Results for 'Disorder'

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  1. Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context (...)
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  2. Psychiatry Beyond the Brain: Externalism, Mental Health, and Autistic Spectrum Disorder.Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger & Shane Glackin - 2019 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 26 (3):E-51-E68.
    Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we (...)
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  3. Is Borderline Personality Disorder a Moral or Clinical Condition? Assessing Charland’s Argument From Treatment.Greg Horne - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (2):215-226.
    Louis Charland has argued that the Cluster B personality disorders, including borderline personality disorder, are primarily moral rather than clinical conditions. Part of his argument stems from reflections on effective treatment of borderline personality disorder. In the argument from treatment, he claims that successful treatment of all Cluster B personality disorders requires a positive change in a patient’s moral character. Based on this claim, he concludes (1) that these disorders are, at root, deficits in moral character, and (2) (...)
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  4. The Phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-Induced Changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients: An Enactive Affordance-Based Model.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are (...)
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  5. Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the Lived Experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2015 - PLoS ONE 10 (8):1-29.
    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes (...)
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  6.  47
    The Biostatistical Theory Versus the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis, Part 1: Is Part-Dysfunction a Sufficient Condition for Medical Disorder?Jerome Wakefield - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):648-682.
    Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory of medical disorder claims that biological part-dysfunction (i.e., failure of an internal mechanism to perform its biological function), a factual criterion, is both necessary and sufficient for disorder. Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder agrees that part-dysfunction is necessary but rejects the sufficiency claim, maintaining that disorder also requires that the part-dysfunction causes harm to the individual, a value criterion. In this paper, I present two considerations against the sufficiency claim. (...)
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  7. Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder.Şerife Tekin - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subject’s self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subject’s self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs written (...)
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  8.  27
    Challenges in Internet Addiction Disorder: Is a Diagnosis Feasible or Not?Alessandro Musetti, Roberto Cattivelli, Marco Giacobbi, Pablo Zuglian, Martina Ceccarini, Francesca Capelli, Giada Pietrabissa & Gianluca Castelnuovo - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    An important international discussion began because of some pioneer studies carried out by Young (1996a) on the internet addiction disorder (IAD). In the fifth and most recent version of the Diagnostic, and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) there is no mention of this disorder and among researchers there are basically two opposite positions. Those who are in favor of a specific diagnosis and those who are claiming the importance of specific criteria characterizing this behavior and the precise (...)
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  9. Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder.Nathan Stout - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1-14.
    In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory (...)
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  10. Psychopathy Without (the Language of) Disorder.Marga Reimer - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):185-198.
    Psychopathy is often characterized in terms of what I call “the language of disorder.” I question whether such language is necessary for an accurate and precise characterization of psychopathy, and I consider the practical implications of how we characterize psychopathy—whether as a biological, or merely normative, disorder.
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  11.  55
    Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder as a Disorder of Attention.Neil Levy - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):3-16.
    An influential model holds that obsessive–compulsive disorder is caused by distinctive personality traits and belief biases. But a substantial number of sufferers do not manifest these traits. I propose a predictive coding account of the disorder, which explains both the symptoms and the cognitive traits. On this account, OCD centrally involves heightened and dysfunctionally focused attention to normally unattended sensory and motor representations. As these representations have contents that predict catastrophic outcomes, patients are disposed to engage in behaviors (...)
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  12. Out on a Limb: The Ethical Management of Body Integrity Identity Disorder.Christopher James Ryan - 2009 - Neuroethics 2 (1):21-33.
    Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration (...)
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  13.  63
    Mental Disorder and the Concept of Authenticity.Alexandre Erler & Tony Hope - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (3):219-232.
    Authenticity has recently emerged as an important issue in discussions of mental disorder. We show, on the basis of personal accounts and empirical studies, that many people with psychological disorders are preoccupied with questions of authenticity. Most of the data considered in this paper are from studies of people with bipolar disorder and anorexia nervosa. We distinguish the various ways in which these people view the relationship between the disorder and their sense of their authentic self. We (...)
