Results for 'Derek A. Parfit'

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  1. Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons.Derek A. Parfit - 1987 - In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.
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  2. On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's 1984 classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
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  3. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid (...)
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  4. Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 81-125.
    One of the central debates within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy concerns how to formulate an egalitarian theory of distributive justice which gives coherent expression to egalitarian convictions and withstands the most powerful anti-egalitarian objections. This book brings together many of the key contributions to that debate by some of the world’s leading political philosophers: Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Larry Temkin.
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  5. We Are Not Human Beings.Derek Parfit - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (1):5-28.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. This information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and is in every (...)
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  6. Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  7. Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?Derek Parfit - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):110-127.
    According to the Repugnant Conclusion: Compared with the existence of many people who would all have some very high quality of life, there is some much larger number of people whose existence would be better, even though these people would all have lives that were barely worth living. I suggest some ways in which we might be able to avoid this conclusion. I try to defend a strong form of lexical superiority.
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  8. Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles.Derek Parfit - 2017 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (2):118-157.
    Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. After we all die, human history ends, since there would be no future people. Would that be bad? Would we have acted wrongly? Some pessimists would answer No. These people are saddened by the suffering in most people’s lives, and they believe it would be wrong to inflict such suffering on others (...)
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  9. Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 1986 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-164.
    How many people should there be? Can there be overpopulation: too many people living? I shall present a puzzling argument about these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then sketch a possible reply.
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  10. The Indeterminacy of Identity: A Reply to Brueckner.Derek Parfit - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):23 - 33.
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  11.  71
    A Buddhist Debate About the Self; and Remarks on Buddhism in the Work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson.Collins Steven - 1997 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 25 (5):467-493.
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  12. The Unimportance of Identity.Derek Parfit - 1995 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in (...)
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  13. Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 2004 - In J. Ryberg & T. Tännsjö (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 7-22.
    How many people should there be? Can there be overpopulation: too many people living? I shall present a puzzling argument about these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then sketch a possible reply.
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  14. Innumerate Ethics.Derek Parfit - 1978 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (4):285-301.
    Suppose that we can help either one person or many others. Is it a reason t0 help the many that We should thus be helping more people? John Taurek thinks not. We may learn from his arguments.
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  15.  38
    A Reply to Sterba.Derek Parfit - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2):193-194.
    I did not, as James Sterba writes, claim to have explained "the asymmetry view." I claimed that, since my suggested explanation makes it impossible to solve the Paradox of Future Individuals, "we must abandon" one of its essential premises (my p. i52). Sterba's main claim is that my suggested explanation "does not so much explain or justify the [asymmetry] view as simply restate it." Is this so? My explanation assumed (W) that an act cannot be wrong if it will not (...)
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  16. What We Could Rationally Will.Derek Parfit - 2002 - The Tanner Lectures on Human Values.
    DEREK PARFIT is senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He regularly teaches there and is also afŠliated with New York University and Harvard. He was educated at Oxford and was a Harkness Fellow at Columbia and Harvard. He has been a visiting professor at Princeton, Temple, Rice, and the University of Colorado at Boulder, and is a fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has made major contributions to (...)
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  17. Parfit on 'the Normal/a Reliable/Any Cause' of Relation R.A. Sidelle - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):735-760.
    In section 96 of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit offers his now familiar tripartite distinction among candidates for ‘what matters’: (1) Relation R with its normal cause; (2) R with any reliable cause; (3) R with any cause. He defends option (3). This paper tries to show that there is important ambiguity in this distinction and in Parfit's defence of his position. There is something strange about Parfit's way of dividing up the territory: I argue that (...)
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  18. Why Anything? Why This?Derek Parfit - 1998 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  19. A Set of Solutions to Parfit's Problems.Stuart Rachels - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):214–238.
    In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit cannot find a theory of well-being that solves the Non-Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, the Absurd Conclusion, and all forms of the Mere Addition Paradox. I describe a “Quasi-Maximizing” theory that solves them. This theory includes (i) the denial that being better than is transitive and (ii) the “Conflation Principle,” according to which alternative B is hedonically better than alternative C if it would be better for someone to have all the B-experiences. (...)
