A longstanding question at the intersection of science, philosophy, and theology is how God might act, or not, when governing the universe. Many believe that determinism would prevent God from acting at all, since to do so would require violating the laws of nature. However, when a robust view of these laws is coupled with the kind of determinism now used in dynamics, a new model of divineaction emerges. This book presents a new approach to divine (...)action beyond the current focus on quantum mechanics and esoteric gaps in the causal order. It bases this approach on two general points. First, that there are laws of nature is not merely a metaphor. Second, laws and physical determinism are now understood in mathematically precise ways that have important implications for metaphysics. The explication of these two claims shows not only that nonviolationist divineaction is possible, but there is considerably more freedom available for God to act than current models allow. By bringing a philosophical perspective to an issue often dominated by theologians and scientists, this text redresses an imbalance in the discussion around divineaction. It will, therefore, be of keen interest to scholars of Philosophy and Religion, the Philosophy of Science, and Theology. (shrink)
DivineAction and Modern Science considers the relationship between the natural sciences and the concept of God acting in the world. Nicholas Saunders examines the Biblical motivations for asserting a continuing notion of divineaction and identifies several different theological approaches to the problem. He considers their theoretical relationships with the laws of nature, indeterminism, and probabilistic causation. His book then embarks on a radical critique of current attempts to reconcile special divineaction with (...) quantum theory, chaos theory and quantum chaos. As well as considering the implications of these problems for common interpretations of divineaction, Saunders also surveys and codifies the many different theological, philosophical and scientific responses to divineaction. The conclusion reached is that we are still far from a satisfactory account of how God might act in a manner that is consonant with modern science despite the copious recent scholarship in this area. (shrink)
For quantum mechanics to form the crux of a robust model of divineaction, random quantum fluctuations must be amplified into the macroscopic realm. What has not been recognized in the divineaction literature to date is the degree to which differential dynamics, continuum mechanics, and condensed matter physics prevent such fluctuations from infecting meso- and macroscopic systems. Once all of the relevant physics is considered, models of divineaction based on quantum randomness are (...) shown to be far more limited than is generally assumed. Unless some sort of new physical mechanism is discovered, the amplification problem cannot be solved. (shrink)
In this paper I suggest a reason why the Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of providence is attractive to contemporary philosophers of religion in the English-speaking academy. The main argument states that there are at least four metaphysical principles that guided discussions on providence and divineaction in the created world, namely divine omnipotence and transcendence, divine providential action, the autonomy of natural created causes, and the success of reason and natural science. Aquinas’ doctrine, I hold, is (...) capable of affirming these four principles without rejecting any of them, as it is in the cases of other doctrines. In addition, I present and answer some objections raised against Aquinas’ thought, and briefly expand on how Aquinas’ ideas on providence are used today to tackle issues regarding contemporary science, such as evolutionary biology, quantum mechanics, and big bang theory. (shrink)
__Scientific Perspectives on DivineAction: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress_ _is a collection of thirteen essays assessing the scholarly contributions to the _Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action_ series, which is comprised of five volumes resulting from international research conferences co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences between 1991 and 2000. The overarching goal of the series is to advance the engagement of constructive theology with the natural sciences with special (...) attention to the theme of divineaction and to investigate the philosophical and theological elements within science. This volume is divided into three sections: In Section One, contributors review the history of the series and the development of new research methodology and discuss philosophical issues raised by the laws of nature and the limits of science; in Section Two, authors provide philosophical analysis of specific issues in the series; and in Section Three, contributors offer theological analyses of specific issues. The five volumes in the series include: _Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature_ ; _Chaos and Complexity_ ; _Molecular and Evolutionary