L'ouvrage regroupe plusieurs chapitres et les notices et photographies de 170 statues et objets présentés lors de trois expositions dans des musées américains, à Yale en 1996, San Antonio et Raleigh en 1997. Après un premier chapitre sur le « genre » (Gender theory in roman art, N.B. Kampen), concept moderne, fruit de plusieurs décades de travail sur la théorie féministe, qui est un chapitre de réflexions sur l'organisation sociale hiérarchisée, fondée sur les différences sexuelles, ..

This study investigated potential risk factors (coping, perfectionism and self-regulation) for substantial injuries in contemporary dance students using a prospective cohort design, as high-quality studies focusing on mental risk factors for dance injuries are lacking. Student characteristics (age, sex, BMI, educational program and history of injury) and psychological constructs (coping, perfectionism and self-regulation) were assessed using the Performing artist and Athlete Health Monitor (PAHM), a web-based system. Substantial injuries were measured with the Oslo Sports Trauma Research Center (OSTRC) Questionnaire on (...) Health Problems and recorded on a monthly basis as part of the PAHM system. Univariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the associations between potential risk factors (i.e. student characteristics and psychological constructs) and substantial injuries. 99 students were included in the analyses. During the academic year 2016-2017, 48 students (48.5%) reported at least one substantial injury. Of all factors included, coping skills (OR: 0.91; 95% CI: 0.84–0.98), age (OR: 0.67; 95% CI: 0.46–0.98) and BMI (OR: 1.38; 95% CI: 1.05–1.80) were identified as significant risk factors in the multivariate analysis. The model explained 24% of the variance in the substantial injury group. Further prospective research into mental risk factors for dance injuries with larger samples sizes is needed to develop preventive strategies. Yet, dance schools could consider including coping skills training as part of injury prevention programs and, perhaps, providing special attention to younger dancers and those with a higher BMI through transitional programs to assist them in managing the stress they experience throughout their (academic) career. (shrink)

We study some properties of the quotient forcing notions ${Q_{tr(I)} = \wp(2^{< \omega})/tr(I)}$ and P I = B(2 ω )/I in two special cases: when I is the σ-ideal of meager sets or the σ-ideal of null sets on 2 ω . We show that the remainder forcing R I = Q tr(I)/P I is σ-closed in these cases. We also study the cardinal invariant of the continuum ${\mathfrak{h}_{\mathbb{Q}}}$ , the distributivity number of the quotient ${Dense(\mathbb{Q})/nwd}$ , in order to (...) show that ${\wp(\mathbb{Q})/nwd}$ collapses ${\mathfrak{c}}$ to ${\mathfrak{h}_{\mathbb{Q}}}$ , thus answering a question addressed in Balcar et al. (Fundamenta Mathematicae 183:59–80, 2004). (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Rodriguez-Pereyra�s claim according to which analytical philosophy should be published exclusively in English. I focus my reply on three issues: (1) the implicit conception of philosophy and of the philosophical practice that underlies his argument, (2) the myth of the �native speaker� and (3) some values that should guide philosophy and which I propose to highlight.

In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism, there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two (...) arguments that Kim mentions against physicalism: the inverted spectrum / zombies argument and the intrinsicality argument. I shall try to show that these three arguments depend upon a misconception of the nature of our ordinary mental concepts. (shrink)

