Results for 'Dispositional properties'

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  1. Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals.Sungho Choi - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):795-841.
    For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis (...)
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    A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties.Marco J. Nathan - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):253-274.
    This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified (...)
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    On the Possibility of Contigently Dispositional Properties.Vassilios Livanios - 2010 - Abstracta 6 (1):3-17.
    Metaphysicians who hold that there is an ontological distinction between two kinds of fundamental natural properties assume that properties are dispositional or non-dispositional necessarily. In contrast to this, I suggest that one can admit the existence of fundamental contingently dispositional properties. After some clarifications concerning the content of the suggested view, I respond to several objections regarding its intelligibility and viability and outline two of its important consequences.
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    Dispositional Properties.Herbert Hochberg - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (1):10-17.
    An analysis of problematic dispositional predicates like 'soluble' is presented. The analysis attempts to combine cogent features of opposed previous analyses of Carnap and Bergmann, while avoiding problematic features of both. The suggestion that there is an ambiguity in negations of assertions of dispositional properties, and a consequent distinction between "not soluble" and "insoluble," lies at the core of the solution.
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    Dispositional Properties.David Weissman - 1965 - Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
    DAVID WEISSMAN DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES FOREWORD BY George Kimball ...
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  6.  1
    On the Possibility of Contigently Dispositional Properties.Vassilios Livanios - 2009 - Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente E Ação 5 (2):3-17.
    Metaphysicians who hold that there is an ontological distinction between two kinds of fundamental natural properties assume that properties are dispositional or non-dispositional necessarily. In contrast to this, I suggest that one can admit the existence of fundamental contingently dispositional properties. After some clarifications concerning the content of the suggested view, I respond to several objections regarding its intelligibility and viability and outline two of its important consequences.
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  7. Dispositional Properties.David Weissman - 2008 - Southern Illinois University Press.
    In_ Dispositional Properties_, David Weissman attacks a problem central to the philosophy of mind and, by implication, to the theory of being: Are there potentialities, capabilities, which dispose the mind to think in one way rather than another? The volume is arranged in the form of four arguments that converge upon a single point. First, there is an intricate discussion of the shortcomings of Hume's account of mind as ideas and impressions. Next comes a brief treatment of the arguments (...)
     
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  8.  28
    Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties.Clark Butler - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):87-108.
    The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.
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  9. Real Dispositions: An Investigation Into the Nature of Dispositional Properties.Jan Hauska - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    Most metaphysicians deny that dispositions are among the fundamental constituents of the world. The solubility of salt, for example, is regarded as derivative from more basic features of reality, such as the molecular structure of salt and the laws of nature. This is an initially plausible view: a disposition seems to be essentially a characterization of what its bearer can do, which seems to be wholly dependent on what that bearer is like. ;Nonetheless, I think that the most attractive view (...)
     
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  10. Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties.William A. Bauer - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (35).
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses (...)
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  11.  63
    Too Many Dispositional Properties.Tobias Hansson - 2006 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):37-42.
    This paper identifies an overdetermination problem faced by the non-reductive dispositional property account of disposition ascriptions. Two possible responses to the problem are evaluated and both are shown to have serious drawbacks. Finally it is noted that the traditional conditional analysis of dispositional ascriptions escapes the original difficulty.
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  12.  78
    Dispositional Properties.A. D. Smith - 1977 - Mind 86 (343):439-445.
  13.  85
    Dispositional Properties and Dispositions.Gustav Bergmann - 1955 - Philosophical Studies 6 (5):77-80.
  14.  25
    Armstrong's Proof of the Realist Account of Dispositional Properties.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):283 – 287.
  15.  65
    Dispositional Properties.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Analysis 22 (2):44 - 46.
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    Are There Non-Dispositional Properties?J. W. Roxbee Cox - 1964 - Analysis 24 (5):161 - 164.
  17.  63
    Mackie on Dispositional Properties.J. W. Roxbee Cox - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):232-234.
  18.  15
    Hume's Theory of Dispositional Properties.John Bricke - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):15-23.
  19. Review: Gustav Bergmann, Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. [REVIEW]John Watling - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):322-322.
     
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  20.  10
    The Causal Efficacy of Macroscopic Dispositional Properties.Max Kistler - 2007 - In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate. pp. 103--132.
  21.  10
    "Dispositional Properties," by David Weissman; Foreword by George Kimball Plochmann.George P. Klubertanz - 1966 - Modern Schoolman 43 (3):303-303.
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    Too Many Dispositional Properties.Tobias Hansson - 2006 - SATS 7 (2).
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  23. Dispositional Properties and Dispositions.Bergmann Gustav - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):322-322.
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  24. Are There Non-Dispositional Properties?Cox Roxbee - 1964 - Analysis 24 (5):161.
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  25. Are There Non-Dispositional Properties?Cox Roxbee & Church Alonso - 1964 - Analysis 24 (5):161.
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  26. Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.Ullin T. Place - 1987 - Synthesis Philosophica 2 (3):149-160.
  27. Are there non-dispositional properties?J. W. Cox Roxbee - 1964 - Erkenntnis 24 (5):161.
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  28. Dispositional Properties.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Erkenntnis 22 (2):44.
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  29. Bergmann Gustav. Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. Philosophical Studies , Vol. 6 , Pp. 77–80.John Watling - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):322.
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  30. The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws.Anjan Chakravartty - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
    One view of the nature of properties has been crystallized in recent debate by an identity thesis proposed by Shoemaker. The general idea is that there is for behaviour. Well-known criticisms of this approach, however, remain unanswered, and the details of its connections to laws nothing more to being a particular causal property than conferring certain dispositions of nature and the precise ontology of causal properties stand in need of development. This paper examines and defends a dispositional (...)
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  31.  38
    Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 1999 - Theoria 65 (2):171–192.
    Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property of being such, having base properties such, that an entity with the property elicits morally merited and motivating responses. Its proponents have argued that this notion can explain how moral judgements can be objective in the sense of expressing (...) that are independent of will and yet imply motivation by those who assert them. In special consideration of Dancy’s Moral Reasons, I argue that the dispositional account does not save the idea of objectivity in the required sense and implies an untenable view of moral motivation. I therefore conclude that the dispositional account fails to explain the two features of moral judgements. (shrink)
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  32.  50
    The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction.Sharon R. Ford - 2012 - In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
    This paper largely engages with Brian Ellis’s description of categorical dimensions as put forward in his paper in this volume. The New Essentialism advocated by Ellis posits the ontologically-robust existence of both dispositional and categorical properties. I have argued that the distinction that Ellis draws between the two is unpersuasive, and that the causal role of categorical dimensions—what they do—is inseparable from what they are. This observation is reinforced by the fact that absolute physical quantities permit re-interpretations of (...)
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  33. What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure.Sharon R. Ford - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Queensland
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view (...)
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  34. Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or Both.Ullin T. Place - 1996 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. pp. 105--125.
     
