20 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Doris Olin [20]Doris Finkel Olin [1]
  1.  11
    Paradox.Doris Olin - 2003 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Paradoxes are more than just intellectual puzzles - they raise substantive philosophical issues and offer the promise of increased philosophical knowledge. In this introduction to paradox and paradoxes, Doris Olin shows how seductive paradoxes can be, why they confuse and confound, and why they continue to fascinate. Olin examines the nature of paradox, outlining a rigorous definition and providing a clear and incisive statement of what does and does not count as a resolution of a paradox. The view that a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  2. Paradox.Doris Olin - 2003 - Routledge.
    Paradoxes are more than just intellectual puzzles - they raise substantive philosophical issues and offer the promise of increased philosophical knowledge. In this introduction to paradox and paradoxes, Doris Olin shows how seductive paradoxes can be, why they confuse and confound, and why they continue to fascinate. Olin examines the nature of paradox, outlining a rigorous definition and providing a clear and incisive statement of what does and does not count as a resolution of a paradox. The view that a (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3.  53
    The Prediction Paradox Resolved.Doris Olin - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):225 - 233.
  4.  85
    A Tale of Two Envelopes.Bernard D. Katz & Doris Olin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):903-926.
    This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. We argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. We go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  40
    A Case Against Closure.Doris Olin - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):235-247.
    Este artigo examina a objeção ao fechamento [dedutivo] que surge no contexto de certos paradoxos epistêmicos, paradoxos cuja conclusão é que a crença justificada pode ser inconsistente. É universalmente aceito que, se essa conclusão é correta, o fechamento deve ser rejeitado, para que se evite a crença justificada em enunciados contraditórios (P, ~P). Mas, mesmo que os argumentos desses paradoxos – o paradoxo da falibilidade (do prefácio) e o paradoxo da loteria – sejam mal-sucedidos, eles, ainda assim, sugerem a existência (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6.  30
    The Prediction Paradox: Resolving Recalcitrant Variations.Doris Olin - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):181 – 189.
  7.  75
    On an Epistemic Paradox.Doris Olin - 1987 - Analysis 47 (4):216 - 217.
  8.  39
    Predictions, Intentions and the Prisoner's Dilemma.Doris Olin - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):111-116.
  9.  9
    Newcomb's Problem, Dominance and Expected Utility.Doris Olin - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 385--398.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10.  4
    The Prediction Paradox Resolved.Doris Olin - 1988 - Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 2:827-831.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  20
    Reasoning About Closure.Bernard D. Katz & Doris Olin - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):67-76.
    The specter of epistemic closure haunts current epistemology: some regard the refutation of closure as obvious, while others take its denial to be an epistemicoutrage. To some extent, the strong difference of opinion has its source in certain misapprehensions. This paper tries to formulate and clarify the key issues dividing the two sides and contends that, in certain respects, the difference between the friend and the foe of closure may be more a matter of semantics than substance. The paper goes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  13
    Perception: Facts and Theories.Doris Olin - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):246.
  13.  83
    William James Pragmatism in Focus.William James & Doris Olin (eds.) - 1992 - Routledge.
    The original 1907 text is accompanied with a series of critical essays from scholars including Moore and Russell. In the introduction Olin evaluates the strength of the criticisms made against James.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  23
    Newcomb's Problem: Further Investigations.Doris Olin - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):129 - 133.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  36
    On a Paradoxical Train of Thought.Doris Olin - 1986 - Analysis 46 (1):18 - 20.
  16.  1
    Consistency and Epistemic Probability.Doris Olin - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 45:211-216.
    Is consistency always epistemically virtuous? In this paper, I examine one threat to the traditional view that consistency is a minimum requirement for rational belief. Central to the argument is the notion of epistemic probability, understood as the degree of support or confirmation provided by the total available evidence. My strategy in examining this argument is to apply analogous reasoning to carefully tailored examples. The conclusions which emerge are substantive, informative and utterly implausible. I conclude, first, that the argument for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  43
    The Fallibility Argument for Inconsistency.Doris Olin - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):95 - 102.
  18.  27
    Knowledge and Defeasible Justification.Doris Olin - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (2):129 - 136.
  19. William James Pragmatism in Focus.Doris Olin (ed.) - 1992 - Routledge.
    The original 1907 text is accompanied with a series of critical essays from scholars including Moore and Russell. In the introduction Olin evaluates the strength of the criticisms made against James.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. William James: Pragmatism in Focus.Doris Olin - 1994 - American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 15 (1):108-112.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark