This book analyses the role of diagrammatic reasoning in Plato’s philosophy: the readers will realize that Plato, describing the stages of human cognitive development using a diagram, poses a logic problem to stimulate the general reasoning abilities of his readers. Following the examination of mental models in this book, the readers will reflect on what inferences can be useful to approach this kind of logic problem. Plato calls for a collaboration between writer and readers. In this book (...) the readers will examine the connection between diagrams and discovery, realizing the important epistemic role of visualization. They will recognize the crucial role that diagrams play in problem solving. The logic problem elaborated by Plato is addressed considering the epistemic function of mental models. These models introduce to an advanced stage of cognitive development, in which reasoning uses in its investigations a higher-level of mathematical complexity, represented by structuralism. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.

Just before the Scientific Revolution, there was a "Mathematical Revolution", heavily based on geometrical and machine diagrams. The "faculty of imagination" (now called scientific visualization) was developed to allow 3D understanding of planetary motion, human anatomy and the workings of machines. 1543 saw the publication of the heavily geometrical work of Copernicus and Vesalius, as well as the first Italian translation of Euclid.

In Part III of his 1879 logic Frege proves a theorem in the theory of sequences on the basis of four definitions. He claims in Grundlagen that this proof, despite being strictly deductive, constitutes a real extension of our knowledge, that it is ampliative rather than merely explicative. Frege furthermore connects this idea of ampliative deductive proof to what he thinks of as a fruitful definition, one that draws new lines. My aim is to show that we can make good (...) sense of these claims if we read Frege’s notation diagrammatically, in particular, if we take that notation to have been designed to enable one to exhibit the (inferentially articulated) contents of concepts in a way that allows one to reason deductively on the basis of those contents. (shrink)

Many types of everyday and specialized reasoning depend on diagrams: we use maps to find our way, we draw graphs and sketches to communicate concepts and prove geometrical theorems, and we manipulate diagrams to explore new creative solutions to problems. The active involvement and manipulation of representational artifacts for purposes of thinking and communicating is discussed in relation to C.S. Peirce’s notion of diagrammatical reasoning. We propose to extend Peirce’s original ideas and sketch a conceptual framework that delineates (...) different kinds of diagram manipulation: Sometimes diagrams are manipulated in order to profile known information in an optimal fashion. At other times diagrams are explored in order to gain new insights, solve problems or discover hidden meaning potentials. The latter cases often entail manipulations that either generate additional information or extract information by means of abstraction. Ideas are substantiated by reference to ethnographic, experimental and historical examples. (shrink)

According to the received view, Charles S. Peirce's theory of diagrammatic reasoning is derived from Kant's philosophy of mathematics. For Kant, only mathematics is constructive/synthetic, logic being instead discursive/analytic, while for Peirce, the entire domain of necessary reasoning, comprising mathematics and deductive logic, is diagrammatic, i.e. constructive in the Kantian sense. This shift was stimulated, as Peirce himself acknowledged, by the doctrines contained in Friedrich Albert Lange's Logische Studien (1877). The present paper reconstructs Peirce's reading of (...) Lange's book, and illustrates what, according to Peirce, was right and what was problematic in Lange's account of reasoning. It further seeks to explain how Peirce's theory of deductive reasoning was a combination of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and Lange's philosophy of logic. (shrink)

In recent years, semiotics has become an innovative theoretical framework in mathematics education. The purpose of this article is to show that semiotics can be used to explain learning as a process of experimenting with and communicating about one's own representations of mathematical problems. As a paradigmatic example, we apply a Peircean semiotic framework to answer the question of how students learned the concept of "distribution" in a statistics course by "diagrammatic reasoning" and by developing "hypostatic abstractions," that (...) is by forming new mathematical objects which can be used as means for communication and further reasoning. Peirce's semiotic terminology is used as an alternative for notions such as modeling, symbolizing, and reification. We will show that it is a precise instrument of analysis with regard to the complexity of learning and of communication in mathematics classroom. (shrink)