Biology_ ; _Neuroscience and the Person_ ; and _Quantum Mechanics _, and are distributed by University of Notre Dame Press. (shrink)
Działanie Boga a prawa przyrody: odpowiedź Łukasiewiczowi W odpowiedzi Łukasiewiczowi na Opatrzność Boża a przypadek w świecie bronię trzech wniosków. Po pierwsze, stanowisko nazwane przez niego „deizmem epistemicznym” staje przed wyzwaniami ze strony fizyki, których często się nie zauważa. Po drugie, jeśli teiści opowiadający się za argumentem celowościowym opartym na tzw. delikatnym dostrojeniu nie mają racji, to nie ma jej również większość fizyków, która uważa, że delikatne dostrojenie wymaga wyjaśnienia. Po trzecie, nie wszystkie prawa przyrody są warunkowe w takim sensie, (...) jaki przyjmuje Łukasiewicz. Na szczęście rozróżnienie między prawami a nienomologiczną informacją pozwala na rozszerzenie jego modelu działania Boga. (shrink)
Is the human mind uniquely nonphysical or even spiritual, such that divine intentions can meet physical realities? As scholars in science and religion have spent decades attempting to identify a 'causal joint' between God and the natural world, human consciousness has been often privileged as just such a locus of divine-human interaction. However, this intuitively dualistic move is both out of step with contemporary science and theologically insufficient. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine (...)action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divineaction in the mind. Sarah Lane Ritchie suggests that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divineaction in the mind. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God's active presence, one may affirm divineaction not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. (shrink)
The following is a synopsis of the paper presented by Alvin Plantinga at the RATIO conference on The Meaning of Theism held in April 2005 at the University of Reading. The synopsis has been prepared by the Editor, with the author’s approval, from a handout provided by the author at the conference. The paper reflects on whether religious belief of a traditional Christian kind can be maintained consistently with accepting our modern scientific worldview. Many theologians, and also many scientists, maintain (...) that the idea of divine intervention is at odds with the framework of natural laws disclosed by science. The paper argues that this notion of a ”religion/science problem’ is misguided. When properly understood, neither the classical (Newtonian) picture of natural laws, nor the more recent quantum mechanical picture, rules out divine intervention. There is nothing in science, under either the old or the new picture, that conflicts with, or even calls in to question, special divineaction, including miracles. (shrink)
Commentators typically neglect the distinct nature and role of hope in Kant’s system, and simply lump it together with the sort of Belief that arises from the moral proof. Kant himself is not entirely innocent of the conflation. Here I argue, however, that from a conceptual as well as a textual point of view, hope should be regarded as a different kind of attitude. It is an attitude that we can rationally adopt toward some of the doctrines that are not (...) able to be proved from within the bounds of mere reason – either theoretical or practical. This does not mean that hope is unconstrained; there are rational limits, as we shall see. In fact one of my central claims here is that a crucial difference between knowledge, rational Belief, and rational hope is that they are governed by different modal constraints; section II discusses those constraints and the kind of modality involved. In section III, I return to Religion and offer what I take to be Kant’s account of the main objects of rational hope in that text – namely, “alleged outer experiences (miracles)”;a “supposed inner experience(effect of grace)”;and a future collective experience (the construction of a truly ethical society). (shrink)
Recent articles by Nicholas Saunders, Carl Helrich, and Jeffrey Koperski raise important questions about attempts to make use of quantum mechanics in giving an account of particular divineaction in the world. In response, I make two principal points. First, some of the most pointed theological criticisms lose their force if we attend with sufficient care to the limited aims of proposals about divineaction at points of quantum indetermination. Second, given the current state of knowledge, (...) it remains an open option to make theological use of an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Any such proposal, however, will be an exploratory hypothesis offered in the face of deep uncertainties regarding the measurement problem and the presence in natural systems of amplifiers for quantum effects. (shrink)
Operative grace is generally considered to be a paradigm example of special divineaction. In this paper, we suggest one reason to think operative grace might be consistent with general divineaction alone. On our view, then, a deist can consistently believe in a doctrine of saving faith.