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  14. The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder.Dominic Murphy & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252.
    This paper is a critical analysis of the concept of mental disorder recently advanced by Jerome Wakefield. Wakefield suggests that mental disorders are most aptly conceived as "harmful dysfunctions" involving two distinct and separable components: the failure of the mechanism in the person to perform a natural function for which the mechanism was designed by natural selection, and a value judgment that the dysfunction is undesirable.
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  15. Free Energy and Virtual Reality in Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: A Complexity Theory of Dreaming and Mental Disorder.Jim Hopkins - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    This paper compares the free energy neuroscience now advocated by Karl Friston and his colleagues with that hypothesised by Freud, arguing that Freud's notions of conflict and trauma can be understood in terms of computational complexity. It relates Hobson and Friston's work on dreaming and the reduction of complexity to contemporary accounts of dreaming and the consolidation of memory, and advances the hypothesis that mental disorder can be understood in terms of computational complexity and the mechanisms, including synaptic pruning, (...)
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  16.  78
    Autonomy and Mental Disorder.Lubomira Radoilska (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Autonomy is a fundamental though contested concept both in philosophy and the broader intellectual culture of today’s liberal societies. For instance, most of us place great value on the opportunity to make our own decisions and to lead a life of our own choosing. Yet, there is stark disagreement on what is involved in being able to decide autonomously, as well as how important this is compared to other commitments. For example, the success of every group project requires that group (...)
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  17. Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (...)
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  18. Mental Disorder and Values.Bengt Brülde - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.
    It is now generally agreed that we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions, but it is not quite clear how. To clarify this, we need to know more than to what extent attributions of disorder are dependent on values. We also have to know (1) what kind of evaluations we have to rely on to identify the class of mental disorder; (2) whether attributions of disorder contain any implicit reference to (...)
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  19.  94
    On Defining “Mental Disorder”: Purposes and Conditions of Adequacy.Bengt Brülde - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):19-33.
    All definitions of mental disorder are backed up by arguments that rely on general criteria (e.g., that a definition should be consistent with ordinary language). These desiderata are rarely explicitly stated, and there has been no systematic discussion of how different definitions should be assessed. To arrive at a well-founded list of desiderata, we need to know the purpose of a definition. I argue that this purpose must be practical; it should, for example, help us determine who is entitled (...)
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  20.  31
    Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Judit Szalai - 2016 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (1):47-59.
    The dominant philosophical conceptions of obsessive-compulsive behavior present its subject as having a deficiency, usually characterized as volitional, due to which she lacks control and choice in acting. Compulsions (mental or physical) tend to be treated in isolation from the obsessive thoughts that give rise to them. I offer a different picture of compulsive action, one that is, I believe, more faithful to clinical reality. The clue to (most) obsessive-compulsive behavior seems to be the way obsessive thoughts, which are grounded (...)
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  21.  56
    A Dynamic Developmental Theory of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Predominantly Hyperactive/Impulsive and Combined Subtypes.Terje Sagvolden, Espen Borgå Johansen, Heidi Aase & Vivienne Ann Russell - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):397-419.
    Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is currently defined as a cognitive/behavioral developmental disorder where all clinical criteria are behavioral. Inattentiveness, overactivity, and impulsiveness are presently regarded as the main clinical symptoms. The dynamic developmental behavioral theory is based on the hypothesis that altered dopaminergic function plays a pivotal role by failing to modulate nondopaminergic (primarily glutamate and GABA) signal transmission appropriately. A hypofunctioning mesolimbic dopamine branch produces altered reinforcement of behavior and deficient extinction of previously reinforced behavior. This gives rise (...)
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  22. Too Fast or Too Slow? Time and Neuronal Variability in Bipolar Disorder—A Combined Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - forthcoming - Schizophrenia Bulletin 43.
    Time is an essential feature in bipolar disorder (BP). Manic and depressed BP patients perceive the speed of time as either too fast or too slow. The present article combines theoretical and empirical approaches to integrate phenomenological, psychological, and neuroscientific accounts of abnormal time perception in BP. Phenomenology distinguishes between perception of inner time, ie, self-time, and outer time, ie, world-time, that desynchronize or dissociate from each other in BP: inner time speed is abnormally slow (as in depression) or (...)