Diagrams figure prominently in human reasoning, especially in science. Cognitive science research has provided important insights into the inferences afforded by diagrams and revealed differences in the reasoning made possible by physically instantiated diagrams and merely imagined ones. In scientific practice, diagrams figures prominently both in the way scientists reason about data and in how they conceptualize explanatory mechanisms. To identify patterns in data, scientists often graph it. While some graph formats, such as line graphs, are used widely, (...) scientists often develop specialized formats designed to reveal specific types of patterns and not infrequently employ multiple formats to present the same data, a practice illustrated with graph formats developed in circadian biology. Cognitive scientists have revealed the spatial reasoning and iterative search processes scientists deploy in understanding graphs. In developing explanations, scientists commonly diagram mechanisms they take to be responsible for a phenomenon, a practice again illustrated with diagrams of circadian mechanisms. Cognitive science research has revealed how reasoners mentally animate such diagrams to understand how a mechanism generates a phenomenon. (shrink)

Many types of everyday and specialized reasoning depend on diagrams: we use maps to fnd our way, we draw graphs and sketches to communicate concepts and prove geometrical theorems, and we manipulate diagrams to explore new creative solutions to problems. While the linear and symbolic character of verbal language has long served as the predominant model of human thought, it is remarkable how — through a range of contexts — thinking and communication critically depend on manipulations of external, ofen (...) non-linear, and manipulable iconic-diagrammatic vehicles. In this issue of Pragmatics and Cognition we explore such diagrammatic reasoning, that is, of individual and intersubjectively distributed cognitive processes relying on external representations (i.e. diagrams in a broad sense) as tools for thinking and communicating. (shrink)

Parallelism has been drawn between modes of representation and problem-sloving processes: Diagrams are more useful for brainstorming while symbolic representation is more welcomed in a formal proof. The paper gets to the root of this clear-cut dualistic picture and argues that the strength of diagrammatic reasoning in the brainstorming process does not have to be abandoned at the stage of proof, but instead should be appreciated and could be preserved in mathematical proofs.

This article aims to examine the relationship between image and narrative by means of Peirce’s first trichotomy of qualisign-sinsign-legisign or, for the purposes of the current argument, image-diagram-metaphor. It is argued that narrative, as an extended metaphor, can be examined in three modes: in the image; schematically, in the imagination; and allegorically or in a thought experiment, through hypothetic interpretation. The article outlines two kinds of diagrammatic reasoning emphasized by Peirce: corollarial deduction in which the image is ‘literally (...) seen’ and the reasoning steps are manifest in its conclusion; and theorematic deduction where the conclusion in a diagram is subject to a hypothesis which transforms the image into something new. Demonstrating the breadth of diagrammatic reasoning with reference to the 2018 film, The Shape of Water, the article seeks to explore how allegory and diagram are mutually cooperative, based on three ontological modes: the expressive, the cognitive, and the symbolic. Its primary focus, then, is not so much on the story events of the narrative, as the way that they are visualized and characterized as the fairy story unfolds. It is suggested that the interpreting activity involved in allegory and diagram ties interpretation to metacognition, ultimately (re)recognizing the image in The Shape of Water in an attempt to ascertain the meaning of love. (shrink)

The approach to the question of philosophical practice has been dominated by a subordination of practice to theory corresponding in general to a representational conception of philosophy. Methods of diagrammatic reasoning developed within philosophical semiotics provide a more effective approach. Inparticular, Peirce’s system of existential graphs exemplifies how diagrammatic reasoning is able formally to express the processes through which philosophical dialogue and cooperation actually take place and to link such processes to the methods and practices arising (...) in other disciplines and traditions, including those of science, politics, art, religion and technological production. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I delineate Peirce's general concept of diagrammatic reasoning from other usages of the term that focus either on diagrammatic systems as developed in logic and AI or on reasoning with mental models. The main function of Peirce's form of diagrammatic reasoning is to facilitate individual or social thinking processes in situations that are too complex to be coped with exclusively by internal cognitive means. I provide a (...) class='Hi'>diagrammatic definition of diagrammatic reasoning that emphasizes the construction of, and experimentation with, external representations based on the rules and conventions of a chosen representation system. The second part starts with a summary of empirical research regarding cognitive effects of working with diagrams and a critique of approaches that use “mental models” to explain those effects. The main focus of this section is, however, to elaborate the idea that diagrammatic reasoning should be conceptualized as a case of “distributed cognition.” Using the mathematics lesson described by Plato in his Meno, I analyze those cognitive conditions of diagrammatic reasoning that are relevant in this case. (shrink)

Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry is widely interpreted as a reaction against a Platonic realist conception of mathematics. Here I argue to the contrary that Aristotle is concerned primarily with the methodological question of how universal inferences are warranted by particular geometrical constructions. His answer hinges on the concept of abstraction, an operation of “taking away” certain features of material particulars that makes perspicuous universal relations among magnitudes. On my reading, abstraction is a diagrammatic procedure for Aristotle, and it is (...) through imagined variation of diagrams that one can universalize spatial inferences. In order to shift the discussion of Aristotle’s work on geometry from ontological to methodological questions, I argue in the first section that geometrical properties for Aristotle are necessary accidents of the particulars, canonically diagrams, in which they inhere. I then consider a line of research that shows how diagrams in ancient geometry are not illustrations of the textual proof but are in part constitutive of geometrical inference, an insight I claim can shed light on Aristotle’s philosophical project. Next I substantiate this assertion by giving an alternative interpretation of abstraction according to which it is a diagrammatic procedure that allows a part of a particular diagram to stand in for a universal. In the last section, I consider Aristotle’s account of mathematical cognition, arguing that there is evidence for the view that imagination is necessary both for the construction of figures, and for their presentation as abstractions subject to universal inference. (shrink)

A Mathematical Review by John Corcoran, SUNY/Buffalo -/- Macbeth, Danielle Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), no. 1, 289–314. ABSTRACT This review begins with two quotations from the paper: its abstract and the first paragraph of the conclusion. The point of the quotations is to make clear by the “give-them-enough-rope” strategy how murky, incompetent, and badly written the paper is. I know I am asking a lot, but I have to ask you to read the quoted (...) passages—aloud if possible. Don’t miss the silly attempt to recycle Kant’s quip “Concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind”. What the paper was aiming at includes the absurdity: “Proofs without definitions are empty; definitions without proofs are, if not blind, then dumb.” But the author even bollixed this. The editor didn’t even notice. The copy-editor missed it. And the author’s proof-reading did not catch it. In order not to torment you I will quote the sentence as it appears: “In a slogan: proofs without definitions are empty, merely the aimless manipulation of signs according to rules; and definitions without proofs are, if no blind, then dumb.”[sic] The rest of my review discusses the paper’s astounding misattribution to contemporary logicians of the information-theoretic approach. This approach was cruelly trashed by Quine in his 1970 Philosophy of Logic, and thereafter ignored by every text I know of. The paper under review attributes generally to modern philosophers and logicians views that were never espoused by any of the prominent logicians—such as Hilbert, Gödel, Tarski, Church, and Quine—apparently in an attempt to distance them from Frege: the focus of the article. On page 310 we find the following paragraph. “In our logics it is assumed that inference potential is given by truth-conditions. Hence, we think, deduction can be nothing more than a matter of making explicit information that is already contained in one’s premises. If the deduction is valid then the information contained in the conclusion must be contained already in the premises; if that information is not contained already in the premises […], then the argument cannot be valid.” Although the paper is meticulous in citing supporting literature for less questionable points, no references are given for this. In fact, the view that deduction is the making explicit of information that is only implicit in premises has not been espoused by any standard symbolic logic books. It has only recently been articulated by a small number of philosophical logicians from a younger generation, for example, in the prize-winning essay by J. Sagüillo, Methodological practice and complementary concepts of logical consequence: Tarski’s model-theoretic consequence and Corcoran’s information-theoretic consequence, History and Philosophy of Logic, 30 (2009), pp. 21–48. The paper omits definitions of key terms including ‘ampliative’, ‘explicatory’, ‘inference potential’, ‘truth-condition’, and ‘information’. The definition of prime number on page 292 is as follows: “To say that a number is prime is to say that it is not divisible without remainder by another number”. This would make one be the only prime number. The paper being reviewed had the benefit of two anonymous referees who contributed “very helpful comments on an earlier draft”. Could these anonymous referees have read the paper? -/- J. Corcoran, U of Buffalo, SUNY -/- PS By the way, if anyone has a paper that has been turned down by other journals, any journal that would publish something like this might be worth trying. (shrink)

