67 found
Order:
  1. Grief.Donald Gustafson - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):457-479.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  2. Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
    This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “ qualia ” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: looking at the history of the conception of pain; raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of pain; (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  19
    Body, Mind, and Method: Essays in Honor of Virgil C. Aldrich.Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.) - 1979 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    SIMPLE SEEING I met Virgil Aldrich for the first time in the fall of 1969 when I arrived in Chapel Hill to attend a philosophy conference. My book, Seeing and Knowing,1 had just appeared a few months earlier.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4.  37
    A Critical Survey of the Reasons Vs. Causes Arguments in Recent Philosophy of Action.Donald Gustafson - 1973 - Metaphilosophy 4 (4):269–297.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  23
    Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Don Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
  6.  8
    Belief in Pain.Don Gustafson - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 4 (3):323-345.
    There is a traditional view of pain as a conscious phenomenon which satisfies the following two principles at least: Pain is essentially a belief- or cognition-independent sensation, given for consciousness in an immediate way, and pain′s unitary physical base is responsible for both its phenomenal or felt qualities and it′s functional, causal features. These are "The Raw Feels Principle" and "The Unity of Pain Principle" . Each is shown to be implausible. Evidence comes from recent pain research in a number (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7.  38
    Passivity and Activity in Intentional Actions.Donald Gustafson - 1981 - Mind 90 (357):41-60.
  8.  10
    Human Action and its Explanation: A Study of the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology.Donald Gustafson - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):112-120.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  29
    The Range of Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1975 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):83 – 95.
    Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10.  2
    The Philosophy of Mind.Donald Gustafson - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (23):772-774.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11.  20
    Belief in Pain.Donald F. Gustafson - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 4 (3):323-45.
    There is a traditional view of pain as a conscious phenomenon which satisfies the following two principles at least: Pain is essentially a belief- or cognition-independent sensation, given for consciousness in an immediate way, and pain′s unitary physical base is responsible for both its phenomenal or felt qualities and it′s functional, causal features. These are "The Raw Feels Principle" and "The Unity of Pain Principle" . Each is shown to be implausible. Evidence comes from recent pain research in a number (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12.  10
    Prichard, Davidson and Action.Don Gustafson - 1991 - Philosophical Investigations 14 (3):205-230.
  13.  58
    A Note on a Misreading of Wittgenstein.Donald Gustafson - 1968 - Analysis 28 (4):143 - 144.
  14.  62
    Castañeda's Intentions: A Critical Study of Castañeda's Thinking and Doing.Donald Gustafson - 1980 - Synthese 44 (2):247 - 284.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  39
    Assertions About the Future.Donald F. Gustafson - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):421-426.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  36
    Our Choice Between Actual and Remembered Pain and Our Flawed Preferences.Donald F. Gustafson - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):111-119.
    In Stephanie Beardman's discussion of the empirical results of Kahneman and Tversky and Kahneman, et al. on pain preference and rational utility decision she argues that an interpretation of these results does not require that false memory for pain episodes yields irrational preferences for future pain events. I concur with her conclusion and suggest that there are reasons from within the pain sciences for agreeing with Beardman's reinterpretation of the Kahneman, et al. data. I cite some of these theoretical and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17.  29
    Expressions of Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1974 - Mind 83 (331):321-340.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  12
    Perspectives on Peirce.Donald Gustafson & Richard J. Bernstein - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (3):387.
  19.  14
    On Unconscious Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1973 - Philosophy 48 (184):178 - 182.
    Professor Hamlyn defen the idea of unconscious intentions independently of its place in Freudian theory. If successful, his argument would show that arguments such as Frederick Siegler's , would not succeed in demonstrating the incoherence of the Freudian notion of unconscious intention. Further, if Hamlyn is successful, he provides conceptual grounds from ordinary, non-psychoanalytic cases from which the Freudian notion of unconscious intention could be reconstructed.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20.  11
    Momentary Intentions.Donald F. Gustafson - 1968 - Mind 77 (305):1-13.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21.  7
    Our Choice Between Actual and Remembered Pain and Our Flawed Preferences.Don Gustafson - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):111-119.
  22.  3
    On the Supposed Utility of a Folk Theory of Pain.Don Gustafson - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (2):223-228.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  3
    Pain, Grammar, and Physicalism.Donald F. Gustafson - 1979 - In Donald F. Gustafson & Virgil C. Aldrich (eds.), Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 149--166.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24.  25
    Wittgenstein and a Causal View of Intentional Action.Donald Gustafson - 1984 - Philosophical Investigations 7 (3):225-243.
