L'ouvrage regroupe plusieurs chapitres et les notices et photographies de 170 statues et objets présentés lors de trois expositions dans des musées américains, à Yale en 1996, San Antonio et Raleigh en 1997. Après un premier chapitre sur le « genre » (Gender theory in roman art, N.B. Kampen), concept moderne, fruit de plusieurs décades de travail sur la théorie féministe, qui est un chapitre de réflexions sur l'organisation sociale hiérarchisée, fondée sur les différences sexuelles, ..

We study some properties of the quotient forcing notions ${Q_{tr(I)} = \wp(2^{< \omega})/tr(I)}$ and P I = B(2 ω )/I in two special cases: when I is the σ-ideal of meager sets or the σ-ideal of null sets on 2 ω . We show that the remainder forcing R I = Q tr(I)/P I is σ-closed in these cases. We also study the cardinal invariant of the continuum ${\mathfrak{h}_{\mathbb{Q}}}$ , the distributivity number of the quotient ${Dense(\mathbb{Q})/nwd}$ , in order to (...) show that ${\wp(\mathbb{Q})/nwd}$ collapses ${\mathfrak{c}}$ to ${\mathfrak{h}_{\mathbb{Q}}}$ , thus answering a question addressed in Balcar et al. (Fundamenta Mathematicae 183:59–80, 2004). (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Rodriguez-Pereyra�s claim according to which analytical philosophy should be published exclusively in English. I focus my reply on three issues: (1) the implicit conception of philosophy and of the philosophical practice that underlies his argument, (2) the myth of the �native speaker� and (3) some values that should guide philosophy and which I propose to highlight.

In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks (...) and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assumptions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inadequacy of this notion (...) in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emergence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts. (shrink)

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assump-tions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inade-quacy of this notion (...) in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emer-gence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts. (shrink)

En este trabajo se propone una caracterización de lo que la tradición filosófica denomina «qualia», a partir de cuatro rasgos principales: intrinsecalidad, inefabilidad, subjetividad y un peculiar acceso epistémico. Después de repasar brevemente las diversas teorías contemporáreas que pretenden responder al problema de cómo incorporar estos qualia al mundo físico, se propone una salida naturalista al problema de los qualia, consistente en dar una explicación independiente de cada uno de estos rasgos dentro de un marco naturalista, tomando como punto de (...) partida nuestro lenguaje mentalista ordinario. La idea es que una vez explicados estos rasgos, la pregunta más abstracta acerca de cómo incorporar los qualia a una pintura naturalista del mundo, ya no necesita ser planteada. (shrink)

In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism, there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two (...) arguments that Kim mentions against physicalism: the inverted spectrum / zombies argument and the intrinsicality argument. I shall try to show that these three arguments depend upon a misconception of the nature of our ordinary mental concepts. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the impact of the different naturalizing attempts in the philosophy of mind, I distinguish two different sources of these attempts: the quinean proposal of naturalizing philosophy as a metaphilosophical program, and the project of defense of a substantive metaphysical naturalist thesis –that conflates naturalism with physicalism-, according to which our world is a “causally self-enclosed system” . I argue that the main common denominator is the idea of rethinking the relationship between philosophy, science and common (...) sense, but that it does not imply that philosophy loses its own distinctive methods nor that philosophical problems are to be replaced by scientific ones. (shrink)

In this paper I shall offer a reconsideration of three main arguments in the current debate on the mind-body problem, on the light of a peculiar way of conceiving mental concepts: I shall defend the view that mental concepts have to be considered as natural kind concepts. In the first part, I shall develop this proposal and in the second part I shall examine Kripke´s arguments against the identity theory, the zombi´s argument against functionalism and Churchland´s argument for eliminativism. I (...) conclude the paper with an sketchy answer to the mind-body problem, in the middle of the road between functionalism and the identity theory. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the like. (...) /// En este trabajo discutiré el naturalismo trascendental que defiende McGinn y las razones que ofrece para mostrar que la filosofía será por siempre un cúmulo de misterios sin respuesta. Mostraré que ninguno de los tres argumentos principales que McGinn propone en favor de su positión es concluyente y que la estructura modular de la mente que presupone no está comprometida con la tesis epistémica del NT, esto es, con la idea de que estamos "cognitivamente cerrados" para responder preguntas acerca de la conciencia, el significado, la libertad, el conocimiento, etc. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to review the controversy concerning the nature of nonconceptual content, and its philosophical implications. I will focus the presentation on three topics: the different motivations behind the postulation of nonconceptual content, the arguments for nonconceptual content, and the different characterizations offered of nonconceptual content. In the last section of the paper I will mention the presuppositions behind this notion and analyze a couple of paradoxical theses that emerged from this discussion.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a phenomenal concept is, and I show (...) the difficulties each of them have. Finally, I develop my own account of phenomenal concepts. My thesis claims that phenomenal concepts are complex concepts whose possession conditions depend upon the mastery of many other concepts, in fact, quite complex concepts such as the distinction between appearance and reality (which belongs to our theory of mind system), and color concepts (at least in the case of the phenomenal concepts needed in order to account for Mary's case). And these later concepts are concepts that have special possession conditions: they include the deployment of nonconceptual recognitional capacities. (shrink)