In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks (...) and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the like. (...) /// En este trabajo discutiré el naturalismo trascendental que defiende McGinn y las razones que ofrece para mostrar que la filosofía será por siempre un cúmulo de misterios sin respuesta. Mostraré que ninguno de los tres argumentos principales que McGinn propone en favor de su positión es concluyente y que la estructura modular de la mente que presupone no está comprometida con la tesis epistémica del NT, esto es, con la idea de que estamos "cognitivamente cerrados" para responder preguntas acerca de la conciencia, el significado, la libertad, el conocimiento, etc. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a phenomenal concept is, and I show (...) the difficulties each of them have. Finally, I develop my own account of phenomenal concepts. My thesis claims that phenomenal concepts are complex concepts whose possession conditions depend upon the mastery of many other concepts, in fact, quite complex concepts such as the distinction between appearance and reality (which belongs to our theory of mind system), and color concepts (at least in the case of the phenomenal concepts needed in order to account for Mary's case). And these later concepts are concepts that have special possession conditions: they include the deployment of nonconceptual recognitional capacities. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that mental concepts are natural kind concepts. By ‘mental concepts’ I mean the ordinary words belonging to our everyday languages that we use in order to describe our mental life. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I shall present the hypothesis: firstly, I shall present a theory about the meaning of natural kind concepts following Putnam's 1975 proposal, with some modifications; secondly, I shall present (...) a taxonomy of mental concepts and, thirdly, I shall explain what the meaning of each kind of mental concept would be on the hypothesis defended in this paper. In the second part of the paper, I shall present two interesting consequences of the hypothesis proposed: first, that it is preferable to avoid a certain way of conceiving phenomenal concepts which does not fit with the hypothesis proposed; second, that folk psychology could fruitfully be considered a theory, and why, ultimately, it will not be eliminated. (shrink)

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assumptions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inadequacy of this notion (...) in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emergence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts. (shrink)

In this paper I shall offer a reconsideration of three main arguments in the current debate on the mind-body problem, on the light of a peculiar way of conceiving mental concepts: I shall defend the view that mental concepts have to be considered as natural kind concepts. In the first part, I shall develop this proposal and in the second part I shall examine Kripke´s arguments against the identity theory, the zombi´s argument against functionalism and Churchland´s argument for eliminativism. I (...) conclude the paper with an sketchy answer to the mind-body problem, in the middle of the road between functionalism and the identity theory. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo presento dos tipos de conceptos, los conceptos psicológicos y los conceptos de color y sugiero una ampliación de la tesis externista que defiende Axel Barceló en su libro Sobre el análisis.In this paper I present two types of concepts, psychological concepts and color concepts, and I suggest an extension of the externist thesis defended by Axel Barceló in his book Sobre el análisis.

The aim of this paper is to review the controversy concerning the nature of nonconceptual content, and its philosophical implications. I will focus the presentation on three topics: the different motivations behind the postulation of nonconceptual content, the arguments for nonconceptual content, and the different characterizations offered of nonconceptual content. In the last section of the paper I will mention the presuppositions behind this notion and analyze a couple of paradoxical theses that emerged from this discussion.

In this paper I examine the impact of the different naturalizing attempts in the philosophy of mind, I distinguish two different sources of these attempts: the quinean proposal of naturalizing philosophy as a metaphilosophical program, and the project of defense of a substantive metaphysical naturalist thesis –that conflates naturalism with physicalism-, according to which our world is a “causally self-enclosed system” . I argue that the main common denominator is the idea of rethinking the relationship between philosophy, science and common (...) sense, but that it does not imply that philosophy loses its own distinctive methods nor that philosophical problems are to be replaced by scientific ones. (shrink)

En este trabajo hago un ejercicio filosófico de aplicación de una visión naturalista de la filosofía analizando desde esta perspectiva la discusión acerca de la naturaleza de la psicología folk, y mostrando la superioridad de la perspectiva de segunda persona para dar cuenta de este fenómeno. Para ello presentaré la perspectiva naturalista que adopto, luego presentaré brevemente las perspectivas clásicas cartesianas para, finalmente, presentar la perspectiva de segunda persona mostrando cómo se puede dar cuenta de las continuidades ontogenéticas y filogenéticas (...) que subyacen al desarrollo de la psicología folk, incorporando en esta explicación tanto elementos filosóficos como científicos. (shrink)

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assump-tions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inade-quacy of this notion (...) in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emer-gence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts. (shrink)