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  35.  47
    Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.
    One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration (...)
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  36. Science in Metaphysics : Exploring the Metaphysics of Properties and Laws.Livanios Vassilis - 2017 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book explores the dispositional and categorical debates on the metaphysics of properties. It defends the view that all fundamental properties and relations are contingently categorical, while also examining alternative accounts of the nature of properties. Drawing upon both established research and the author's own investigation into the broader discipline of the metaphysics of science, this book provides a comprehensive study of the many views and opinions regarding a most debatable topic in contemporary metaphysics.
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  37. Dispositional Essentialism and the Grounding of Natural Modality.Siegfried Jaag - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14 (34).
    Dispositional essentialism is a non-Humean view about the essences of certain fundamental or natural properties that looms large in recent metaphysics , not least because it promises to explain neatly the natural modalities such as laws of nature, counterfactuals, causation and chance. In the current paper, however, several considerations are presented that indicate a serious tension between its essentialist core thesis and natural “metaphysical” interpretations of its central explanatory claims.
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  38.  68
    Extending the Notion of Affordance.Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):275-293.
    Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical (...)
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  39. Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities?Bence Nanay - 2011 - Ratio 24 (3):299-310.
    It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fail.
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  40.  53
    In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.
    The ontology of ‘powerful qualities’ is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with ‘dispositionalproperties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer ( 2012 ) has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically (...)
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  41. How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach?Robert Schroer - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterlly 47 (3):253-266.
    : It is widely thought that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties; specifying the nature of this dependency, however, has proven a difficult task. The dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties also presents a challenge to the thesis of Physicalism: If the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study and if dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, then it appears that there (...)
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    The Problem of Retention.Matthew Tugby - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    A popular version of anti-Humeanism is one that views fundamental properties as being irreducibly dispositional in nature, and it is a view to which I am attracted. Proponents of this view typically object to Humean regularity theories of laws on the basis that they do not explain why our world is regular rather than chaotic from moment to moment. It is thought that, for this reason, Humeanism does not provide firm enough foundations for induction. However, in this paper (...)
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    Aristotle on the Emergence of Material Complexity: Meteorology IV and Aristotle’s Biology.James G. Lennox - 2014 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 4 (2):272-305.
    In this article I defend an account of Meteorology IV as providing a material-level causal account of the emergence of uniform materials with a wide range of dispositional properties not found at the level of the four elements—the emergence of material complexity. I then demonstrate that this causal account is used in the Generation of Animals and Parts of Animals as part of the explanation of the generation of the uniform parts (tissues) and of their role in providing (...)
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    An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View".Sharon R. Ford - 2007 - In Giacomo Romano (ed.), Symposium on: John Heil, From an Ontological Point of View. Bari: Swif. pp. 45-51.
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object require the qualitative as individuator of objects and powers? The answer depends on whether it is possible (...)
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  45.  6
    Conscious Primitives and Their Reality.Simone Gozzano - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):247-255.
    : In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology. Keywords : Consciousness; Introspection; Realism; Type-identity; Dispositional Properties I (...)
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  46. Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws of Nature?Richard Corry - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):263 - 275.
    A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be (...)
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    Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection.Tomasz Bigaj - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.
    Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that (...)
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  48.  17
    Hume, Dispositional Essentialism, and Where to Find the Idea of Necessary Connection.William Hannegan - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):787-791.
    Dispositional essentialists hold that the world is populated by irreducibly dispositional properties, called “potencies,” “powers,” or “dispositions.” Each of these properties is marked out by a characteristic stimulus and manifestation bound together in a metaphysically necessary connection. Dispositional essentialism faces an old objection from David Hume. Hume argues, in his Treatise of Human Nature, that we have no adequate idea of necessary connection. The epistemology of the Treatise allegedly rules the idea out. Dispositional essentialists (...)
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  49.  1
    The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional.Galen Strawson - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):271–282.
    Suppose that X and Y can’t possibly exist apart in reality; then—by definition—there’s no real distinction between them, only a conceptual distinction. There’s a conceptual distinction between a rectilinear figure’s triangularity and its trilaterality, for example, but no real distinction. In fundamental metaphysics there is no real distinction between an object’s categorical properties and its dispositional properties. So too there is no real distinction between an object and its properties. And in fundamental metaphysics, for X and (...)
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  50. The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism.David Yates - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.
    Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata (...)
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