In dem vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich an aktuelle argumentationsdidaktische Überlegungen anknüpfen und einen spezifischen Aspekt genauer untersuchen, der von der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung bisher ein Stück weit vernachlässigt worden ist. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Vermittlung sogenannter argumentativer Metakompetenzen, worunter ich grob gesprochen Fähigkeiten des angemessenen Gebrauchs bzw. der verantwortungsvollen Regulation von argumentativen Kompetenzen verstehe. Die grundlegende Idee ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Ausbildung basaler argumentativer Fähigkeiten zwar grundsätzlich durchaus wichtig und wünschenswert ist, dass aber gleichzeitig ein Einsatz dieser Fähigkeiten in (...) unterschiedlichen Situationen ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt. Dementsprechend müssen Lernende nicht nur mit argumentativen Kompetenzen ausgestattet, sondern darüber hinaus auch zu einem reflektierten und situativ angemessenen Gebrauch dieser Kompetenzen befähigt werden. (shrink)

This chapter examines how Spinoza deals with the identity problem by looking at his account of material and mental things. To understand how material things can remain the same over time, it looks at the “Physical Digression” where Spinoza explains the constitution of bodies. By using the structural criterion, Spinoza can solve a number of problems concerning identity and change. Spinoza would say that there is no identity between the body before and after the accident because the proportion between its (...) moving and non‐moving parts is no longer the same. Memory plays no decisive role, and can therefore be disregarded in the account of diachronic identity. Spinoza goes far beyond the Aristotelian conception by spelling out the form in kinetic terms for material things, and in representational terms for mental things. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ongoing debate over the relation between belief and credence. A proposal is made to reverse the currently predominant order of analysis, by taking belief as conceptually basic and credence as the phenomenon to be clarified. In brief, the proposal is to explicate an agent’s credence in a proposition P as the agent’s tendency toward believing P. Platitudinous as this reduction may seem, it runs counter to all of the major positions in the debate, including the Threshold (...) View, the Certainty View as conventionally understood, Dualism, Eliminativism, as well as Credence Primitivism. Section 1 gives an overview on the current state of the debate. Section 2 considers unsuccessful predecessors of the proposed belief-first approach to credence. Section 3 motivates and lays out the basics of a conceptual framework for thinking about doxastic states that characterizes such states in terms of two formally independent dimensions, one pertaining to the agent’s tendency toward believing P, the other to the level of resilience with which the agent manifests that tendency. Against this backdrop, it is argued in Sect. 4 that the present reduction satisfies a set of standard, theoretically neutral criteria of adequacy for theories of credence, at least once they are purged of a quite common conflation of tendency and resilience. Section 5 argues against all of the above competing accounts. (shrink)

The present essay is a compact form of the results obtained during many decades of research into the primeval foundations of the collective fields of force, both social and of consciousness. Since everything is determined by their origins, and the collective forces arise from the mind, we had to explore the ultimate origins of mind. We have come to recognize the law of interactions as the law and necessity which determine the primeval origins of mind. It also determines the substance (...) and essence of the Universe and the modes of its existence and functioning. The present essay is a concise form of results obtained during many decades of research in the primeval foundations of collective, both social and consciousness fields. I point out that a yet unknown type of forces existed in the Golden Age, which I termed as collective force. In the Golden Age mankind lived in communities which had a full unity. The communal life developed its collective forms, of which the most significant are the development of human speech, of language, share of work and the development of the communal fests. The law determining the primeval origins of mind is the cosmic law of interactions. It defines the substance of the Universe and the ways of its existence and activity. A detailed analysis is presented on the nature of the lay of interaction here. One consequence of this fundamental principle is the general prevalence of the principle of mutuality, which plays a basic role in the understanding of the unfolding and degeneration of consciousness. The principle of mutuality determines the changes of every levels of life. The laws of the generation of consciousness in the ages of evolution toward Homo and the Golden Age are analysed. I presented some evidences indicating the factual existence of the Golden Age, as well as its destruction, which was necessarily accompanied by the overthrow of the consciousness of the Golden Age, its repression and replacement by the newly developed rational, upper or superficial mind. Starting from the consideration that our mind is a product of our history, the phenomenon of the 'double mind' is recognised, the largely antagonistic duality of human mind. It is succeeded to solve the riddle of the double mind and determining its substance. Our double mind, consisting of the ‘upper’ or rational mind and the ‘deep-mind’, is a creature of the two fundamental ages of mankind, that of the age of power domination and the Golden Age. Therefore it expresses the duality of our history. We attempted to explore the heritage of the Golden Age embedded into our world of instincts, sexuality, emotional and sensual world, and the expressions of this heritage according to the different periods of our lives. If we will succeed in enlightening the deep-mind it may make it possible to give back the long-forgotten collective fields of forces to mankind, unavailable to the surface mind at present, and would expand the all-pervasive power of the conscious mind significantly. Hopefully, our results open up new vistas for the research of the collective fields and the double nature of the human mind, and may enable us to know and complete ourselves more deeply and thoroughly. (shrink)

