Ce livre étudie la refonte husserlienne de l'esthétique transcendantale kantienne, pour mettre en évidence sa fonction fondatrice dans l'idéalisme phénoménologique et interroger sa légitimité. On part donc des points essentiels de la critique husserlienne de Kant, pour dégager à partir d'eux les axes de la méthode husserlienne: dégager les intuitions pures depuis leur connexion essentielle avec les qualités sensibles, retracer leur engendrement synthétique par les actes de la conscience, et séparer l'espace perceptif des espaces catégoriaux pour reconduire ces derniers à (...) leur mode propre de production. Husserl parvient-il, dans cette esthétique transcendantale progressant de bas en haut de la hylè sensible aux objets complexes, à éviter toute présupposition et à rester fidèle à son exigence d'intuitivité? Il semble au contraire que la méthode husserlienne repose sur nombre d'actes abstractifs et idéalisants. Par là, c'est la possibilité d'une philosophie purement descriptive qui est mise en question. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 184 - 204 According to a very specific and widespread line of interpretation, the mode of working of intentionality could be understood by analogy with the linguistic paradigm set forth by Gottlob Frege in his famous essay “_Über Sinn und Bedeutung._” The goal of the present paper is to dismiss such an interpretation by also analyzing the manner in which Husserl relates, and thereby traces back, the constitution of the logical sphere to the (...) so-called pre-categorial. (shrink)

In this paper we focuse on how the first Heidegger changed the essential idea of phenomenology: if the terms of intentionality, pure consciousness, transcendental subject, noema and noesis radically disappear from Heidegger’s conceptuality, what does it mean exactly? Does Heidegger preserve anything from the idea of intentionality, from Husserl’s task of clarifying the aprioristic correlation between consciousness and object, and from Husserl’s relation of foundation of intentional modalities of higher level on modalities of lower level? We want here to emphasize (...) some essential changes concerning the idea of phenomenology: the holistic structure of experience, the task of clarifying the structure of transcendance as a foundation of intentionality, and the inversion of Husserl’s relation of foundation. On the contrary, we show how Husserl’s concept of sense is essentially different from that of ideal signification. (shrink)

Le but de l'article est de cerner le sens précis du concept de constitution, central dans la pensée de Husserl, et ce afin de comprendre la portée ontologique de son idéalisme transcendantal: en quel sens s'agit-il d'un idéalisme? Le sujet constituant produit-il le sens et l'être des objets? On s'interroge d'abord sur le champ d'objets qui sert à Husserl de fil conducteur pour l'élaboration de ce concept: est-ce celui des objets immanents, des choses spatio-temporelles, ou des idéalités? Ayant montré que (...) la constitution de la res extensa possède une fonction paradigmatique, on met en question la possibilité de transposer ses traits essentiels à celle des idéalités formelles ou mathématiques: celles-ci ont-elles une subsistance et un caractère d'Idée kantienne analogues à ceux de la res extensa? Comment concilier leur validité omnitemporelle, qui accrédite une thèse réaliste, et le fait qu'elles apparaissent à un moment précis de l'histoire, qui semble justifier la thèse idéaliste? The aim of this article is to tackle and define the concept of constitution, which is central in Husserl's thought, in order to understand the ontological significance of its transcendental idealism: what kind of idealism is it? Does the constituting subject produce the sense and the being of objects? The first question will be to know what field of objects Husserl uses as paradigm in the construction of this concept: is it the field od immanent temporal objects, of spatiotemporal things or of idealities? Having proved that the constitution of the res extensa has a paradigmatic fonction, is it possible to transfer its main characteristics to the constitution of formal or mathematical idealities? Do the latter have the same subsistence and the same statut of Kantian ideas as the res extensa? How is possible to reconcile their omnitemporal validity with the fact that they appear at a particular time in history? (shrink)

Dans Par-delà la révolution copernicienne, l'auteur avait pris pour fil conducteur la critique husserlienne de la révolution copernicienne de Kant : si, pour ce dernier, l'être des objets se règle sur les structures a priori du sujet transcendantal, c'est en phénoménologie, à l'inverse, chaque catégorie essentielle d'objets qui prescrit en miroir une structure régulatrice du sujet constituant. Le présent ouvrage prolonge cette démarche : car loin que le système des objets soit clos une fois pour toutes, la sphère des objets (...) culturels et idéaux est au contraire en perpétuel devenir ; cela n'implique-t-il pas, du côté du sujet, une plasticité et une relativité historiques de son essence et de ses facultés? En outre, si l'on considère les structures de la raison scientifique, on doit avec Husserl faire le constat qu'elles sont privées de permanence anhistorique et que l'histoire est scandée par des coupures épistémologiques où se redéfinissent le style de la rationalité et les catégories de la raison scientifique. Quelle est l'instance qui produit de telles mutations de la rationalité? Est-ce le sujet transcendantal, ou bien une dimension a-subjective plus originaire que le sujet lui-même? (shrink)

The concept of possibility has an essential function within Husserlian phenomenology. Firstly Husserlian phenomenology is an eidetical one, which is based on a subjective relation towards mere poss...

