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Diana I. Pérez [16]Diana Inés Pérez [1]
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Diana Perez
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Diana Perez
Harvard University
  1. Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts.Diana I. Perez - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (2):359-379.
    In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism, there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two (...)
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  2. The Will to Communicate.Diana I. Pérez - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):91-97.
    In this paper I discuss Rodriguez-Pereyra�s claim according to which analytical philosophy should be published exclusively in English. I focus my reply on three issues: (1) the implicit conception of philosophy and of the philosophical practice that underlies his argument, (2) the myth of the �native speaker� and (3) some values that should guide philosophy and which I propose to highlight.
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  3. Analytic Philosophy.Diana I. Pérez & Gustavo Ortiz Millán - 2010 - In Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte & Otávio Bueno (eds.), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  4.  8
    Languages for the Analytic Tradition.Diana I. Pérez - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (1):49-69.
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  5. Why Should Our Mind-Reading Abilities Be Involved in the Explanation of Phenomenal Consciousness?Diana I. Pérez - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):35-84.
    In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks (...)
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  6. Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
    The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a phenomenal concept is, and I show (...)
     
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  7.  39
    Is Thought Without Language Possible?Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Principia 9 (1-2):177-191.
    In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assumptions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inadequacy of this notion (...)
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  8.  27
    Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts.Diana I. Pérez - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):201-225.
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  9.  16
    Mysteries and Scandals. Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy (Misterios y Escándalos. El Naturalismo Trascendental y Elfuturo de Lafilosofía).Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Critica 37 (110):35 - 52.
    In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism (TN) and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the (...)
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  10.  6
    El problema mente-cuerpo reconsiderado.Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 34:97-110.
    In this paper I shall offer a reconsideration of three main arguments in the current debate on the mind-body problem, on the light of a peculiar way of conceiving mental concepts: I shall defend the view that mental concepts have to be considered as natural kind concepts. In the first part, I shall develop this proposal and in the second part I shall examine Kripke´s arguments against the identity theory, the zombi´s argument against functionalism and Churchland´s argument for eliminativism. I (...)
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  11.  2
    Is Thought Without Language Possible?Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2):177-191.
    In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assump-tions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inade-quacy of this notion (...)
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  12.  11
    Review: Conceptos fenoménicos, conceptos psicológicos y la explicación de la conciencia. [REVIEW]Diana I. Pérez - 2009 - Critica 41 (121):85 - 97.
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  13.  3
    Dificultades para la superveniencia estética.Diana Inés Pérez - 2015 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 27 (2):66-84.
    In the last half century,there were several attempts to adopt the notion of supervenience in order to shed light on the claim of generality that is involved in aesthetic judgments. In this paper I will show the difficulties brought up by the transposition of the notion of supervenience from other areas of philosophy to the philosophy of art and I will also show the intrinsic difficulties of this project. First, I will revise the origins of the notion of supervenience in (...)
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  14. Cuestiones filosóficas. Ensayos en honor de Eduardo Rabossi.Diana I. Pérez & Luis Fernández Moreno - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):114-119.
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  15. La noción de superveniencia en la visión estratificada del mundo.Diana I. Pérez - 1995 - Análisis Filosófico 15 (1):181.
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  16. Mysteries and Scandals. Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy.Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Critica 37 (110):35-52.
    In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the like. (...)
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  17. Premio Alberto Coffa: Monismo anómalo Y causación psicofísica.Diana I. Pérez - 1994 - Análisis Filosófico 14 (1):1.
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