Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been invoked by some philosophers to argue that content‐bearing mental states can’t serve as the explananda in genuinely causal explanations of behaviour. In this paper, I demonstrate that such arguments presuppose that psychological explanations are theory‐based and that, if this theoretical conception of psychological explanation is replaced by the simulation model, we remove the source of the apparent tension between externalism and caus‐ality and are in a position to understand how appeal to content‐bearing (...) mental states may be causally explanatory. (shrink)

There are at least two notable and distinct literatures on the subject of questions: the educational literature, analyzing questions with a pedagogical upshot in mind, and the philosophical literature, analyzing questions with the concerns of philosophy of language and logic. This paper goes some way towards bridging these literatures by taking a philosophical stance on questions and by examining how a basic treatment of questions as a philosophical theme can greatly aid the introduction of students to the study of philosophy. (...) The foreignness of philosophy to many students means that they enter philosophy courses with many assumptions about it. Discussing their assumptions about questions (e.g. “There are certain questions that should not be asked;” “There are certain questions that cannot be answered”) is a useful way to ease students into philosophical inquiry. This approach also allows for the enrichment of students’ taxonomies of questions. Unlike many other answer-oriented disciplines, philosophy places a high value on the role of questions in inquiry and pays close attention to how different types of questions call for different types of answers. The author defines a number of types of questions (normatively answerable, unanswerable, and defective) and addresses both their philosophical import as well as their value for students. (shrink)