Results for 'Doing and Allowing'

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  1. Doing, Allowing, and the Problem of Evil.Daniel Lim - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (3):273-289.
    Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave (...)
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    Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Cases.Duncan Purves - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):129-137.
    The aim of this paper is to explain and defend a type of argument common in the doing/allowing literature called a “contrast argument.” I am concerned with defending a particular type of contrast argument that is intended to demonstrate the moral irrelevance of the doing/allowing distinction. This type of argument, referred to in this paper as an “irrelevance argument,” is exemplified by an argument offered by James Rachels (1975) that employs the Smith and Jones bathtub cases. (...)
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  3. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction.Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent (...)
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  4.  48
    Barry and Øverland on Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm.Fiona Woollard - 2019 - Ethics and Global Politics 12 (1):43-51.
    In Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland address the two types of argument that have dominated discussion of the responsibilities of the affluent to respond to global poverty. The second type of argument appeals to ‘contribution-based responsibilities’: the affluent have a duty to do something about the plight of the global poor because they have contributed to that plight. Barry and Øverland rightly recognize that to assess contribution-based responsibility for global poverty, we need (...)
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  5. Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation.Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence (...)
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  6. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction.Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (7):459-469.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the (...)
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  7. A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Xiaofei Liu - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a (...)
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  8. Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics.Thomas S. Huddle - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as (...)
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  9.  49
    Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past.Jason Hanna - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):677-698.
    Most deontologists claim that it is more objectionable to do harm than it is to allow harm of comparable magnitude. I argue that this view faces a largely neglected puzzle regarding the moral relevance of an agent's past behavior. Consider an agent who chooses to save five people rather than one, where the one person's life is in jeopardy because of something the agent did earlier. How are the agent's obligations affected by the fact that his now letting the one (...)
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    Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past.Jason Hanna - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):677-698.
    Most deontologists claim that it is more objectionable to do harm than it is to allow harm of comparable magnitude. I argue that this view faces a largely neglected puzzle regarding the moral relevance of an agent's past behavior. Consider an agent who chooses to save five people rather than one, where the one person's life is in jeopardy because of something the agent did earlier. How are the agent's obligations affected by the fact that his now letting the one (...)
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  11.  6
    Doing and Allowing Harm to Refugees.Bradley Hillier-Smith - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3).
    Most theorists working on moral obligations to refugees conceive of western states as innocent bystanders with duties to aid refugees if they can do so at little cost to themselves. This paper challenges this dominant theoretical framing of global displacement by highlighting for the first time certain practices of western states in response to refugee flows such as border violence, detention, encampment and containment which may make us question whether states who engage in such practices are indeed innocent. This paper (...)
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  12. The Evil of Refraining to Save: Liu on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Jacob Blair - 2017 - Diametros 52:127-137.
    In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a (...)
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  13.  31
    Double Effect, Doing and Allowing, and the Relaxed Nonconsequentialist.Fiona Woollard - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):142-158.
    Many philosophers display relaxed scepticism about the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Doctrine of Double Effect, suspecting, without great alarm, that one or both of these Doctrines is indefensible. This relaxed scepticism is misplaced. Anyone who aims to endorse a theory of right action with Nonconsequentialist implications should accept both the DDA and the DDE. First, even to state a Nonconsequentialist theory requires drawing a distinction between respecting and promoting values. This cannot be done without accepting (...)
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  14. Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources.Timothy Hall - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.
    Of great importance to many non-consequentialists is a claimed moral difference between doing and allowing harm. I argue that non-consequentialism is best understood, however, as consisting in three morally distinct categories where commentators typically identify two: standard doings of harm, standard allowings of harm, and denials of resources. Furthermore, the moral distinctness of denials of resources is independent of whether denials are doings or allowings of harm, I argue. I argue by way of matched examples, as well as (...)
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  15.  32
    A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.David K. Chan - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press. pp. 25-45.
    Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. In this chapter, I show that the examples typically used to support (...)
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  16. Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation (...)
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  17. Doing, Allowing, and the State.Adam Omar Hosein - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state (...)
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  18.  20
    Doing, Allowing, and Precaution.Marion Hourdequin - 2007 - Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.
    Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions (...)
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  19.  71
    Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction.Bashshar Haydar - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):96.
    This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or (...)
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  20.  64
    Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement.Fiona Woollard - 2010 - Ratio 23 (2):199-216.
    Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required (...)
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  21.  9
    Doing, Allowing, Gains, and Losses.Camilla Colombo - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1107-1118.
    This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky’s standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous “Asian flu” case. It argues that, alongside with their “loss/no gain effect” account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data, amounts to a more reasonable psychological explanation for the preference reversal. Specifically, my hypothesis is that shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents’ classification of the same action as “doing harm” rather than “allowing harm to occur”, (...)
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  22.  15
    On the Doing-Allowing Distinction and the Problem of Evil: A Reply to Daniel Lim.Andrew Loke - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (2):137-143.
    In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.
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  23. The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the DoingAllowing Distinction.Bashshar Haydar - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is (...)
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  24.  19
    Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.
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  25. Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences.Fiona Woollard - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan (...)
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  26.  22
    Consequentialism and the New Doing-Allowing Distinction.Paul Hurley - 2019 - In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: new directions, new problems? Oxford, UK: pp. 176-197.
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  27.  41
    Doing and Allowing Harm.Fiona Woollard - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Fiona Woollard presents an original defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, according to which doing harm seems much harder to justify than merely allowing harm. She argues that the Doctrine is best understood as a principle that protects us from harmful imposition, and offers a moderate account of our obligations to offer aid to others.
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  28.  33
    State Action, State Policy, and the Doing/Allowing Distinction.Brian Berkey - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):147-149.
  29.  22
    Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions. [REVIEW]Alec Walen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (2):183 - 215.
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  30. If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Fiona Woollard - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341.
    I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent (...)
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  31. Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing.Ben Bradley & Michael Stocker - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):799-808.
    We reply to Scheffler's "Doing and Allowing.".
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  32.  95
    The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Samuel C. Rickless - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.
    The various proponents of the DDA differ over how it should be understood. It might be thought that the distinction between doing and allowing reduces to the distinction between action and inaction. As against this, Philippa Foot has argued that some actions, such as pulling the plug on an artificial respirator, should be treated as “allowings.” On her view, the relevant distinction is primarily one between initiating or sustaining a harmful causal sequence, and allowing or enabling a (...)
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  33.  48
    Environmentalism, Moral Responsibility, and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Allen Thompson - 2006 - Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278.
    In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental (...)
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  34. Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Warren S. Quinn - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.
  35. Doing and Allowing.Samuel Scheffler - 2004 - Ethics 114 (2):215-239.
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  36. Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Kai Draper - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):253-280.
  37. Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm: Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015, ISBN: 978-0-19-968364-2, $70, HC. [REVIEW]Jacob Blair - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):673-681.
  38. 2.“Doing and Allowing” and Doing and AllowingDoing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (Pp. 799-808).William J. FitzPatrick, Gerhard Øverland, Talbot Brewer, David Enoch & Philip Stratton‐Lake - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4).
     
