Whitehead's magnum opus is as important as it is difficult. It is the only work in which his metaphysical ideas are stated systematically and completely, and his metaphysics are the heart of his philosophical system as a whole.
This essay is a comparative study of two rationalists in as far as they differ in their understanding of the nature of Reason. It is an essay written from the point of view of Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics, an essay which, while remaining almost completely free of Whitehead’s confusing and complex technical vocabulary, explicates and defends Whitehead’s conception of Reason by focusing on just those points where Whitehead deviates from the position taken by a second contemporary rationalist, Brand Blanshard. (...) The title of the essay refers to Whitehead’s use of the symbols “Plato” and “Ulysses” to personify what he views as the two aspects of Reason. Blanshard is familiar with Whitehead’s position and has briskly attacked Whitehead’s use of the symbol “Ulysses.” The full import of the symbol “Ulysses” is not, however, immediately apparent in those places where Whitehead uses it and it is my deep suspicion that Blanshard, and undoubtedly many other readers of Whitehead, fail fully to grasp the import of this symbol because they do not see that it derives its power in large part from its relationship to Whitehead’s somewhat obscure account of the nature of propositions and how they function in the world. Therefore Part I of this paper both explicates the doctrine of propositions held by Whitehead and interprets the meaning of the symbol “Ulysses” in the light of that explication. Part II turns polemical and argues simultaneously for the soundness of Whitehead’s view of the nature of Reason and the inadequacy of Blanshard’s alternative position. (shrink)
It was a genuine pleasure to read Frederick Ferré’s presidential address. He has done an elegant job of humanizing Whitehead’s account of the nature of speculative philosophy. Not only has he provided a most useful expansion of Whitehead’s rather austerely presented criteria for judging the success of a metaphysical system—coherence, logicality, applicability, and adequacy—he has wrapped the whole in his version of the axiological viewpoint in such a way that we see how norms and value judgments anchor metaphysics in an (...) unshakable practicality that goads us evermore toward living not just well, but beautifully. I find this vision not only satisfactory, but genuinely uplifting. Therefore, in what follows I will simply put forward some random thoughts concerning the practicality of metaphysics generated by Ferré’s very succinct, yet rich, presentation. (shrink)
One final introductory thought. A great deal of the work that has been done from within the perspective of Whitehead's process metaphysics has been done with the very specific aim of showing how process thought is capable of grounding a modern reinterpretation of the notion of deity, a notion of deity that rests more easily amidst the concepts that engage the modern world than do the more traditional notions of deity. Some of the people I respect most highly in this (...) world are deeply involved in this theistic project, but that project is not, as is quite widely known, my project. I worry that the great attention paid to Whitehead's theistic readjustments has obscured Whitehead's rich availability when attention is turned toward more particularly philosophical issues. If the analyses and suggestions which follow prove to be plausible, perhaps they will encourage more research into ways that Whitehead's categories might be profitably directed upon issues and traditions out there in the wider philosophical world. But now I turn to reflections upon Whitehead, Sartre, and such notions as indeterminism and personhood. (shrink)
Philosophy is, and has been, many things to many people, and that is fine. Some of those persons who do, or have done, philosophy have engaged in the business of creating categoreal schemes. Were one to ask why these persons set about to construct categoreal schemes, the answer would have to be complex—the conscious motivations, purposes, and goals of system-builders are undoubtedly various. And that is fine. So when I suggest, as I am about to, an account of what it (...) is that categoreal schemes are really trying to do, it must be understood that I do not intend my account to be dogmatically a priori. I have simply thought about some of the great systematizers and the categoreal schemes they have concocted, have admittedly done this reflecting from the perspective of Whitehead’s process metaphysics, and have arrived at certain conclusions about what might be viewed as a diagnostic tool for understanding many of the interesting and historically important categoreal schemes. (shrink)