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  23.  42
    Body Integrity Identity Disorder Beyond Amputation: Consent and Liberty.Amy White - 2014 - HEC Forum 26 (3):225-236.
    In this article, I argue that persons suffering from Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) can give informed consent to surgical measures designed to treat this disorder. This is true even if the surgery seems radical or irrational to most people. The decision to have surgery made by a BIID patient is not necessarily coerced, incompetent or uninformed. If surgery for BIID is offered, there should certainly be a screening process in place to insure informed consent. It is beyond (...)
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  24. Free Will and Mental Disorder: Exploring the Relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
    A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, (...)
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  25.  87
    Is Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder Really a Disorder?Tamara Kayali Browne - 2015 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 12 (2):313-330.
    Premenstrual dysphoric disorder was recently moved to a full category in the DSM-5 . It also appears set for inclusion as a separate disorder in the ICD-11 . This paper argues that PMDD should not be listed in the DSM or the ICD at all, adding to the call to recognise PMDD as a socially constructed disorder. I first present the argument that PMDD pathologises understandable anger/distress and that to do so is potentially dangerous. I then present (...)
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  26. Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction.David Papineau - 1994 - Philosophy 37:73-82.
    I shall begin with the "anti-psychiatry" view that the lack of a physical basis excludes many familiar mental disorders from the category of "illness". My response to this argument will be that anti-psychiatrists are probably right to hold that most mental disorders do not involve any physical disorder, but that they are wrong to conclude from this that these mental disorders are not illnesses.
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  27. Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder.Marcus P. Adams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):233-249.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation (...)
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  28. Can We Define Mental Disorder by Using the Criterion of Mental Dysfunction?Thomas Schramme - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):35-47.
    The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart (...)
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  29.  38
    Extending Disorder: Essentialism, Family Resemblance and Secondary Sense. [REVIEW]Neil Pickering - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):185-195.
    It is commonly thought that mental disorder is a valid concept only in so far as it is an extension of or continuous with the concept of physical disorder. A valid extension has to meet two criteria: determination and coherence. Essentialists meet these criteria through necessary and sufficient conditions for being a disorder. Two Wittgensteinian alternatives to essentialism are considered and assessed against the two criteria. These are the family resemblance approach and the secondary sense approach. Where (...)
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  30.  59
    Furries and the Limits of Species Identity Disorder: A Response to Gerbasi Et Al.Fiona Probyn-Rapsey - 2011 - Society and Animals 19 (3):294-301.
    This is a response to an article published inSociety & Animals in 2008 that argued for the existence of a “species identity disorder” in some furries. Species identity disorder is modeled on gender identity disorder, itself a highly controversial diagnosis that has been criticized for pathologizing homosexuality and transgendered people. This response examines the claims of the article and suggests that the typology it constructs is based on unexamined assumptions about what constitutes “human” identity and regulatory fictions (...)
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  31.  21
    Mental Disorder Between Naturalism and Normativism.Somogy Varga - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12422.
    Worries about the potential medicalization of social and moral problems has propelled the debate on the nature of mental disorder, with normativists insisting that psychiatric classification is inherently value-laden and naturalists maintaining that a purely descriptive account of disease is possible. In recent work, some authors take a different path, accepting that the concepts of disease and mental disorder are value-laden but maintaining that this does not prevent objective truths regarding mental disorder attribution. This paper explores two (...)
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  32.  17
    Harm and the Concept of Medical Disorder.Neil Feit - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):367-385.
    According to Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder, the inability of some internal part or mechanism to perform its natural function is necessary, but not sufficient, for disorder. HDA also requires that the part dysfunction be harmful to the individual. I consider several problems for HDA’s harm criterion in this article. Other accounts on which harm is necessary for disorder will suffer from all or almost all of these problems. Comparative accounts of harm imply that (...)