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  20. Is Common-Sense Morality Self-Defeating?Derek Parfit - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (10):533-545.
    When is a moral theory self-defeating? I suggest the following. There are certain things we ought to try to achieve. Call these our moral aims. Our moral theory would be self-defeating if we believed we ought to do what will cause our moral aims to be worse achieved. Is this ever true? If so, what does it show?
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  21.  71
    Acts and Outcomes: A Reply to Boonin-Vail.Derek Parfit - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (4):308-316.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
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  22.  85
    Correspondence.Derek Parfit & Charles Fried - 1979 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (4):395-397.
    An exchange of correspondence with Charles Fried. Parfit's section begins: "I am puzzled. Consider Case One: I could save either one stranger or five others. Both acts would involve a heroic personal sacrifice. I choose, for no reason, to save the one rather than the five. Fried argues: (i ) Since both acts would involve a heroic sacrifice, I could not be criticized if I chose to do neither. (2) If I could not be criticized for choosing to do (...)
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  23. Should We Retire Derek Parfit?Ronald M. Green - 2011 - Hastings Center Report 41 (1):3-3.
    For nearly a generation, Derek Parfit's arguments in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons have shaped debates about our moral responsibilities to future people. Struggling to accommodate Parfit's insights, philosophers and bioethicists have minimized or accentuated obligations to the future in ways that defy ordinary moral intuitions. In this issue, Robert Sparrow develops the troubling implications of the views of two leading theorists whose work favoring human genetic enhancement is influenced by Parfit. Sparrow believes they return (...)
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  24. A Counterexample to Parfit's Rule Consequentialism.Jacob Nebel - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-10.
    Derek Parfit argues that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. I present a counterexample: a world in which no one's moral beliefs have any motivating force. I explain how Parfit's metaethical commitments imply that such a world is possible, and why this possibility is a problem for Parfit's project of reconciling Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism. I consider two of Parfit's responses to my counterexample.
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  25.  10
    A Critical Review on the Thesis of the Depe ndence of the Experiences of Derek Parfit.Angelo Antonio Briones Belmar - 2019 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 30:238-267.
    Resumen: Derek Parfit en Personas, racionalidad y tiempo sostiene que si bien es posible concebir experiencias sin referir a personas, las experiencias dependen para su existencia de las personas, y a su vez, las experiencias dependerían para su identidad de cierta otra entidad no idéntica con la entidad persona. Tal tesis, que deviene de determinado experimentos mentales de Parfit, específicamente del argumento Mi División y el Argumento del Hospital, se revisará desde ciertas nociones metafísicas de E. J. (...)
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  26. Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions.Margaret A. Boden, Richard B. Brandt, Peter Caldwell, Fred Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Richard Hare, David Hume, W. D. Joske, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Kaufman, James Lenman, John Leslie, Steven Luper-Foy, Michaelis Michael, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, George Pitcher, Stephen E. Rosenbaum, David Schmidtz, Arthur Schopenhauer, David B. Suits, Richard Taylor & Bernard Williams - 2004 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.
     
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  27.  73
    Postscript.Derek Parfit - 2004 - In Jesper Ryberg & Torbjörn Tännsjö (eds.), The Classical Review. pp. 387-388.
    The reasoning in this anthology shows how hard it is to form acceptable theories in cases that involve different numbers of people. That's highly important. And it gives us ground for worry about our appeal to particular theories in the other two kinds of case: those which involve the same numbers, in the different outcomes, though these are not all the same people, and those which do involve all and only the same people. But there is still a clear distinction (...)
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  28. A Dilemma for Parfit's Conception of Normativity.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):466-474.
    In his discussion of normative concepts in the first part of On What Matters (2011), Parfit holds that apart from the ‘ought’ of decisive reason, there are other senses of ‘ought’ which do not imply any reasons. This claim poses a dilemma for his ‘reason-involving conception’ of normativity: either Parfit has to conclude that non-reason-implying ‘oughts’ are not normative. Or else he is forced to accept that normativity needs only to involve ‘apparent reasons’ – a certain kind of (...)
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  29.  66
    Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry.Andrea Sauchelli (ed.) - 2020 - Routledge.