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This paper argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism and naturalism. This (...) crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The paper examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies. (shrink)

Aquinas holds that human beings perceive material objects in a rational way, since their sensory faculty is always under the guidance of the rational faculty. This paper intends to shed light on this fundamental thesis. First, it examines the metaphysical background, focusing on Aquinas’s claim that there is just one soul with interconnected, hierarchically ordered faculties. Second, it looks at the interconnection in the case of perception, paying particular attention to the vis cogitativa. This special power, which can only be (...) found in human beings, belongs to the sensory faculty but is always guided by the rational faculty and produces perceptions that are conceptually structured: it enables human beings to see something as something. Third, the paper builds a bridge to recent theories of “transformative rationality.” Like the advocates of this theory, Aquinas claims that rationality is not simply added to sensory activity, but rather something that is present in every act of human perception. (shrink)

This study illuminates how a cross-sector social partnership legitimizes itself toward multiple internal and external stakeholders. Within a single-case study design, we collected retrospective and real time data on the partnership between Deutsche Post DHL and The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Within this partnership, Deutsche Post DHL provides corporate volunteers that support disaster response after natural disasters on a pro bono basis. The main objects that needed legitimacy as well as the audiences from which legitimacy (...) was mainly sought changed over time. In addition, we identified legitimation work as occurring across objects, audiences, and time. Thus, we introduce legitimation work as the purposeful effort of the legitimacy seeker to avoid certain issues while ensuring other issues that are of importance to the conferrer of legitimacy. These findings contribute to micro-level considerations within institutional theory which view legitimacy as socially constructed between legitimacy seeker and conferrer. Hence, we add another perspective on legitimation to the previously existing conceptualizations of legitimacy as a deterministic consequence of institutionalization. (shrink)

Parallax, or the change in the position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight and more precisely, the assumption that this adjustment is not only due to a change of focus, but a change in that object's ontological status has been a key philosophical concept throughout history. Building upon Slavoj Žižek's The Parallax View, this volume shows how parallax is used as a figure of thought that proves how the incompatibility between the physical and the theoretical touches (...) not only upon the ontological, but also politics and aesthetics. With articles written by internationally renowned philosophers such as Frank Ruda, Graham Harman, Paul Livingston and Zizek himself, this book shows how modes of parallax remain in numerous modern theoretical disciplines, such as the Marxian parallax in the critique of political economy and politics; and the Hegelian parallax in the concept of the work of art, while also being important to debates surrounding speculative realism and dialectical materialism. Spanning philosophy, parallax is then a rich and fruitful concept that can illuminate the studies of those working in epistemology, ontology, German Idealism, political philosophy and critical theory. (shrink)

In eukaryotes, the messenger RNA (mRNA), the blueprint of a protein‐coding gene, is processed and packaged into a messenger ribonucleoprotein particle (mRNP) by mRNA‐binding proteins in the nucleus. The steps of mRNP formation – transcription, processing, packaging, and the orchestrated release of the export‐competent mRNP from the site of transcription for nuclear mRNA export – are tightly coupled to ensure a highly efficient and regulated process. The importance of highly accurate nuclear mRNP formation is illustrated by the fact that mutations (...) in components of this pathway lead to cellular inviability or to severe diseases in metazoans. We hypothesize that efficient mRNP formation is realized by a molecular mRNP packaging station, which is built by several recruitment platforms and coordinates the individual steps of mRNP formation. (shrink)

Consider where κ is an uncountable regular cardinal. By a result of Shelah's we have for almost all witnessing this. Here we consider the question if there could be a similar result for. We will discuss some basic facts implying that this cannot hold in general. We will use these facts to construct an interesting example of a pseudo Prikry forcing, answering a question of Sinapova.

In the past several years, observational entropy has been developed as both a quantum generalization of Boltzmann entropy, and as a rather general framework to encompass classical and quantum equilibrium and non-equilibrium coarse-grained entropy. In this paper we review the construction, interpretation, most important properties, and some applications of this framework. The treatment is self-contained and relatively pedagogical, aimed at a broad class of researchers.

Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense are they defective? Many will be false and harmful, but philosophers have further argued that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by violating our epistemic responsibilities. It is also assumed that we are only morally responsible for the harms that prejudiced beliefs cause because, in forming these (...) beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. In Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that these common convictions are misguided. His discussion shows in detail that there are many epistemically justified pathways to prejudiced belief, and that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to articulate our ethical responsibilities. Doing so unreasonably burdens victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, Begby provides an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. This view is supported by a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, and institutional levels of decision making. Additionally, Begby develops a systematic platform for non-ideal epistemology which would apply to a wide range of other social and epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more. (shrink)

This paper discusses a scenario borrowed from Williamson (2000) and repurposes it to argue for the possibility of conflict between two prima facie categorical norms of epistemic rationality: the norm to respect one’s evidence and the norm to be coherent. It is argued, pace Williamson, that in the conflict defining the scenario, the evidence norm overrides the coherence norm; that a rational agent with our evidence would lack evidence about some of their own credences; and that for agents whose evidence (...) is limited in this way, incoherence fails to entail irrationality. The above possibility claim has also been defended by Worsnip (2018), albeit on a quite different premise set and in conjunction with a coherence-centered account of epistemic rationality that issues predictions incompatible with those licensed by the evidence-centered account recommended here, as illustrated towards the end of the paper. (shrink)

Abstract of the book This volume has three aims. First, historians of philosophy have typically focused on the discussions of the moral relevance of emotions, and with the exception of scholars of ancient philosophy, neglected the place of emotions in cognitive life. This collection of articles refocuses the discussion of emotion in the medieval and early modern periods to their role in cognition. Second, though many have aimed to clarify relationship between the later thinkers and their predecessors with regard to (...) issues in metaphysics and epistemology, there has been very little effort at tracing similar lines of thought about emotion. As a whole, the contributions to this volume serve to begin a discussion about the continuities between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions. In this regard, there is also a discussion of the emotions of cognitive life of the Renaissance. Though we get only a snapshot of a period of philosophical work often passed over, even this snapshot invites questions about how to weave an intellectual history about accounts of our emotions in our cognitive lives. Finally, attention to the concerns that engage philosophers of the medieval, renaissance and early modern periods can inform the contemporary debate regarding the relationship between emotions, cognition, and reason. The thirteen contributions explore this from the point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in self-understanding and the social situation of individuals. (shrink)

Für die Moralphilosophie ist eine Theorie praktischer Gründe von zentraler Bedeutung. Ein zentraler Streitpunkt ist dabei die Verbindung zwischen Normativität und Motivation. Endres rekonstruiert kritisch die bedeutenden Positionen von B. Williams, J. McDowell und C. Korsgaard. Die Positionen lassen sich als humesch, aristotelisch und kantisch kennzeichnen, so dass ihre Behandlung zugleich auch als eine Auseinandersetzung mit exemplarischen Beispielen der wichtigsten Ansätze der Philosophiegeschichte zu verstehen ist. Kernthese ist, dass es einen signifikanten Aspekt praktischer Gründe gibt, der in der gegenwärtigen (...) Debatte übersehen worden ist: praktische Gründe müssen Personen zugänglich sein. Nur in McDowells Ansatz stellt dies einen endgültigen Einwand dar, da sich die beiden anderen Positionen so umformulieren lassen, dass sie der Zugänglichkeit Rechnung tragen können. (shrink)

As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call (...) “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios. (shrink)

In diesem Buch setzen sich zehn Wissenschaftler und Autoren aus verschiedenen Disziplinen mit dem unfaßbaren Thema Glück auseinander. Weit davon entfernt, Glücksratgeber zu sein, hinterfragen die hier versammelten Autoren verschiedene Glücksdefinitionen: Philosophisch gesehen findet sich das Glück zum Beispiel im «guten Leben». Wer der schwierigen Frage, was ein gutes Leben sei, aus dem Weg gehen will, der sucht das Glück vielleicht lieber in konkreten Dingen, wie Geld, Sport, Drogen, Musik, Reisen oder Lesen. Neben dem individuellen Glück werden auch große, kulturelle (...) Glücksbeschaffer besprochen, denn Religion, Ideologie und Magie wollen ebenfalls das Glück herbeibringen - oder sie versprechen es zumindest. Im Licht der unterschiedlichen Methoden und Fragestellungen treffen in diesem Band verschiedene Facetten der zutiefst menschlichen Suche nach dem Glück aufeinander. Aus der Summe der Perspektiven eröffnet sich ein fragmentarisches Panorama, welches auf eindrucksvolle Weise die Größe des gesuchten Gefühles offenbart. (shrink)

The famous debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger of 1929 in Davos was set on a global stage and, yet, inherently Eurocentric. This volume explores how the hypothetical presence of the Kyoto school founder Nishida Kitarō would have overcome this limitation.