Any notion of a god that is of relevance to us must show how it makes a difference in the world. But this idea of an interventionist god doesn’t make sense for a secular and scientific mentality such as ours. I take Brenda de Wet’s five sticking points for any religious believer that seem to fail to make the grade of intellectual integrity (2008), and argue that starting from creedal and popular formulations of the notion of a god, as she (...) does along with most standard textbooks in the philosophy of religion, reveals an oversight of self-knowledge characteristic of much modern philosophy. Uncovering similar inadequacies in the secularized Deist account of god (which has given rise to the problem of the relevance of the god) opens up questions to do with the contingent intersubjective conditions of possibility for the development of the power of knowing and acting in the sense implied in the notion of intellectual integrity. But, I argue, free self-determination, and the contingency of its actualization, suggests the reality of a non-finite source of this freedom, and indeed this being manifest in an unavoidably historical, particularistic way. Along these lines I argue for an intellectually coherent notion of particular divineaction but in a non-interventionist model. (shrink)
This article sets out a formal procedure for determining the probability that God would do a specified action, using our moral knowledge and understanding God as a perfect being. To motivate developing the procedure I show how natural theology – design arguments, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, and the treatment of miracles and religious experiences as evidence for claims about God – routinely appeals to judgments involving these probabilities. To set out the procedure, I describe a (...) decision-theoretic model for practical reasoning which is deontological so as to appeal to theists, but is designed not to presuppose any substantive moral commitments, and to accommodate normative and non-normative uncertainty. Then I explain how judgments about what we probably ought to do can be transformed into judgments about what God would probably do. Then I show the usefulness of the procedure by describing how it can help structure discussions in natural theology and a-theology, and how it offers an attractive alternative to ‘skeptical theism’. (shrink)
Today’s debates present ”occasionalism’ as the position that any satisfying account of divineaction must avoid. In this paper I discuss how a leading Cartesian author of the end of the seventeenth century, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, attempted to avoid occasionalism. Régis’s case is illuminating because it stresses both the difficulties connected with the traditional alternatives to occasionalism and also those aspects embedded in the occasionalist position that should be taken into due account. The paper focuses on Régis’s own account (...) of secondary causation in order to show how the challenge of avoiding occasionalism can lead to the development of new accounts of divineaction. (shrink)
On the face of it, the idea of divineaction in nature brings challenges to the autonomy of nature, and thus to the foundation of the natural sciences. According to the contemporary scientific world view, nature does not need anything extra to bring about any event which happens in nature. Apparently contrasting with this view, the main monotheistic religions claim that God is capable of intervening in the universe to guide it to its end and completion, and does (...) so. This dilemma has brought theologians to search for a way in which God could perform this activity without interfering with the natural processes. The indeterminism of quantum events seems to be a conceptual framework which provides the place where God could choose the outcome of any event, given its indeterminacy. This solution, however, raises several difficulties for the traditional understanding of God as omnipotent, omniscient, provident, and transcendent. In the end, God has to act as another natural cause. The root of this dilemma (God’s action against nature’s actions) is the notion of deterministic causality used in the debate, which remains unexplained, and the assumption that God depends upon the natural order to act. This project is to evaluate some modern approaches to the problem of divineaction, and to consider Aquinas’ views on causality, with which it is possible to hold a non-deterministic interpretation of nature. Then, to see first how he applies this notion to God’s causality, to show how nature depends on God, and second how God acts providentially in all natural operations, as a first cause moving a secondary cause. (shrink)
Miracles are signs of God's power. Confusion about them comes from misunderstanding or doubting the relationship between God and creation rather than from science properly understood.
The fact that certain configurations of problems and the philosophical antinomies, paradoxes and confusions they contain regularly return in the history of the rational exposition of these problems points to more than the limitations of human reason and the inexhaustibility of the subject matter; it is indicative of a structural problem . If we agree that integrity is defined as the quality of being unimpaired based on unity or wholeness, then holding beliefs based on theories compromised by structural problems jeopardises (...) one’s intellectual integrity. The Christian notion of particular divineaction founders on more than one structural problem. On the one hand, divineaction is held to be constitutive of the Christian faith. On the other hand, it is held to be inconceivable , improbable , impossible , unnecessary , and indefensible by the way many interpret current scientific, philosophical and theological theories. Together, these objections assert that divineaction is implausible. This paper outlines five objections to particular divineaction that poses a challenge to intellectual integrity. In doing so, the minimum requirements for a rationally justifiable theory of divineaction is delineated. (shrink)