    Derek Parfit (1942–2017) is widely considered to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Reasons and Persons is arguably the most influential of the two books published in his lifetime and hailed as a classic work of ethics and personal identity. Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry is an outstanding introduction to and assessment of Parfit’s book, with chapters by leading scholars of ethics, metaphysics and of (...)
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  30. Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit.Kim Atkins - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):329 – 349.
    In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other (...)
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  31.  76
    Rationality and Time.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:47 - 82.
    One theory about rationality is the Self-interest Theory, or S. S claims that what each of us has most reason to do is whatever would be best for himself. And it is irrational for anyone to do what he knows would be worse for himself. When morality conflicts with self-interest, many people would reject the Self-interest Theory. But most of these people would accept one of the claims that S makes. This is the claim that we should not care less (...)
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  32. Essays on Derek Parfit's on What Matters.Jussi Suikkanen & John Cottingham (eds.) - 2009 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    World–renowned British philosopher Derek Parfit′s On What Matters is certain to change the face of some of the most fundamental concerns of moral philosophy – including the nature of practical reasons and rationality, and the interpretation of Kantian Ethics and its relation to consequentialism. It will also initiate new debates about the freedom of the will, the nature of moral attitudes and properties, the relationship between prudentiality and ethics, and the significance of desiring. -/- In Essays on (...) Parfit s On What Matters, seven leading moral philosophers offer critical evaluations of the central ideas presented in this greatly anticipated new work. Authored by a team including Princeton′s Michael Smith, one of the world′s leading meta–ethicists, the papers address a variety of topics relating to Parfit′s work, including his central thesis that the main ethical theories can agree on what matters, and his defense of moral realism. (shrink)
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  33. Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, On What Matters.Stephen Darwall - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):79-105.
    Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of (...)
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  34. Should Ethics Be More Impersonal? A Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):439-484.
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  35. Przeludnienie a jakość życia.Derek Parfit - 1996 - Nowa Krytyka 7.
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  36.  71
    Is Personal Identity Something That Does Not Matter? An Inquiry Into Derek Parfit and Alfred N. Whitehead.Eleonora Mingarelli - 2013 - Process Studies 42 (1):87-109.
    The purpose of the present article is to disentangle both Parfit’s and Whitehead’s views on personal identity. Issues regarding what it means to be a singular individual, how a person can remain the same over time, and what makes an individual an original being with specific characteristics will be examined.
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  37. "Evidence and the Afterlife" Several Prominent Philosophers, Including A.J. Ayer and Derek Parfit, Have.Steven D. Hales - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):335-346.
    vol. 28, nos. 1-4, 2001 empirical data-a large concession-belief in reincarnation is still unjustified.
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  38. Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions.David Benatar, Margaret A. Boden, Peter Caldwell, Fred Feldman, John Martin Fischer, Richard Hare, David Hume, W. D. Joske, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Kaufman, James Lenman, John Leslie, Steven Luper, Michaelis Michael, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, George Pitcher, Stephen E. Rosenbaum, David Schmidtz, Arthur Schopenhauer, David B. Suits, Richard Taylor, Bruce N. Waller & Bernard Williams (eds.) - 2004 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.
     
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  39. Climbing Which Mountain? A Critical Study of Derek Parfit On What Matters.Timothy Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):167-181.
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  40. Parfit on Fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.
    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In (...)
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  41.  67
    Discounting the Future: John Rawls and Derek Parfit's Critique of the Discount Rate.L. van Liedekerke - 2004 - Ethical Perspectives 11 (1):72-83.
    This article concentrates on the critique by John Rawls and Derek Parfit of the use of a discount rate in economics. In a presentation of the basic economics underlying the use of a discount rate, the inherently problematic nature of people’s preferences with respect to time are highlighted. The second part discusses the role of the discount rate in economic optimal growth models. An outline of the economic theory of optimal growth is provided, pointing out how Rawls’s analysis (...)
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  42.  30
    Knowledge Argument Versus Bundle Theory According to Derek Parfit.Tomasz Huzarek - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):237-250.
    According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour (...)
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  43.  7
    Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism 1.David Sobel - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6.