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  33. Some Epistemological Concerns About Dissociative Identity Disorder and Diagnostic Practices in Psychology.Michael J. Shaffer & Jeffery Oakley - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29.
    In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal (...)
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  34.  60
    How Does a Psychiatrist Infer From an Observed Condition to a Case of Mental Disorder?Maël Lemoine - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):979-983.
    The main thesis of this paper is that mental health practitioners can legitimately infer that a patient's given condition is a case of mental disorder without having diagnosed any specific mental disorder. The article shows how this is justifiable by relying either on psychopathological reasoning, on 'intentional' analysis or possibly on other modes of reasoning. In the end, it highlights the clinical and philosophical consequences of the plurality of modes of 'inferences to mental disorder'.
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  35. Fuzzy Fault Lines: Selves in Multiple Personality Disorder.George Graham - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of (...)
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  36.  26
    Body Dysmorphic Disorder: Contraindication or Ethical Justification for Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery in Adolescents.Merle Spriggs & Lynn Gillam - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (9):706-713.
    Is Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery for an adolescent with Body Dysmorphic Disorder ever ethically justified? Cosmetic genital surgery for adolescent girls is one of the most ethically controversial forms of cosmetic surgery and Body Dysmorphic Disorder is typically seen as a contraindication for cosmetic surgery. Two key ethical concerns are that Body Dysmorphic Disorder undermines whatever capacity for autonomy the adolescent has; and even if there is valid parental consent, the presence of Body Dysmorphic Disorder means (...)
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  37.  83
    What Is Personality Disorder?Hanna Pickard - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):181-184.
    The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association 1994, 689) defines personality disorder (PD) as: An enduring pattern of experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of an individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (or more) of the following areas: 1 Cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events); 2 Affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of emotional response); 3 Interpersonal functioning; and 4 Impulse control. B The enduring ..
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  38.  52
    Sorting Out the Concept Disorder.Patricia A. Ross - 2005 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2):115-140.
    . Current debates concerning the concept of mental disorder involve many different philosophical issues. However, it is not always clear from these discussions how, or whether, these issues relate to one another, or in exactly what way they are important for the definition of disorder. This article aims to sort through some of the philosophical issues that arise in the current literature and provide a clarification of how these issues are related to one another and whether they are (...)
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  39.  31
    “A Fire in the Blood”: Metaphors of Bipolar Disorder in Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind. [REVIEW]Thomas J. Schoeneman, Janel Putnam, Ian Rasmussen, Nina Sparr & Stephanie Beechem - 2012 - Journal of Medical Humanities 33 (3):185-205.
    Content analysis of three chapters of Jamison’s memoir, An Unquiet Mind, shows that depression, mania, and Bipolar Disorder have a common metaphoric core as a sequential process of suffering and adversity that is a form of malevolence and destruction. Depression was down and in, while mania was up, in and distant, circular and zigzag, a powerful force of quickness and motion, fieriness, strangeness, seduction, expansive extravagance, and acuity. Bipolar Disorder is down and away and a sequential and cyclical (...)
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  40. Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Timothy J. Bayne - 2002 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the (...)
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  41.  66
    Ontological Insecurity: A Guiding Framework for Borderline Personality Disorder.Tina Pietsch, John Wilson & Matthew McDonald - 2010 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 41 (1):85-105.
    The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the experience of Borderline Personality Disorder with the aim of developing a more liberating approach to its diagnosis and treatment. Eight participants diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder were recruited from a psychiatric hospital operated by the Surrey and Borders NHS Trust and an outpatient daycentre based in London, United Kingdom. A narrative approach to methodology was employed to collect and analyse the participants’ life-stories. Themes to emerge from the participant’s narratives (...)
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  42. Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood.Steve Matthews - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.
    Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may be escaped (...)
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  43.  25
    The Role of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder in the Subjectification of Women.Jane M. Ussher - 2003 - Journal of Medical Humanities 24 (1-2):131-146.
