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Diana Raffman
University of Toronto, Mississauga
  1.  17
    Thinking About Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.
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  2. Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.Sergio Tenenbaum & Diana Raffman - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):86-112.
    In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.
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  3. Vagueness Without Paradox.Diana Raffman - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):41-74.
  4. On the Persistence of Phenomenology.Diana Raffman - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 293–308.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ].
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  5.  31
    Sorites Paradox.Dominic Hyde & Diana Raffman - 2018 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  6.  41
    Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language.Diana Raffman - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    In Unruly Words, Diana Raffman advances a new theory of vagueness which, unlike previous accounts, is genuinely semantic while preserving bivalence. According to this new approach, called the multiple range theory, vagueness consists essentially in a term's being applicable in multiple arbitrarily different, but equally competent, ways, even when contextual factors are fixed.
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  7. Vagueness and Context-Relativity.Diana Raffman - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):175 - 192.
    This paper develops the treatment of vague predicates begun in my "Vagueness Without Paradox" (Philosophical Review 103, 1 [1994]). In particular, I show how my account of vague words dissolves an "eternal" version of the sorites paradox, i.e., a version in which the paradox is generated independently of any particular run of judgments of the items in a sorites series. In so doing I refine the notion of an internal contest, introduced in the earlier paper, and draw a distinction within (...)
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  8. Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive?Diana Raffman - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):153-75.
    It is widely supposed that one family of sorites paradoxes, perhaps the most perplexing versions of the puzzle, owe at least in part to the nontransitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. To a first approximation, perceptual indiscriminability is the relationship obtaining among objects (stimuli) that appear identical in some perceptual respect—for example hue, or pitch, or texture. Indiscriminable objects look the same, or sound the same, or feel the same. Received wisdom has it that there are or could be series of objects (...)
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  9.  19
    Deeper Into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation. [REVIEW]Diana Raffman - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):576.
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  10.  71
    Relativism, Retraction, and Evidence.Diana Raffman - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):171-178.
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  11. How to Understand Contextualism About Vagueness: Reply to Stanley.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):244–248.
    accounts in general, contrary to what he seems to think. Stanley’s discussion concerns the dynamic or ‘forced march’ version of the sorites, viz. the version framed in terms of the judgments that would be made by a competent speaker who proceeds step by step along a sorites series for a vague predicate ‘F’. According to Stanley, the contextualist treatment of the paradox is based on the idea that the speaker shifts the content of the predicate whenever necessary to make it (...)
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  12.  45
    Responses to Discussants.Diana Raffman - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):483-501.
  13. Borderline Cases and Bivalence.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.
    It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that (...)
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  14. Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
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  15. 10. Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Pp. 179-183). [REVIEW]Henry S. Richardson, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, Peter Singer, Karen Jones, Sergio Tenenbaum, Diana Raffman, Simon Căbulea May, Stephen C. Makin & Nancy E. Snow - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1).
  16.  94
    Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202.
    In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” , George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.
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  17. Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness.Diana Raffman - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 509--22.
    Higher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases—borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higherorder vagueness, what I will call ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates constructed from vague predicates by attaching operators having to do with (...)
     
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  18.  95
    What Autism May Tell Us About Self‐Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happé.Diana Raffman - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):23-31.
  19. Music, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science.Diana Raffman - unknown
    Philosophers of music (and also music theorists) have recognized for a long time that research in the sciences, especially psychology, might have import for their own work. (Langer 1941 and Meyer 1956 are good examples.) However, while scientists had been interested in music as a subject of research (e.g., Helmholtz 1912, Seashore 1938), the discipline known as psychology of music, or more broadly cognitive science of music, came into its own only around 1980 with the publication of several landmark works. (...)
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  20. Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus.Ruth Barcan Marcus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This 'state of the art' collection honours one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.
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  21. Is Twelve-Tone Music Artistically Defective?Diana Raffman - 2003 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27 (1):69–87.
    Worries about the artistic integrity (for lack of a better term) of twelve-tone music are not new. Critics, philosophers, musicians, even composers them- selves have assailed the idiom with a fervor usually reserved for individual artists or works. Just why it is supposed to be defective is not entirely clear, however. I want to revisit these questions by way of putting some insights from music history and theory together with some insights from the philosophy and psychology of music. To find (...)
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  22.  55
    Vagueness and Observationality.Diana Raffman - 2011 - In Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide. Springer Verlag. pp. 107--121.
