461 found
Order:
See also
Doug Dennett
University of Vermont
  1. Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1339 citations  
  2. The Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1987 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1124 citations  
  3. Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1035 citations  
  4. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Bradford Books.
  5. Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - Routledge.
  6. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1984 - MIT Press.
    Essays discuss reason, self-control, self-definition, time, cause and effect, accidents, and responsibility, and explain why people want free will.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   296 citations  
  7. Freedom Evolves.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Viking Press.
    Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   229 citations  
  8. Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   449 citations  
  9.  33
    Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   800 citations  
  10. Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  11.  68
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
  12. Conditions of Personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   150 citations  
  13.  88
    Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   558 citations  
  14. Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   320 citations  
  15.  57
    The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.
  16. Quining Qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
    " Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   208 citations  
  17. Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Basic Books.
  18.  18
    Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Gilbert Harman & Daniel C. Dennett - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (1):115.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   469 citations  
  19.  54
    Darwin's Dangerous Idea.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):169-174.
  20. Consciousness Cannot Be Separated From Function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  21. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2005 - MIT Press.
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  22. Beliefs About Beliefs [P&W, SR&B].Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):568-570.
  23. Escape From the Cartesian Theater. Reply to Commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-247.
    Damasio remarks, it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly." Indeed, serial information processing models generally run this risk (Kinsbourne, 1985). The commentaries provide a wealth of confirming instances of the seductive power of this idea. Our sternest critics Block, Farah, Libet, and Treisman) adopt fairly standard Cartesian positions; more interesting are those commentators who take themselves to be mainly in agreement with us, but who express reservations or offer support with arguments that betray a continuing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   230 citations  
  24. Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away.D. C. Dennett - 1975 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (2):169–188.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   222 citations  
  25. The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  26.  31
    Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.Daniel C. Dennett - 1989 - Journal of the History of Biology 22 (2):361-367.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   217 citations  
  27. True Believers : The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In A. F. Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  28.  30
    Real Patterns.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   167 citations  
  29. Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This book brings together his essays on the philosphy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive ethology that appeared in inaccessible journals from 1984...
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  30. Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI.Daniel Dennett - 1984 - In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution. Cambridge University Press.
  31.  12
    Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.Daniel C. Dennett - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):540-543.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   182 citations  
  32. Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet?Daniel C. Dennett - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  33. The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 4--237.
    What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  34. Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle & Daniel N. Robinson - 2007 - Columbia University Press.
    In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_, which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  35.  10
    Content and Consciousness.D. C. Dennett - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (18):604-604.
  36. Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
  37. How to Study Human Consciousness Empirically or Nothing Comes to Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - Synthese 53 (2):159-80.
  38.  53
    What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?Michael A. Cohen, Daniel C. Dennett & Nancy Kanwisher - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):324-335.
    Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still see far less than we think we do. Taken (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  39.  69
    Why Not the Whole Iguana?Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):103-104.
  40. Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Vs Folk Science and Belief Vs Opinion.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--148.
    Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  41. On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - In Brainstorms. MIT Press.
  42.  32
    Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind.Matthew M. Hurley, Daniel C. Dennett & Reginald B. Adams - 2011 - MIT Press.
    Why do we spend so much of our time passing on amusing anecdotes, making wisecracks,watching The Simpsons? In Inside Jokes, Matthew Hurley, DanielDennett, and Reginald Adams offer an evolutionary and cognitive perspective.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  43. Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - forthcoming - 2021: Polity Books.
    Some thinkers argue that our best scientific theories about the world prove that free will is an illusion. Others disagree. The concept of free will is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso – to debate (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Who's On First?Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
    There is a pattern of miscommunication bedeviling the people working on consciousness that is reminiscent of the classic Abbott and Costello ‘ Who ’ s on First?’ routine. With the best of intentions, people are talking past each other, seeing major disagreements when there are only terminological or tactical preferences — or even just matters of emphasis — that divide the sides. Since some substantive differences also lurk in this confusion, it is well worth trying to sort out. Much of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  45. The Mind's I.Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel C. Dennett (eds.) - 1981 - Basic Books.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  46. Why You Can’T Make a Computer That Feels Pain.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Synthese 38 (3):415-449.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  47.  18
    Elbow Room.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):423-425.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  48. The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches: A View From the East Pole.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
  49. The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts.Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:177-194.
    I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  50. The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.
    Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
1 — 50 / 461