  25.  22
    Wittgenstein on Meaning Something.Donald Gustafson - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (3):18-31.
    Evidently wittgenstein claimed that it is a mistake to think that meaning something consists in anything. This claim is examined and several arguments for it are evaluated. I examine the less radical claim that meaning something does not consist in any one thing. Some parallels between semantic intention and actional intention are investigated. I argue that the first, Like the second, Are sometimes actual antecedents of thought and speech "and" action, Respectively. In such cases meaning something consists in thinking and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  37
    Agency and Necessity.Donald Gustafson - 1989 - Teaching Philosophy 12 (3):285-287.
  27. Absurd but possibly true.Donald Gustafson - 1966 - Theoria 32 (1):67.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. A Critical Survey of the Reasons Vs. Causes Arguments in Recent Philosophy of Action.Donald Gustafson - 1973 - Metaphilosophy 4 (4):269-297.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29.  17
    Armstrong's Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1984 - Philosophia 14 (3-4):369-387.
  30. A note on knowing and believing.Don F. Gustafson - 1965 - Theoria 31 (3):275.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. A note on a misreading of Wittgenstein.Donald Gustafson - 1968 - Analysis 28 (4):143.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  4
    Alfred R. Mele., Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Donald Gustafson - 1994 - International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2):134-135.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  17
    Are Strawson's Persons Immortal?Don F. Gustafson - 1967 - Philosophical Studies 18 (3):45 - 47.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  15
    Animal Thinking.Donald Gustafson - 1986 - Environmental Ethics 8 (2):179-182.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  23
    Animal Thought.Donald Gustafson - 1984 - Environmental Ethics 6 (3):275-276.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  1
    Animal Thought. [REVIEW]Donald Gustafson - 1984 - Environmental Ethics 6 (3):275-276.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  1
    Animal Thinking. [REVIEW]Donald Gustafson - 1986 - Environmental Ethics 8 (2):179-182.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  3
    B. Smith's "Memory". [REVIEW]Donald Gustafson - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):295.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  41
    Discussions:Hampshire on Trying.Don F. Gustafson - 1964 - Theoria 30 (1):31-38.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  39
    Explanation in Psychology.Donald F. Gustafson - 1964 - Mind 73 (April):280-281.
  41. Essays In Philosophical Psychology.Donald F. Gustafson (ed.) - 1964 - Anchor Books.
  42.  3
    Explanation in Psychology.Don F. Gustafson - 1964 - Mind 73 (290):280 - 281.
  43.  5
    Eighteen Months on the Planet and Already a Psychological Theorist.Don Gustafson - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):125 – 137.
    A critical review essay of The Child's Theory of Mind, Henry M. Wellman, 1992, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, xiii + 358 pp, $16.95; and Young Children's Understanding of Pretense, Paul L. Harris, Robert D. Kavanaugh, 1993, with Commentary by Henry M. Wellman, Anne K. Hickling and a Reply by the authors. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Serial No. 231, Vol. 58, No. 1. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, v + 110 pp.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  7
    George W. Miller, Jr. 1934-1974.Donald Gustafson - 1974 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48:177 - 178.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  1
    Hampshire on trying.Don F. Gustafson - 1964 - Theoria 30 (1):31.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  2
    Intending.Donald Gustafson - 1980 - Philosophical Books 21 (1):50-52.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  9
    K. T. Fann's "Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy". [REVIEW]Donald Gustafson - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):577.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  49
    Metaphysics.Donald Gustafson - 1985 - Teaching Philosophy 8 (3):264-265.
  49.  36
    Minds, Brains, and Science.Donald Gustafson - 1986 - Teaching Philosophy 9 (4):360-362.
  50.  18
    Naturalism and Representation: The Place of Nature in Mind.Donald Gustafson - 1990 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 37 (1):123-149.
    Arguments against naturalistic style accounts of representations in humans and other animals would be obviated if scepticism concerning their conclusion could be justified. One such justification consists in showing, in detail, that the concept of representation has a purchase among 'non-linguistic' animals. Thereby the existence of natural or 'intrinsic' intentionality is secured. Four levels of explanation can be distinguished in the study of animal behavior and capacity rely on attributions of representations to animals (to what N. Humphrey calls 'nature's psychologists'). (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 67