Theories of diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning typically seek to account for either the formal semantics of diagrams, or for the advantages which diagrammatic representations hold for the reasoner over other forms of representation. Regrettably, almost no theory exists which accounts for both of these issues together, nor how they affect one another. We do not attempt to provide such an account here. We do, however, seek to lay out larger context than is generally used for examining the (...) processes of using diagrams in reasoning or communication. A context in which detailed studies of sub-problems, such as the formal semantics or cognitive impact of specific diagrammatic systems, may be embedded.Accounts of the embedding of sentential logics in the computational processes of reasoners and communicators are relatively well developed from several decades of research in AI. Analogies between the sentential and the graphical cases are quite revealing about both similarities and differences. To provide a structure for the 'grand context' of diagrammatic representation and reasoning, and to clarify the relations between its component problems, we examine carefully these analogies and the decomposition they provide of subproblems for analysing diagrammatic reasoning. (shrink)

Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning refers to the diagrammatic inferential practice that originated in the geometrical proofs of Euclid’s Elements. A seminal philosophical analysis of this practice by Manders (‘The Euclidean diagram’, 2008) has revealed that a systematic method of reasoning underlies the use of diagrams in Euclid’s proofs, leading in turn to a logical analysis aiming to capture this method formally via proof systems. The central premise of this paper is that our understanding of Euclidean diagrammatic (...) reasoning can be fruitfully advanced by confronting these logical and philosophical analyses with the field of cognitive science. Surprisingly, central aspects of the philosophical and logical analyses resonate in very natural ways with research topics in mathematical cognition, spatial cognition and the psychology of reasoning. The paper develops these connections, concentrating on four issues: (1) the cognitive origins of Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning, (2) the cognitive representations of spatial relations in Euclidean diagrams, (3) the nature of the cognitive processes and cognitive representations involved in Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning seen as a form of visuospatial relational reasoning and (4) the complexity of Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning for the human cognitive system. For each of these issues, our analysis generates concrete experiment proposals, opening thereby the way for further empirical investigations. The paper is thus a prolegomenon to a research program on Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning at the crossroads of logic, philosophy and cognitive science. (shrink)

Discussions concerning belief revision, theorydevelopment, and ``creativity'' in philosophy andAI, reveal a growing interest in Peirce'sconcept of abduction. Peirce introducedabduction in an attempt to providetheoretical dignity and clarification to thedifficult problem of knowledge generation. Hewrote that ``An Abduction is Originary inrespect to being the only kind of argumentwhich starts a new idea'' (Peirce, CP 2.26).These discussions, however, led to considerabledebates about the precise way in which Peirce'sabduction can be used to explain knowledgegeneration (cf. Magnani, 1999; Hoffmann, 1999).The crucial question is (...) that of understandinghow we can get the new elements capableof enlarging our theories. Under thesecircumstances, it might be helpful to step outof the entanglement and reconsider the basis ofthe problem that originally triggered Peirce'sinterest in abduction. This will lead us toanother Peircean concept, that of ``diagrammaticreasoning,'' which I discuss here in the contextof his ``pragmatism.'' In this way, I hope toreach a better understanding of thecontribution of ``abduction'' to the knowledgegeneration process. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber (MS) have ventured to undermine an age-old assumption in logic, namely the presence of premise-conclusion structures, in favor of two novel claims: that reasoning is an evolutionary product of a reason-intuiting module in the mind, and that theories of logic teach next to nothing about the mechanisms of how inferences are drawn in that module. The present paper begs to differ: logic is indispensable in formulating conceptions of cognitive elements of reasoning, and MS is no (...) less exempt from taking notice of premise-conclusion structures than the commonplace theories of reasoning are. Our counterclaim is realized in terms of diagrammatic reasoning dating back to Charles Peirce’s pragmaticism. The upshot is that pragmatist logic restores the premise-conclusion structures in argumentation, supplants reason-intuition module with logical content, and validates good reasoning as an indispensable resource evident to all rational minds that claim ownership of reason and understanding. (shrink)