    Of the many families of words that are thought to be vague, so-called observational predicates may be both the most fascinating and the most confounding. Roughly, observational predicates are terms that apply to objects on the basis of how those objects appear to us perceptually speaking. ‘Red’, ‘loud’, ‘sweet’, ‘acrid’, and ‘smooth’ are good examples. Delia Graff explains that a “predicate is observational just in case its applicability to an object (given a fixed context of evaluation) depends only on the (...)
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  23.  41
    Toward a Cognitive Theory of Musical Ineffability.Diana Raffman - 1988 - Review of Metaphysics 41 (4):685-706.
    DESPITE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OF IDEOLOGY, objective, and style, these theorists join in giving voice to what is perhaps the most deeply rooted conviction in modern aesthetics: that aesthetic experience is, in some essential respect, ineffable. In apprehending a work of art we come to know something we cannot put into words.
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  24.  36
    Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan.Diana Raffman - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):127-132.
  25. 18 From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism.Diana Raffman - 2008 - In Edmond L. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 325.
    Representationalist solutions to the qualia problem are motivated by two fundamental ideas: first, that having an experience consists in tokening a mental representation1; second, that all one is aware of in having an experience is the intentional content of that representation. In particular, one is not aware of any intrinsic features of the representational vehicle itself. For example, when you visually experience a red object, you are aware only of the redness of the object, not any redness or red quale (...)
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  26.  41
    First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs.Diana Raffman - 1998 - In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
  27.  41
    The Meaning of Music.Diana Raffman - 1991 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):360-377.
  28.  15
    Contextualism and the Sorites Paradox.Inga Bones & Diana Raffman - 2019 - In Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox. Cambridge, Vereinigtes Königreich: pp. 63-77.
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  29. Aesthetics Naturalized: Cognitivist Reflections on a Traditional Problem in the Philosophy of Art.Diana Raffman - 1986 - Dissertation, Yale University
    The thesis develops a cognitivist account of the supposed ineffability of musical experience. It is contended that, when the ineffability is viewed as adhering to a certain kind of perceptual knowledge of a musical signal, its nature can be illuminated by the adoption of a recent cognitivist theory of perception in conjunction with a generative grammar for tonal music . On this two-headed view, music perception consists in a rule-governed process of computing a series of increasingly abstract mental representations of (...)
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  30.  8
    Commentary: Transvaluationism.Diana Raffman - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):127-127.
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  31. Can We Do Without Concepts?: Comments on Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts. [REVIEW]Diana Raffman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):423 - 427.
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  32. Nontransitivity, Indiscriminability, and Looking the Same.Diana Raffman - manuscript
  33.  62
    Précis of Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language.Diana Raffman - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):452-456.
  34.  26
    Review: Some Thoughts About "Thinking About Consciousness". [REVIEW]Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):163 - 170.
  35. Some Thoughts About Thinking About Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):163-170.
    David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness tells a skillful, inventive, and plausible story about why, given that the phenomenal character of conscious experience is an unproblematically physical property, we continue to suffer from “intuitions of dualism”. According to Papineau, we are misled by the peculiar structure of the phenomenal concepts we use to introspect upon that phenomenal character. Roughly: unlike physical concepts, phenomenal concepts exemplify the kind of experience they are concepts of; and this creates the mistaken impression that the physical (...)
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  36. Theories of Vagueness.Diana Raffman & Stewart Shapiro - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):259-262.
    The goal of this book is to defend a supervaluationist theory of vagueness. Keefe begins by laying out a series of desiderata for an adequate theory of vagueness generally: among other things, such a theory will need to solve the sorites paradox, provide a plausible analysis of borderline cases, preserve so-called penumbral connections among borderline predications, accommodate the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness, and comport with as many of our ordinary linguistic intuitions as possible. She then proceeds to evaluate in turn (...)
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  37. Vagueness, Hysteresis, and the Instability of Color.Diana Raffman - 2017 - In Marcos Silva (ed.), How Colours Matter to Philosophy. Springer.
    This paper explores the implications of some experimental data for views that identify colors with objective physical properties such as reflectance profiles. Those who reject objectivist views often argue from the existence of intersubjective differences in color categorization ; but objectivists have managed to stand their ground by identifying colors with sets or ranges of reflectances individuated by the ways in which they stimulate the visual system. In the interest of moving the debate forward, I provide a new kind of (...)
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  38. Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (275):167-172.
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