En este trabajo se propone una caracterización de lo que la tradición filosófica denomina «qualia», a partir de cuatro rasgos principales: intrinsecalidad, inefabilidad, subjetividad y un peculiar acceso epistémico. Después de repasar brevemente las diversas teorías contemporáreas que pretenden responder al problema de cómo incorporar estos qualia al mundo físico, se propone una salida naturalista al problema de los qualia, consistente en dar una explicación independiente de cada uno de estos rasgos dentro de un marco naturalista, tomando como punto de (...) partida nuestro lenguaje mentalista ordinario. La idea es que una vez explicados estos rasgos, la pregunta más abstracta acerca de cómo incorporar los qualia a una pintura naturalista del mundo, ya no necesita ser planteada. (shrink)

I. P. Ivanov conceptual ideas of upbringing are studied. There are the main ideas and methods of collective creative upbringing and including children in cooperation activity. The necessity of forming humanistic relationships of generations by including children in social creative activities is proved.

The twenty-seven fragments under this number ‘were assembled in the belief that they represented lyric verses in the Aeolic dialect and might contribute something to the text of Sappho or Alcaeus’ . The only feature that is ‘unequivocally Aeolic’ is in fr. 2. 9 the letter following is, or possibly the division is not considered, no doubt rightly). Is this indeed a text in the Aeolic dialect ? There is very little other indication: fr. 4. 3 in fr. 4. 5 (...) would seem decisive if the reading were quite certain. (shrink)

En este artículo examinaremos un caso de aplicación de la hipótesis de la relatividad lingüística : la influencia del género gramatical de las lenguas sobre la cognición o el pensamiento de los hablantes. Dado que las lenguas difieren tanto en sus repertorios léxicos como sobre todo en sus gramáticas de género para referir a las personas, a otras entidades animadas e incluso a entidades inanimadas, nuestro propósito será, en primer lugar, revisar la evidencia experimental reciente que avalaría la HRL en (...) este dominio, al comprobar una variedad de impactos cognitivos y psicológicos, variables según las lenguas de los hablantes. En particular, identificaremos cuáles son los “efectos relativistas” en el caso de los rasgos morfosintácticos de las lenguas con carga de género, y en relación con la universalización del género masculino. Sobre la base de la evaluación realizada e incorporando los aportes de los estudios de “género y lenguaje” de los enfoques feministas, concluiremos señalando de qué diversas maneras es viable e importante promover usos inclusivos del lenguaje e incluso cambios más profundos hacia un lenguaje inclusivo, con especial referencia al español. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico y otro analítico, que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y (...) acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cabo. In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place. (shrink)

Using a design-based research approach, we studied ways to advance opportunities for children and families to engage in engineering design practices in an informal educational setting. 213 families with 5–11-year-old children were observed as they visited a tinkering exhibit at a children’s museum during one of three iterations of a program posing an engineering design challenge. Children’s narrative reflections about their experience were recorded immediately after tinkering. Across iterations of the program, changes to the exhibit design and facilitation provided by (...) museum staff corresponded to increased families’ engagement in key engineering practices. In the latter two cycles of the program, families engaged in the most testing, and in turn, redesigning. Further, in the latter cycles, the more children engaged in testing and retesting during tinkering, the more their narratives contained engineering-related content. The results advance understanding and the evidence base for educational practices that can promote engineering learning opportunities for children. (shrink)

A significant characteristic of science today is the extensive utilization of the concept of "probability." Originally it arose in applied fields and was not employed in fundamental research. However, with the development of quantum and statistical physics in the course of the 20th century, the mathematical apparatus of probability theory was widely used in the study of phenomena that obviously could not be studied without it. Thus, it became clear that probability plays a significant role in a scientific world view. (...) Whereas previously it had been regarded merely as a sad consequence of the temporary incompleteness of our knowledge, the time has now come when probability must take its place in the description of the objective regularities of nature. (shrink)