In the development of pure mathematics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, two very different movements had prevailed. The so-called rigor movement of arithmetization, which turned into set theoretical foundationalism, on the one hand, and the axiomatic movement, which originated in Poncelet's or Peirce's emphasis on the continuity principle, on the other hand. Axiomatical mathematics or mathematics as diagrammatic reasoning represents a genetic perspective aiming at generalization, whereas mathematics as arithmetic or set theory is mainly concerned with foundation (...) and separation. We may thus conclude when Peirce defines mathematics in terms of diagrammatic reasoning, that this implies some very profound distinctions in the epistemology of mathematics. (shrink)

The paper attempts to analyze in some detail the main problems encountered in reasoning using diagrams, which may cause errors in reasoning, produce doubts concerning the reliability of diagrams, and impressions that diagrammatic reasoning lacks the rigour necessary for mathematical reasoning. The paper first argues that such impressions come from long neglect which led to a lack of well-developed, properly tested and reliable reasoning methods, as contrasted with the amount of work generations of mathematicians (...) expended on refining the methods of reasoning with formulae and predicate calculus. Next, two main groups of problems occurring in diagrammatic reasoning are introduced. The second group, called diagram imprecision, is then briefly summarized, its detailed analysis being postponed to another paper. The first group, called collectively the generalization problem, is analyzed in detail in the rest of the paper. The nature and causes of the problems from this group are explained, methods of detecting the potentially harmful occurrences of these problems are discussed, and remedies for possible errors they may cause are proposed. Some of the methods are adapted from similar methods used in reasoning with formulae, several other problems constitute new, specifically diagrammatic ways of reliable reasoning. (shrink)

In current philosophy of information, different authors have been supporting the veridicality thesis (VT). According to this thesis, an epistemically-oriented concept of information must have truth as one of its necessary conditions. Two challenges can be raised against VT. First, some philosophers object that veridicalists erroneously ignore the informativeness of false messages. Secondly, it is not clear whether VT can adequately explain the information considered in hypothetical reasoning. In this sense, logical diagrams offer an interesting case of analysis: by (...) manipulating a logical diagram we can verify that a certain conclusion follows from a set of premises, but it cannot help us to determine the actual truth-value of a given set of propositions. Focusing on the latter challenge, in this paper I claim that logical diagrams set out potential counterexamples to VT and, consequently, pose a real challenge to this thesis. First, a veridicalist analysis of logical diagrams requires the assumption of metatheoretical properties which are not satisfied by some logical systems (and, consequently, are not satisfied by some systems of logical diagrams). So, VT does not fit well as a general framework for a theory of logical diagrammatic information. Secondly, based on semantic inferentialism, one can propose a normative interpretation of the inferential content of logical diagrams not exposed to the problems faced by VT. Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that veridicalism cannot accommodate such a normative interpretation. In other words, normativism represents a real (though still underexplored) alternative to veridicality. Due to these reasons, I conclude that, until further research, we should adopt a more parsimonious standpoint and say that logical diagrams provide inferential information simply. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 210 Seiten: 35-56.

In the 1903 lecture “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?” Charles Peirce provides a detailed account of the process of ethical deliberation intended to shape right conduct. He does this in the context of arguing against the claim that there is no distinction between moral right and wrong. He considered the argument for this claim to be analogous to the argument for the claim that there is no distinction between good and bad reasoning.1 Though Peirce’s ultimate concern in the (...) lecture is to show that there is a distinction between good and bad reasoning, his discussion of the distinction between moral right and wrong is important in itself for what it reveals about his views on ethics. For the purposes of... (shrink)

