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Domingos Faria
Universidade de Lisboa
  1. É o mal no mundo logicamente compatível com a existência de Deus?Domingos Faria - 2016 - Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia 3 (1).
    O objetivo deste artigo, que se insere no âmbito da filosofia da religião, é tratar o problema lógico do mal e mais concretamente a teoria da defesa do livre-arbítrio de Alvin Plantinga. Quero examinar se esta é uma teoria plausível e se resiste a algumas objeções. Pretendo defender que esta teoria parece resistir a certas objeções.
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  2.  18
    A epistemologia reformista de Plantinga.Domingos Faria - 2011 - Critica.
    A epistemologia da crença religiosa é uma área da filosofia da religião que procura responder ao seguinte problema: haverá justificação para se ter fé sem provas, argumentos ou indícios? Ou formulando de outra forma: será epistemicamente legítimo acreditar em Deus sem provas, argumentos ou indícios? Além das respostas tradicionais de William Clifford e de William James a esse problema, há uma resposta mais contemporânea e filosoficamente prometedora: a epistemologia reformista de Alvin Plantinga (n. 1932). Chama-se “reformista” à sua epistemologia porque (...)
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  3.  22
    A Tradição Socrática na Sala de Aula.Domingos Faria - 2011 - Dissertation, Universidade Do Minho
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  4. Como Explicar o Fenómeno da Vagueza?Domingos Faria - 2013 - Investigação Filosófica 1.
  5.  11
    Dois Exorcismos Para Afastar o Novo Gênio Maligno.Domingos Faria - 2017 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (3):461-471.
    Our main aim in this paper is to develop two solutions or exorcisms to ward off the new evil demon problem against epistemic reliabilism. The first solution is designated as “indexical reliabilism” and the second as “normal-conditions reliabilism”. We will argue that the second solution is more plausible than the first. We will also argue that this second solution, if properly developed, can respond well to several recent objections. Therefore, reliabilism has good ways of dealing with the new evil demon (...)
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  6.  7
    From a Logical Point of Vies is the Evil Against God?Domingos Faria - 2016 - Aufklärung 3 (1):125-134.
    The aim of this paper, which isframed within philosophy of religion, is todeal with the logical problem of evil andmore specifically with the theory of freewill defense of Alvin Plantinga. I wantsurvey whether this is a plausible theoryand whether it resists to some objections. Iintend to hold that this theory seems resistto some objections.
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  7.  32
    Group Belief: Defending a Minimal Version of Summativism.Domingos Faria - 2021 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (1):82-93.
    Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B (...)
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  8.  5
    Group Testimony.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):283-304.
    Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages of the (...)
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  9.  52
    Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (3):283-304.
    Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages (...)
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  10.  12
    Haverá uma viável objeção de jure à crença teísta?Domingos Faria - 2015 - Evista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade Do Porto – Série de Filosofia 32.
    In this paper I want to dispute Plantinga’s claim that there is no viable de jure objection to theistic belief that does not presuppose that such belief is false. So, contrary to Plantinga, I argue that there is at least one viable de jure objection, i.e., an objection to justification or warrant of theistic belief which does not previously depend nor presuppose the falsehood of theism.
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  11.  48
    Is Epistemic Safety Threatened by Frankfurt Cases? A Reply to Kelp.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Diametros 17 (66):66-71.
    I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa and Pritchard, among others, and can be formulated as follows: If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, (...)
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  12. Is There Room for Justified Beliefs Without Evidence? A Critical Assessment of Epistemic Evidentialism.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):137-152.
    In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be no epistemically justified belief without evidence. However, there are other kinds of justification beyond the epistemic justification, such as prudential or moral justification; (...)
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  13. Mackie Vs Plantinga on the Warrant of Theistic Belief Without Arguments.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (1):77.
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because (...)
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  14. (Β) Não Dá Base Ao Incompatibilismo Entre Determinismo E Livre-Arbítrio.Domingos Faria - 2019 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75 (3):1951-1976.
    Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.
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  15.  15
    Proposta de Argumento Contra o Naturalismo Metafísico.Domingos Faria - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (3):361.
    In this paper I present a proposal to reformulate the argument of Alvin Plantinga (2011) against metaphysical naturalism. Contrary to Plantinga’s argument, in this new version I propose to consider the probability of the reliability of cognitive faculties, not with regard to any kind of beliefs, but only with respect to metaphysical beliefs. I claim that those who accept naturalism have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs and, thus, they have (...)
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  16. Será a Semelhança Das Maçãs Vermelhas Uma Entidade Adicional Às Maçãs?Domingos Faria - 2013 - ARGUMENTOS - Revista de Filosofia 5.
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  17. Será Procedente o Argumento de Kripke Contra a Teoria da Identidade Tipo-Tipo?Domingos Faria - 2014 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70 (1):112-131.
    Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...)
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  18. Será procedente o argumento de Plantinga contra o naturalismo metafísico?Domingos Faria - 2015 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 22 (39):121-139.
    O naturalismo metafísico é a perspetiva de que não há uma pessoa como Deus, nem algo semelhante a Deus. Alvin Plantinga tem argumentado que esta perspetiva é auto-refutante e, por isso, irracional. Isto porque se o naturalismo metafísico fosse verdadeiro (em conjunção com a teoria da evolução), então teríamos fortes razões para duvidar da fiabilidade das nossas faculdades cognitivas e, por conseguinte, teríamos fortes razões para duvidar da verdade de qualquer das nossas crenças, inclusive do naturalismo metafísico. O meu objetivo (...)
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  19. Será que, como defendem os epicuristas, estar morto não é um mal para quem morre?Domingos Faria - 2014 - Fundamento: Revista de Pesquisa Em Filosofia 5 (1).
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  20. São Sólidos os Argumentos de Quine Contra a Modalidade de Re?Domingos Faria - 2013 - Theoria - Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia 5 (12).
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  21.  31
    Uma Avaliação Do Argumento Ontológico Modal de Plantinga.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Kairos 15 (1):71-84.
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity”. Plantinga tries to show that this argument is valid and it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of (...)
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  22. Uma pessoa tem corpo e alma? Os argumentos de Swinburne.Domingos Faria - 2014 - Philosophy@Lisbon 4:13-18.
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