This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “ qualia ” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: looking at the history of the conception of pain; raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of pain; (...) considering evidence from the neurophysiological systems of pain; investigating the possible biological role or roles of pain; and considering methodological questions of the comparable status of the results of the sciences of pain in contrast to certain intuitions underpinning “the explanatory gap” in the case of pain. Skepticism concerning the crucial underlying intuitions seems justified by these considerations. (shrink)
SIMPLE SEEING I met Virgil Aldrich for the first time in the fall of 1969 when I arrived in Chapel Hill to attend a philosophy conference. My book, Seeing and Knowing,1 had just appeared a few months earlier.
There is a traditional view of pain as a conscious phenomenon which satisfies the following two principles at least: Pain is essentially a belief- or cognition-independent sensation, given for consciousness in an immediate way, and pain′s unitary physical base is responsible for both its phenomenal or felt qualities and it′s functional, causal features. These are "The Raw Feels Principle" and "The Unity of Pain Principle" . Each is shown to be implausible. Evidence comes from recent pain research in a number (...) of dimensions. A further argument against The Unity of Pain Principle is constructed by analogy with facts about blindsight. The consequences of rejecting P or Q are examined in light of the traditional epistemological role of pain as exemplar of sensations thought to be foundational for knowledge, the prospects of a modularity theory of the pain system, recent accounts of pain among contemporary philosophers, a naturalist and realist conception of pain, and views about the status of Folk Psychology. (shrink)
In Stephanie Beardman's discussion of the empirical results of Kahneman and Tversky and Kahneman, et al. on pain preference and rational utility decision she argues that an interpretation of these results does not require that false memory for pain episodes yields irrational preferences for future pain events. I concur with her conclusion and suggest that there are reasons from within the pain sciences for agreeing with Beardman's reinterpretation of the Kahneman, et al. data. I cite some of these theoretical and (...) empirical reasons. I engage in some speculation as to why preferences for pain experiences, which harbor the Peak and Ending profile, make biological sense. Given the results from the pain sciences and the clinical practices based in them, I conclude that the medical ethical issue Kahneman raises and Beardman tries to solve is not a pressing moral demand on medical practitioners. (shrink)
What follows raises objections to some arguments that claimthat a principle of applicability of ordinary pain talkconstrains developments in the pain sciences. A more apt pictureof lay use of pain language shows its non-theoretic character.Since instrumentalism and eliminativism are philosophical viewsabout the status of theories of pain, neither is a threatto clinical use of standard pain lingo. Perfected pain theoryis likely to enhance and improve pain language in clinicalsettings, should such theory find its way into popular ideasand talk of pain.
Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all (...) and intends no particular object. Thus the range of intention affects entailments, compatibility and inconsistency among intentional action sentences. A fragment of a theory of the range of intentions is set out and some of its implications are examined. (shrink)
Arguments against naturalistic style accounts of representations in humans and other animals would be obviated if scepticism concerning their conclusion could be justified. One such justification consists in showing, in detail, that the concept of representation has a purchase among 'non-linguistic' animals. Thereby the existence of natural or 'intrinsic' intentionality is secured. Four levels of explanation can be distinguished in the study of animal behavior and capacity rely on attributions of representations to animals (to what N. Humphrey calls 'nature's psychologists'). (...) Such explanations cite factors which do not covary directly with physical magnitudes in the stimuli. Additional animal studies are analysed, examining (1) the claim that not all representations are 'linguistic' (the Two Representations Hypothesis), (2) categorization in animals, (3) 'self-representation' in animals, (4) animal deception, and (5) comparative and weighting representations in animal learning and behavior. (shrink)
Professor Hamlyn defen the idea of unconscious intentions independently of its place in Freudian theory. If successful, his argument would show that arguments such as Frederick Siegler's , would not succeed in demonstrating the incoherence of the Freudian notion of unconscious intention. Further, if Hamlyn is successful, he provides conceptual grounds from ordinary, non-psychoanalytic cases from which the Freudian notion of unconscious intention could be reconstructed.
Evidently wittgenstein claimed that it is a mistake to think that meaning something consists in anything. This claim is examined and several arguments for it are evaluated. I examine the less radical claim that meaning something does not consist in any one thing. Some parallels between semantic intention and actional intention are investigated. I argue that the first, Like the second, Are sometimes actual antecedents of thought and speech "and" action, Respectively. In such cases meaning something consists in thinking and (...) speaking with an intention. But what does "this" consist in? (shrink)
Arguments against naturalistic style accounts of representations in humans and other animals would be obviated if scepticism concerning their conclusion could be justified. One such justification consists in showing, in detail, that the concept of representation has a purchase among 'non-linguistic' animals. Thereby the existence of natural or 'intrinsic' intentionality is secured. Four levels of explanation can be distinguished in the study of animal behavior and capacity rely on attributions of representations to animals. Such explanations cite factors which do not (...) covary directly with physical magnitudes in the stimuli. Additional animal studies are analysed, examining the claim that not all representations are 'linguistic', categorization in animals, 'self-representation' in animals, animal deception, and comparative and weighting representations in animal learning and behavior. (shrink)