Semantic studies on diagrammatic notations (Barwise & Etchemendy, ; Shimojima, ; Stenning & Lemon, ) have revealed that the “non-deductive,” “emergent,” or “perceptual” effects of diagrams (Chandrasekaran, Kurup, Banerjee, Josephson, & Winkler, ; Kulpa, ; Larkin & Simon, ; Lindsay, ) are all rooted in the exploitation of spatial constraints on graphical structures. Thus, theoretically, this process is a key factor in inference with diagrams, explaining the frequently observed reduction of inferential load. The purpose of this study was to (...) examine the empirical basis for this theoretical suggestion, focusing on the reality of the constraint-exploitation strategy in actual practices of diagrammatic reasoning. Eye movements were recorded while participants used simple position diagrams to solve three- or four-term transitive inference problems. Our experiments revealed that the participants could exploit spatial constraints on graphical structures even when (a) they were not in the position of actually manipulating diagrams, (b) the semantic rule for the provided diagrams did not match their preferences, and (c) the constraint-exploitation strategy invited a partly adverse effect. These findings indicate that the hypothesized process is in fact robust, with the potential to broadly account for the inferential advantage of diagrams. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the use of diagrams in mathematical reasoning and puts forward examples where diagrams are useful. It is not suggested that diagrammatic reasoning is sometimes necessary to justify mathematical results, but rather that such reasoning in some cases may be useful in discovering new theorems or in their communication. The topic could to a large extent have been treated by psychological research, it seems. Some typos interfere with the presentation. In the references, the title (...) of the article and the page numbers of the article by Barwise and Etchemendy have been replaced by the information for the article by De Cruz. (shrink)

We advance a theoretical framework which combines recent insights of research in logic, psychology, and formal semantics, on the nature of diagrammatic representation and reasoning. In particular, we wish to explain the varied efficacy of reasoning and representing with diagrams. In general we consider diagrammatic representations to be restricted in expressive power, and we wish to explain efficacy of reasoning with diagrams via the semantical and computational properties of such restricted `languages'. Connecting these foundational insights (...) (from semantics and complexity theory) to the psychology of reasoning with diagrams requires us to develop the notion of the {\it availability} (to an agent) of {\it constraints} operating within representation systems, as a consequence of their direct semantic interpretation. Thus we offer a number of fundamental definitions as well as a research programme which aligns current efforts in the logical and psychological analysis of diagrammatic representation systems. (shrink)

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

The paper aims to show how by elaborating the Peircean terms used in the title creativity in learning processes and in scientific discoveries can be explained within a semiotic framework. The essential idea is to emphasize both the role of external representations and of experimenting with those representations , and to describe a process consisting of three steps: First, looking at diagrams "from a novel point of view" offers opportunities to synthesize elements of these diagrams which have never been perceived (...) as connected before. Second, by forming those observed syntheses to "new objects" of thinking, and by signifying these objects through new signs , new means of thinking and acting are created . And finally, by applying these new means – in proofs, for instance – the "intelligibility" of new discoveries and their power to explain problematic facts must be tested. (shrink)

In a famous passage from his al-Bāhir, al-Samaw’al proves the identity which we would now write as (ab)n=anbn\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(ab)^n=a^n b^n$$\end{document} for the cases n=3,4\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$n=3,4$$\end{document}. He also calculates the equivalent of the expansion of the binomial (a+b)n\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(a+b)^n$$\end{document} for the same values of n and describes the construction of what we now call the Pascal Triangle, showing (...) the table up to its 12th row. We give a literal translation of the whole passage, along with paraphrases in more modern or symbolic form. We discuss the influence of the Euclidean tradition on al-Samaw’al’s presentation, and the role that diagrams might have played in helping al-Samaw’al’s readers follow his arguments, including his supposed use of an early form of mathematical induction. (shrink)

Proof-theory has traditionally been developed based on linguistic (symbolic) representations of logical proofs. Recently, however, logical reasoning based on diagrammatic or graphical representations has been investigated by logicians. Euler diagrams were introduced in the eighteenth century. But it is quite recent (more precisely, in the 1990s) that logicians started to study them from a formal logical viewpoint. We propose a novel approach to the formalization of Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in which diagrams are defined not in terms (...) of regions as in the standard approach, but in terms of topological relations between diagrammatic objects. We formalize the unification rule, which plays a central role in Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in a style of natural deduction. We prove the soundness and completeness theorems with respect to a formal set-theoretical semantics. We also investigate structure of diagrammatic proofs and prove a normal form theorem. (shrink)