This chapter, which provides a discussion on the phenomenological foundations of predicative structure, first introduces the different steps in Edmund Husserl's argument. It is noted that not all judgements can be equated with a nexus between a conceptual function and an argument. The predicative structure shows the orientation of consciousness towards one or more objects taken as a theme of interest and utterance. The genetic phenomenological perspective posits the question of the origin of predicative judgement within a much larger context. (...) Husserl's account amounts to granting a paradigmatic character to the theory of experience of ultimate individual substrates and to the theory of perceptual judgement. Levinasian phenomenology implies a radical rethinking of the primacy of the predicative apophansis. It is noted that language can never be taken as an independent and autonomous dimension. (shrink)

L’article s’interroge sur l’unité intrinsèque des concepts d’intuition, d’évidence et de remplissement dans la pensée de Husserl : existe-t-il un concept formel d’intuition qui soit valable pour toutes les sphères d’objets possibles ? Peut-on transposer aux différents types d’essences ou de catégories d’objets le paradigme de l’intuition élaboré dans la sphère de la perception sensible ? Cette question nous conduit à analyser, chez Husserl, la structure et les modalités du remplissement et de l’intuition pour les singularités sensibles, les essences matériales (...) et les essences mêlant sensibilité et forme catégoriale.In our paper, we ask whether or not the concepts of intuition, insight and fulfillment have an intrinsic unity in Husserl’s thought. Does a formal concept of intuition exist, which would have a validity in all possible spheres of objects ? Is it possible to transfer to the different kinds of essences the model of intuition, which has been elaborated in the sphere of sensory perception ? That problem leads us to analyze in Husserl’s thought the structure and modalities of fulfillment and intuition for sensory singularities, for material essences and for essences that are a mix of sensibility and categorical form. (shrink)

This study focuses on the essential difference between Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental Idealism. In fact, Husserl describes in the «Cartesian Meditations» his own ontological thesis as a «transcendental idealism», in which all sorts of entities have to be constituted by an activity of the transcendental subjectivity, so that we have to regard pure consciousness as the ontological origin of all entities in the world. But this study is interested in the two opposite signications of the Kantian copernican inversion. On the (...) one hand, the Copernican inversion has the same sense as the phenomenological reduction, which implies that Husserl can’t agree with Kant’s presupposition of absolute things in themselves; on the second hand, it involves a relativistic and anthropologistic orientation, so that the aprioristic structures of given objects are founded on the universal structures of finite subjectivity, on pure forms and faculties of human consciousness. At the opposite, Husserl enounces a methodological prescription for any phenomenological elucidation: it is not allowed to presuppose in phenomenology any given faculty or given nature of transcendental subjectivity. This prescription has important consequences on which this study focuses. First the ontological difference between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivatus, in nite and nite type of intuition, doesn’t have any validity: the difference between factual and rational truths only depends on the essence of the truth itself, and doesn’t have its foundation on the ontological difference between creative and receptive sort of intuition. Secondly, this first thesis admits an immediate application on the level of subjective constitution of objects: the modality in which an object appears to the subjectivity doesn’t depend on the universal structure of finite subject, but is exclusively founded on the essence of the object itself, so that it is impossible to consider the aprioristic constitutive structure as a merely subjective structure. Thirdly, in this transcendental phenomenology everything has to be constituted by subjectivity: the aprioristic character of the pure forms of sensibility is not founded on the structure of finite subjectivity, but rather on the essential connection between sensual material and form; so that it is not allowed to presuppose any facticity of time and space; the pure forms of sensibility have to be constituted by a special type of synthesis that we have to elucidate in opposition to other types of higher levels. The profound signication of Husserl’s anticopernican inversion is that the field of transcendental phenomenology consists of the essential form of an eidos ego, which is «more objective than any objectivity», as Levinas said; and that transcendental phenomenology is completely dominated by the principium reddendae rationis. (shrink)