    This paper will examine the way in which premenstrual symptomatology has been represented and regulated by psychology and psychiatry. It questions the “truths” about women's premenstrual experiences that circulate in scientific discourse, namely the fictions framed as facts that serve to regulate femininity, reproduction, and what it is to be “woman.” Hegemonic truths that define Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD) and its nosological predecessor Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS) are examined to illustrate how regimes of objectified knowledge and practices of “assemblage” come (...)
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  44.  73
    Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder: Mental Illness.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):35-52.
    What mental disorder means is controversial. I attempt to solve that controversy by applying the method of defining a phenomenon in terms of the goals we have for demarcating that phenomenon from other phenomena to the case of mental disorder. I thus address the question about the nature of mental disorder by paying attention to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder. I maintain that these goals, which embody the reasons why we consider mental (...) a significant phenomenon for us, have a common denominator: they refer to psychological capacity for autonomy. I present a conceptual foundation for defining mental disorder on the basis of that psychological capacity and argue that this way of understanding the nature of mental disorder avoids the main problems of the central contemporary theories of mental disorder. Then I explain why this conception of the nature of mental disorder is not undermined by anti-psychiatric criticisms to the effect that mental illness does not exist, that the mentally ill should not be treated differently from others, and that seeing problems of the mentally disordered as psychiatric problems is unjustified medicalization. I conclude by suggesting that the presented conceptual foundation for defining mental disorder would benefit from being complemented by results of empirical psychology. (shrink)
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  45.  10
    ‘A Healthier and More Hopeful Person’: Illegitimacy, Mental Disorder and the Improved Prognosis of the Adolescent Mother. [REVIEW]Ofra Koffman - 2015 - Journal of Medical Humanities 36 (2):113-126.
    This paper aims to contribute to the exploration of the shift from a problematisation of ‘unwed motherhood’ to ‘teenage motherhood’ in late twentieth century Britain. It does so by exploring the dominant social scientific understanding of ‘unwed mothers’ during the 1950s and 1960s which suggested that these women suffered from a psychological disorder. I then analyse the conceptualisation of ‘adolescent unwed mothers’ exploring why professionals deemed them to be less disturbed than older women in their predicament. This finding is (...)
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  46. The Concept of Mental Disorder: A Proposal.Alfredo Gaete - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (4):327-339.
    During the last years, there has been an important discussion on the concept of mental disorder. Several accounts of such a concept have been offered by theorists, although neither of these accounts seems to have successfully answered both the question of what it means for a certain mental condition to be a disorder and the question of what it means for a certain disorder to be mental. In this paper, I propose an account of the concept of (...)
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    What Does It Take to Be a Brain Disorder?Anneli Jefferson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):249-262.
    In this paper, I address the question whether mental disorders should be understood to be brain disorders and what conditions need to be met for a disorder to be rightly described as a brain disorder. I defend the view that mental disorders are autonomous and that a condition can be a mental disorder without at the same time being a brain disorder. I then show the consequences of this view. The most important of these is that (...)
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  48. Emotional Disorder and Attention.Kent Bach - 1993 - In George Graham (ed.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Some would say that philosophy can contribute more to the occurrence of mental disorder than to the study of it. Thinking too much does have its risks, but so do willful ignorance and selective inattention. Well, what can philosophy contribute? It is not equipped to enumerate the symptoms and varieties of disorder or to identify their diverse causes, much less offer cures (maybe it can do that-personal philosophical therapy is now available in the Netherlands). On the other hand, (...)
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  49.  2
    An Evaluation of the DSM Concept of Mental Disorder.Guy A. Boysen - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):157-173.
    The stated purpose of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is to classify mental disorders. However, no tenable operational definition of mental disorder is offered in the manual. This leaves the possibility open that the behaviors labeled as disordered in the DSM are not members of a valid category. Attempts to define mental illness fall into the category of essentialist or relativist based, respectively, on the acceptance or denial of the existence of a defining biological attribute that (...)
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  50.  55
    Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder: MatthewsEric,1936-Against Definition.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):67-72.
    A response to the commentaries presented by Eric Matthews and Julian Savulescu on Jukka Varelius, 'Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.’ Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2009 Vol. 16 (1): 35-52.
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