The following is a synopsis of the paper presented by Alvin Plantinga at the Ratioconference on The Meaning of Theism held in April 2005 at the University of Reading. The synopsis has been prepared by the Editor, with the author's approval, from a handout provided by the author at the conference. The paper reflects on whether religious belief of a traditional Christian kind can be maintained consistently with accepting our modern scientific worldview. Many theologians, and also many scientists, maintain that (...) the idea of divine intervention is at odds with the framework of natural laws disclosed by science. The paper argues that this notion of a ‘religion/science problem’ is misguided. When properly understood, neither the classical picture of natural laws, nor the more recent quantum mechanical picture, rules out divine intervention. There is nothing in science, under either the old or the new picture, that conflicts with, or even calls in to question, special divineaction, including miracles. (shrink)
This article addresses the question of what God's ultimate purposes might be for creating the world, focusing particularly on what His purpose might have been in creating the world via a seemingly partly chance-driven evolutionary process. It argues that God's creation of human beings and other living organisms through an evolutionary process allows for richer and deeper sorts of interconnections between humans and non-human creation than would otherwise be possible. These interconnections are of significant value, mainly because they allow for (...) creation to become more deeply united with ourselves, in fact so united that there exists a deep communion between us and the rest of creation. This communion is not only an intrinsic good, but it enriches us, since part of this communion is creation becoming part of our very self, and thus we consciously share in the richness of creation. (shrink)
John Polkinghorne, formerly a physicist and now an Anglican priest and theologian, has made a significant contribution to the current dialogue between Christian theology and the natural sciences. I examine here his reflection on what is commonly called the problem of special divineaction in the world. Polkinghorne argues that God acts in the world via a “topdown” or “downward” mode of causation that exploits the indeterministic openness of chaotic systems without requiring that God violate natural laws. In (...) response, I argue: that divine intervention in response to human sin is theologically, as well as scientifically unobjectionable; and that the belief that God is the transcendent creator of the world renders the “causal joint” between God and the world metaphysical in nature, thus obviating the need to uncover a physical feature of the world that God exploits in order to act in the world. (shrink)
Many theistic philosophers conceive of God’s activity in agent-causal terms. That is, they view divineaction as an instance of (perhaps the paradigm case of) substance causation. At the same time, many theists endorse the claim that God acts for reasons, and not merely wantonly. It is the aim of this paper to show that a commitment to both theses gives rise to a dilemma. I present the dilemma and then spend the bulk of the paper defending its (...) premises. I conclude with some suggestions for how one might carve out an alternative model of divineaction. (shrink)
The new interest in special divineaction has led to a close reading of the great debates and discussions of the early modern period in an attempt to understand contemporary resistance to the notion of divineaction, and to develop strategies for reaffirming the notion in a refined manner. Although continuing engagement with and evaluation of the Humean legacy on miracles and divineaction will be of central importance to this programme of review, there (...) are other issues that also need to be addressed. In this article I identify some of the factors that have caused or continue to cause difficulties for the articulation of a concept of special divineaction and I suggest how they might be engaged. (shrink)
Most people believe that everything happens for a reason. Whether it is “God’s will,” “karma” or “fate,” we want to believe that an overarching purpose undergirds everything, that nothing in the world--especially a disaster or tragedy--is a random, meaningless event. This dilemma presents itself provocatively in Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution that, in the conventional scientific understanding, is driven by random chance. Reconciling chance and divine purpose poses challenges to the Judeo-Christian tradition. But the Hebrew Scriptures, in the ancient (...) and powerful story of Job, reveal that questions of purpose and order have long been a part of the conversation. Although the Bible generally affirms that God blesses the righteous in an orderly way, the story of Job is a powerful counterexample to this orderly scheme. The achingly beautiful but tragic story of Job, in concert with the modern quantum picture of the world, push back against the idea that “everything happens for a reason.”. (shrink)
If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a preceding cause? For example, if the universe began with the Big Bang and if God brought it about, did the Big Bang then have a preceding cause? The standard answer is: yes, it was caused by a divine willing. I propose an alternative view: God’s actions, unlike human actions, are not initiated by willings, undertakings, or volitions, but God brings about the intended event directly. Presenting a (...) solution to the dilemma of free will I explain what ‘bringing about directly’ means and show that the question of what an action begins with is distinct from the question whether it is a basic action. (shrink)
This book introduces and showcases contributions from leading international scholars on the topic of "divineaction" in the world, with special attention on the ...
Machine generated contents note: Preface; Introduction: what is remythologizing?; Part I. 'God' in Scripture and Theology: 1. Biblical representation (Vorstellung): divine communicative action and passion; 2. Theological conceptualization (Begriff): varieties of theism and panentheism; 3. The new kenotic-perichoretic relational ontotheology: some 'classical' concerns; Part II. Communicative Theism and the Triune God: 4. God's being is in communicating; 5. God in three persons: the one who lights and lives in love; Part III. God and World: Authorial Action and (...) Interaction: 6. Divine author and human hero in dialogical relation; 7. Divine communicative sovereignty and human freedom: the hero talks back; 8. Impassible passion? Suffering, emotions, and the crucified God; 9. Impassible compassion? From divine pathos to divine patience; Conclusion: always remythologizing? Answering to the Holy author in our midst; Select bibliography; Index of scriptural references; General index. (shrink)