The rise in computing and multimedia technology has spawned an increasing interest in the role of diagrams and sketches, not only for the purpose of conveying information but also for creative thinking and problem-solving. This book attempts to characterise the nature of "a science of diagrams" in a wide-ranging, multidisciplinary study that contains accounts of the most recent research results in computer science and psychology. Key topics include: cognitive aspects, formal aspects, and applications. It is a well-written and indispensable survey (...) for researchers and students in the fields of cognitive science, artificial intelligence, human-computer interaction, and graphics and visualisation. (shrink)

Schemes of diagrammatic representation have been so familiarly introduced into logical treatises during the last century or so, that many readers, even of those who have made no professional study of logic, may be supposed to be acquainted with the general nature and object of such devices. Of these schemes one only, viz. that commonly called "Eulerian circles," has met with any general acceptance. A variety of others indeed have been proposed by ingenious and celebrated logicians, several of which (...) would claim notice in a historical treatment of the subject; but they mostly do not seem to me to differ in any essential respect from that of Euler. They rest upon the same leading principle, and are subject all alike to the same restrictions and defects. We must therefore cast about for some new scheme of diagrammatic representation which shall be competent to indicate imperfect knowledge on our part; for this will at once enable us to appeal to it step by step in the process of working out our conclusions. I have never seen any hint at such a scheme, though the want seems so evident that one would suppose that something of the kind must have been proposed before. (shrink)

Theorems in automated theorem proving are usually proved by formal logical proofs. However, there is a subset of problems which humans can prove by the use of geometric operations on diagrams, so called diagrammatic proofs. Insight is often more clearly perceived in these proofs than in the corresponding algebraic proofs; they capture an intuitive notion of truthfulness that humans find easy to see and understand. We are investigating and automating such diagrammatic reasoning about mathematical theorems. Concrete, rather (...) than general diagrams are used to prove particular concrete instances of the universally quantified theorem. The diagrammatic proof is captured by the use of geometric operations on the diagram. These operations are the inference steps of the proof. An abstracted schematic proof of the universally quantified theorem is induced from these proof instances. The constructive -rule provides the mathematical basis for this step from schematic proofs to theoremhood. In this way we avoid the difficulty of treating a general case in a diagram. One method of confirming that the abstraction of the schematic proof from the proof instances is sound is proving the correctness of schematic proofs in the meta-theory of diagrams. These ideas have been implemented in the system, called Diamond, which is presented here. (shrink)

In this study I aim to develop a cognitive evaluation of how semantically-driven and rule-based diagrammatic reasoning were psychologically plausible for partic-ular cases of scientific practice: an actual trackless path reconstruction in bubble chamber experiments, as reported by Galison (1997). I will propose “cognitive imagery projection and manipulation” (CIPM) as the most plausible psychologi-cal (perceptual/attentional/cognitive) mechanism matching the specific explanatory requirements for the case study, outlining the most significant current theories about this mental phenomenon (Shimojima; 2011).

Rocco Gangle addresses the methodological questions raised by a commitment to immanence in terms of how diagrams may be used both as tools and as objects of philosophical investigation. Gangle integrates insights from Spinoza, Pierce and Deleuze in conjunction with the formal operations of category theory.

In the graphical representation of ontologies, it is customary to use graph theory as the representational background. We claim here that the standard graph-based approach has a number of limitations. We focus here on a problem in the graph-based representation of ontologies in complex domains such as biomedical, engineering and manufacturing: lack of mereotopological representation. Based on such limitation, we proposed a diagrammatic way to represent an entity’s structure and various forms of mereotopological relationships between the entities.

Our brains make up a series of signs and are engaged in making or manifesting or reacting to a series of signs: through this semiotic activity they are at the same time engaged in “being minds.” An important effect of this semiotic activity of brains is a continuous process of “externalization of the mind” that exhibits a new cognitive perspective on the mechanisms underlying the semiotic emergence of abductive processes of meaning formation. I consider this process of externalization interplay critical (...) in analyzing the relation between meaningful semiotic internal resources and devices and their dynamical interactions with the externalized semiotic materiality suitably stocked in the environment. The last part of the paper will describe some aspects of this interplay between external diagrammatization and internal recapitulation showing the specificity of their co-evolution. (shrink)