Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March 23-24 2001 Session 1: Eugenics Narrative and Reproductive Engineering.
L’ouvrage collectif dirigé par Diane-Gabrielle Tremblay propose d’analyser la diversité des temporalités sociales et la manière dont elles sont vécues par les individus en fonction du pays, de l’âge, du contexte personnel et professionnel. Il rassemble 13 contributions réparties en 3 parties. La première traite de la conciliation emploi famille de manière globale, la seconde poursuit la réflexion sur les temps prescrits et temps réels en abordant quelques pratiques..
This paper theorizes two dialectic moments in which art is situated. The hypothetical dialectic is based on Hal Foster’s explication of the relationship between the neo-avant-garde and the historical avant-garde which forms the thesis of his text The Return of the Real. This dialect is comprised of an initial moment that delineates the terms of our enunciative and perceptive condition followed by a second that “comprehends,” not completes, the first. I forward Slavoj Žižek’s notion of the stain to characterize this (...) first moment. By looking at the stain, we see the make-up of the whole field of symbolic relations attempting—but ultimately failing—seamlessly to incorporate it. I give Diane Arbus’s use of the stain as a subject as an illustration of this first moment. Further, I posit Žižek’s notion of the act as a method to redialecticize art stuck in this initial moment and made stagnant through cynicism. Acts are moments of absolute freedom, that “[temporarily suspend] the field of ideological meaning” (Enjoy Your Symptom 35). However, I qualify the act in art as a “spectre” of the real: “The Real which returns [as]… an image, a semblance, an ‘effect,’ which, at the same time, [delivers] ‘the thing itself’” (Welcome to the Desert of the Real 18). I use recent collage paintings by Albert Oehlen as illustrations to stage the latter part of my argument. (shrink)
Most discussions in ethics argue that a certain practice or act is morally justified, with any underlying theory taken as supporting a guide to general action by aiding discovery of the objectively and singularly right thing to do. I suggest that this oversimplifies the agent’s own experience of the moral dilemma, and I take the recent English case of Diane Pretty’s request for assisted suicide as an example. Here the law reacted one way, despite the obvious sympathy many felt (...) for her. This only appears paradoxical, I suggest, because too much is expected of the concept of justification, and because moral understanding of a particular case is too often reduced to the legalistic search for general justificatory reasons. The starting point should be, I conclude, a full awareness of the phrase “there but for the grace of God go I”. (shrink)
In two recent court cases, Ms B, a paralysed competent adult, was allowed to end her life; Mrs Pretty, another paralysed competent adult, was not. In legal terms, the essential difference between the two cases is that Ms B was seeking the withdrawal of treatment, whereas Mrs Pretty was asking for assistance in ending her life. I argue that while this distinction may accurately state the law that governs these situations, it does not rest on a defensible moral basis. Both (...) the women should have been allowed to choose the manner in which they would die. (shrink)