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  39.  55
    The First Dogma of Deontology: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say.Alan Strudler & David Wasserman - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (1):51 - 67.
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  40.  11
    Redirecting Threats, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Special Wrongness of Solar Radiation Management.Patrick Taylor Smith - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):143-146.
  41.  44
    Quinn on Doing and Allowing.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):343-352.
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  42.  4
    Doing and Allowing in the Context of Physician-Assisted Suicide.Dieter Birnbacher - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):575-588.
    Supporting the rational suicide of a patient with a terminal disease is opposed by a majority of German doctors, whereas assistance in such patients’ hastening their death by voluntarily stopping eating and drinking is predominantly judged to be acceptable. Are these two positions compatible? It is argued that the normative differentiation cannot be justified by the fact that the assistance in active suicide is itself active, whereas assistance in VSED is merely passive. Even in "letting die" a patient from hastening (...)
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  43.  28
    Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm , Pp. 239.Peter A. Graham - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (3):369-373.
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    Doing and Allowing Harm. Fiona Woollard, 2015 Oxford, Oxford University Press 239 Pp., £40.00. [REVIEW]Fei Song - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):278-280.
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  45.  17
    Woollard, Fiona. Doing and Allowing Harm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 256. $70.00. [REVIEW]Samuel C. Rickless - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):862-866.
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  46.  48
    Doing and Allowing: Dispensing with Rights and Agency.David Ryan - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):557-573.
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  47. Two Grades of Non-Consequentialism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):795-814.
    In this paper, I explore how to accommodate non-consequentialist constraints with a broadly value-based conception of reasons for action. It turns out that there are two grades of non-consequentialist constraints. The first grade involves attaching ethical importance to such distinctions as the doing/allowing distinction, and the distinction between intended and unintended consequences that is central to the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, at least within the value-based framework, this first grade is insufficient to explain rights, which ground weighty (...)
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  48. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the (...)
     
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  49.  94
    How Not to Make Trade-Offs Between Health and Other Goods.Antti Kauppinen - manuscript
    In the context of a global pandemic, there is good health-based reason for governments to impose various social distancing measures. However, in addition to health benefits, such measures also cause economic and other harms. In this paper, I look at proposals to make use of existing QALY (quality-adjusted life year) valuations and WELLBYs (wellbeing-adjusted life-years) as the currency for making trade-offs between health and other goods. I argue that both methods are problematic. First, whether the costs and benefits are translated (...)
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  50.  48
    Starting a Flood to Stop a Fire? Some Moral Constraints on Solar Radiation Management.David R. Morrow - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):123-138.
    Solar radiation management (SRM), a form of climate engineering, would offset the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations by reducing the amount of sunlight absorbed by the Earth. To encourage support for SRM research, advocates argue that SRM may someday be needed to reduce the risks from climate change. This paper examines the implications of two moral constraints?the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Doctrine of Double Effect?on this argument for SRM and SRM research. The Doctrine of (...)
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