Morality, as a distinctive reflection of the needs, interests, and tasks of real groups and classes, changes with the change in their historical status and functions. Such change is also characteristic of the morality of the working class, which passes through a number of stages in its development: proletarian morality under capitalism, socialist morality in socialist society, and communist morality of the developed, communist social relationships of the future. Within these three major periods it is possible to identify different phases (...) corresponding to changing conditions, concrete tasks, and needs. Thus elements of proletarian morality, which took shape in the period of free capitalist competition, undergo a definite transformation in the epoch of imperialism and also change in a period of revolutionary enthusiasm. (shrink)

The book develops a philosophical foundation to the field of management education using the work of Martin Heidegger as a guiding philosophy. It asks the questions ‘what is a corporation?’ and ‘what is corporate management?’ These two questions are foundational for management thought in general and management ethics in particular. Most other academic fields are in some way defined and guided by a philosophical discourse. This philosophical discourse is largely missing in the field of management thought and education. Without this (...) foundation it can never be clear what actually belongs into a certain academic discipline and what does not. It also therefore lacks a sound and well articulated ontological foundation critical for developing approaches to ethical management. This book seeks to fill this gap and consequently represents an interdisciplinary effort between the academic field of management/business administration and philosophy, which is vital for business ethics. Intended as required reading for an elective on philosophy of management that is offered annually at the Wits Business School / University of the Witwatersrand / Johannesburg. The structure of the course will be largely based on the structure of the book. (shrink)

Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...) new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. (shrink)

The practice of early modern natural history depended on the collective collecting activities of a great variety of people. Among them, artisans played a major role in acquiring and distributing knowledge about the natural world and they contributed significantly to the scholarly labour in natural history. This distributed labour was both acknowledged by contemporaries as well as hidden from sight, reflecting the period′s dominant norms for class and gender. By combining an interpretation of the visual representation of labour in European (...) insect studies with an examination of written sources about natural history practices from about 1680 to 1810, this article decodes the often‐codified frontispieces and other more symbolic illustrations to offer new insights into the labour of natural history. Those who identified as scholars and artisans (or both) conceptualised their own intellectual and practical engagement with natural history within the semantic field of work. Some seemed to have even envisioned a new social role for academics as well as artisans. This article analyses the diversity of the “productive forces” in insect studies as they changed over time and it reconstructs what I will call the social imaginaries of participation. (shrink)

According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...) to which prejudices are epistemically insidious: once they are internalized as background beliefs, they quite reasonably come to control the assessment and interpretation of new evidence. This property of insidiousness helps explain why prejudices are so recalcitrant to empirical counterevidence and also why they are frequently invisible to introspective reflection. (shrink)

Belief polarization is widely seen to threaten havoc on our shared political lives. It is often assumed that BP is the product of epistemically irrational behaviors at the individual level. After distinguishing between BP as it occurs in intra-group and inter-group settings, this paper argues that neither process necessarily reflects individual epistemic irrationality. It is true that these processes can work in tandem to produce so-called “echo chambers.” But while echo chambers are often problematic from the point of view of (...) collective rationality, it doesn't follow that individuals are doing anything wrong, epistemically speaking, in seeking them out. In non-ideal socio-epistemic contexts, echo chamber construction might provide one's best defense against systematic misinformation and deception. (shrink)

Im Bild der «offenen Kreise» nimmt der Band Grundspannungen der Wissenschaften in den Blick. Sie ergeben sich aus ihren zentralen Fragestellungen und den Grenzen dessen, was überhaupt als wissenschaftlich gelten kann. Das Buch versteht sich daher als Beitrag zur Diskussion dessen, was die Wissenschaft als eine fortwährende Befragung der eigenen Standpunkte von allen anderen Formen der Erkenntnis unterscheidet. Die dazu versammelten Texte gingen mehrheitlich aus dem studium universale Leipzig hervor. Anlass war das 600-jährige Bestehen der Universität Leipzig. Zur Debatte steht (...) das grundlegende Selbstverständnis der Wissenschaften am Beispiel von Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Erkenntnistheorie, Sprachkritik und dem Fehlverhalten von Wissenschaftlern. Demgegenüber stehen Fragen zu den Grenzen der Wissenschaftlichkeit am Beispiel der Theologie, der Alchemie, des Farbempfindens, der Plastination oder der Tendenz zum Exzentrischen und Absonderlichen in der Wissenschaft. Das abstrakte Paradox der «geschlossenen Offenheit» der Wissenschaften kann letztlich von diesen selbst nicht eingelöst werden. Hierzu bedarf es der Kunst. Die beigegebenen Drucke Susanne Werdins laden zu einer solchen Reflexion ein. (shrink)

Bestattungen im Friedwald, Plastination oder der Versuch, durch Einfrieren den Leichnam zu konservieren: All dies sind neue Phänomene der Bestattungs- und Erinnerungskultur, die in diesem Band diskutiert werden. Der Tod, so die These, soll durch den gezielten Einsatz des eigenen toten Körpers gefügig gemacht und durch eine spezifische Vorstellung von Unsterblichkeit umgangen werden.