    Derek Parfit, in On What Matters, argues that all subjective accounts of normative reasons for action are false. This chapter focuses on his “Agony Argument.” The first premise of the Agony Argument is that we necessarily have current reasons to avoid our own future agony. Its second premise is that subjective accounts cannot vindicate this fact. So, the argument concludes, subjective accounts must be rejected. This chapter accepts the first premise of this argument and that it is valid. (...)
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  44. Parfit and the Russians.Simon Beck - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):205.
    The paper takes a close look at Derek Parfit’s example of the Nineteenth Century Russian in 'Reasons and Persons'. Parfit presents it as an example which illustrates the moral consequences of adopting his reductionist view of personal identity in a positive light. I argue that things turn out to be more complex than he envisages, and that it might be far more difficult to live in his world than he allows.
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  45.  40
    Should Consequentialists Make Parfit's Second Mistake? A Refutation of Jackson.Ben Eggleston - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):1–15.
    Frank Jackson claims that consequentialists should hold the view that Derek Parfit labels the second ‘mistake in moral mathematics’, which is the view that “If some act is right or wrong because of . . . effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act.” But each of the three arguments that Jackson offers is unsound. The root of the problem is that in order to argue for the conclusion Jackson aims to establish (that consequentialists (...)
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    We Are Not Replicable: A Challenge to Parfit’s View.Amihud Gilead - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):453-460.
    Challenging the idea of personal identity, Derek Parfit has argued that persons are replicable and that personal identity does not really matter. In a recent paper Parfit again defends the idea of personal replicability. Challenging this idea in turn, I explain why persons are absolutely not replicable. To prove this I rely on two arguments—the Author Argument and the Love Argument. The irreplicability of persons relies upon the singularity of each person and thus entails that personal identity (...)
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  47. Parfit on Pains, Pleasures, and the Time of Their Occurrence.Dan Moller - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67 - 82.
    Consider our attitude toward painful and pleasant experiences depending on when they occur. A striking but rarely discussed feature of our attitude which Derek Parfit has emphasized is that we strongly wish painful experiences to lie in our past and pleasant experiences to lie in our future. Our asymmetrical attitudes toward future and past pains and pleasures can be forcefully illustrated by means of a thought-experiment described by Parfit (1984, 165) which I will paraphrase as follows: You (...)
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  48.  62
    Parfit’s and Scanlon’s Non-Metaphysical Moral Realism as Alethic Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):751-761.
    Thomas Scanlon and Derek Parfit have recently defended a meta-ethical view that is supposed to satisfy realistic intuitions about morality, without the metaphysical implications that many find hard to accept in other realist views. Both philosophers argue that truths in the normative domain do not have ontological implications, while truths in the scientific domain presuppose a metaphysical reality. What distinguishes Scanlon and Parfit’s approach from other realistic meta-ethical theories is that they maintain that normative entities exist in (...)
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  49.  17
    Normative Wahrheiten Ohne Ontologie? Derek Parfit Und der „Neue“ Non-Naturalismus.Markus Rüther - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):187-220.
    Das Thema des Beitrages bildet der „neue“ Non-Naturalismus, welcher exemplarisch am metaethischen Ansatz von Derek Parfit untersucht wird. Parfits Ansatz zeichnet sich durch das Ziel aus, eine neue Theorienoption zu ermöglichen, die einerseits von der Existenz normativer Tatsachen ausgeht, ohne jedoch andererseits auf die ontologischen Verpflichtungen der klassischen Vertreter des Non-Naturalismus festgelegt zu sein. Hierfür wird der Begriff der „nicht-ontologischen Existenz“ eingeführt und von robusten ontologischen Existenzweisen unterschieden. In diesem Beitrag wird dafür argumentiert, dass Parfit bisher nur (...)
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    The Parfit Population Problem.Don Locke - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (240):131 - 157.
    Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons is a long, difficult and fascinating book, inside which three shorter, clearer and better books are struggling to get out. The third of these shorter but better books deals with the problem of Future Generations, and that is the book I want to discuss. In it Parfit tries, but fails, to find a theory—Theory X, he calls it—which will deal with various problems and issues which he develops, and in particular the issue (...)
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