...)
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