En este trabajo hago un ejercicio filosófico de aplicación de una visión naturalista de la filosofía analizando desde esta perspectiva la discusión acerca de la naturaleza de la psicología folk, y mostrando la superioridad de la perspectiva de segunda persona para dar cuenta de este fenómeno. Para ello presentaré la perspectiva naturalista que adopto, luego presentaré brevemente las perspectivas clásicas cartesianas para, finalmente, presentar la perspectiva de segunda persona mostrando cómo se puede dar cuenta de las continuidades ontogenéticas y filogenéticas (...) que subyacen al desarrollo de la psicología folk, incorporando en esta explicación tanto elementos filosóficos como científicos. (shrink)

The twenty-seven fragments under this number ‘were assembled in the belief that they represented lyric verses in the Aeolic dialect and might contribute something to the text of Sappho or Alcaeus’ . The only feature that is ‘unequivocally Aeolic’ is in fr. 2. 9 the letter following is, or possibly the division is not considered, no doubt rightly). Is this indeed a text in the Aeolic dialect ? There is very little other indication: fr. 4. 3 in fr. 4. 5 (...) would seem decisive if the reading were quite certain. (shrink)

Van den Berg, I.P., Extended use of IST, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 73–92. Internal Set Theory is an axiomatic approach to nonstandard analysis, consisting of three axiom schemes, Transfer , Idealization , and Standardization . We show that the range of application of these axiom schemes may be enlarged with respect to the original formulation. Not only more kinds of formulas are allowed, but also different settings. Many examples illustrate these extensions. Most concern formal aspects of nonstandard (...) asymptotics. (shrink)

Background Medical ethics deals with the ethical obligations of doctors to their patients, colleagues and society. The annual reports of Sri Lanka Medical Council indicate that the number of complaints against doctors has increased over the years. We aimed to assess the level of knowledge, attitude and practice regarding medical ethics among doctors in three teaching hospitals in Sri Lanka. Methods A hospital-based cross-sectional study was conducted among doctors using a pre-tested self-administered, anonymous questionnaire. Chi Squared test, and ANOVA test (...) were used to identify the significance of association between level of knowledge and selected factors. Results Most doctors had a poor level of knowledge on medical ethics, with postgraduate trainees showing significantly higher level of knowledge. The average knowledge on medical ethics among doctors was significantly different between the three hospitals. Over 95% had a favourable attitude towards gaining knowledge and advocated the need for training. The majority indicated awareness of unethical practices. 24.6% of respondents stated that they get a chaperone ‘sometimes’ during patient examination while 3.5% never do. The majority responded that they never accept gifts from pharmaceutical companies in recognition of their prescribing pattern. 12–41% of doctors participated in the study acknowledged that they ‘sometime’ engaged in unethical practices related to prescribing drugs, accepting gifts from pharmaceutical companies and when obtaining leave. Conclusion Most doctors had a poor level of knowledge of medical ethics. Postgraduate trainees had a higher level of knowledge than other doctors. The majority showed a favourable attitude towards gaining knowledge and the need of training. Regular in-service training on medical ethics for doctors would help to improve their knowledge on medical ethics, as well as attitudes and ethical conduct. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico y otro analítico, que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y (...) acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cabo. In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place. (shrink)

En este artículo examinaremos un caso de aplicación de la hipótesis de la relatividad lingüística : la influencia del género gramatical de las lenguas sobre la cognición o el pensamiento de los hablantes. Dado que las lenguas difieren tanto en sus repertorios léxicos como sobre todo en sus gramáticas de género para referir a las personas, a otras entidades animadas e incluso a entidades inanimadas, nuestro propósito será, en primer lugar, revisar la evidencia experimental reciente que avalaría la HRL en (...) este dominio, al comprobar una variedad de impactos cognitivos y psicológicos, variables según las lenguas de los hablantes. En particular, identificaremos cuáles son los “efectos relativistas” en el caso de los rasgos morfosintácticos de las lenguas con carga de género, y en relación con la universalización del género masculino. Sobre la base de la evaluación realizada e incorporando los aportes de los estudios de “género y lenguaje” de los enfoques feministas, concluiremos señalando de qué diversas maneras es viable e importante promover usos inclusivos del lenguaje e incluso cambios más profundos hacia un lenguaje inclusivo, con especial referencia al español. (shrink)

Using a design-based research approach, we studied ways to advance opportunities for children and families to engage in engineering design practices in an informal educational setting. 213 families with 5–11-year-old children were observed as they visited a tinkering exhibit at a children’s museum during one of three iterations of a program posing an engineering design challenge. Children’s narrative reflections about their experience were recorded immediately after tinkering. Across iterations of the program, changes to the exhibit design and facilitation provided by (...) museum staff corresponded to increased families’ engagement in key engineering practices. In the latter two cycles of the program, families engaged in the most testing, and in turn, redesigning. Further, in the latter cycles, the more children engaged in testing and retesting during tinkering, the more their narratives contained engineering-related content. The results advance understanding and the evidence base for educational practices that can promote engineering learning opportunities for children. (shrink)

The nonstandard stroboscopy method links discrete-time ordinary difference equations of first-order and continuous-time, ordinary differential equations of first order. We extend this method to the second order, and also to an elementary, yet general class of partial difference/differential equations, both of first and second order. We thus obtain straightforward discretizations and continuizations, even avoiding change of variables. In fact, we create intermediary objects: partial difference equations with S-continuous solutions, which have both discrete and continuous properties.

I argue that the dual-process account of human learning rejected by Mitchell et al. in the target article is informative and predictive with respect to human behaviour in a way that the authors' purely propositional account is not. Experiments that reveal different patterns of results under conditions that favour either associative or rule-based performance are the way forward.