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Dorothée Legrand [28]Dorothee Peggy Martine Legrand [1]
  1. The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  2.  5
    What is Self-Specific? Theoretical Investigation and Critical Review of Neuroimaging Results.Dorothée Legrand & Perrine Ruby - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (1):252-282.
  3. Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience.Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
  4.  56
    Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective (...)
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  5.  25
    Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: On Being Bodily in the World.Dorothee Peggy Martine Legrand - 2007 - Janus Head 9 (2):493-519.
    Empirical and experiential investigations allow the distinction between observational and non-observational forms of subjective bodily experiences. From a first-person perspective, the biological body can be an “opaque body” taken as an intentional object of observational consciousness, a “performative body” pre-reflectively experienced as a subject/agent, a “transparent body” pre-reflectively experienced as the bodily mode of givenness of objects in the external world, or an “invisible body” absent from experience. It is proposed that pre-reflective bodily experiences rely on sensori-motor integrative mechanisms that (...)
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  6.  28
    Subjectivity and the Body: Introducing Basic Forms of Self-Consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):577-582.
  7. Transparently Oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One.Dorothée Legrand - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Different points of Metzinger's position makes it a peculiar form of representationalism: (1) his distinction between intentional and phenomenal content, in relation to the internalism/externalism divide; (2) the notion of transparency defined at a phenomenal and not epistemic level, together with (3) the felt inwardness of experience. The distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive phenomenal internality will allow me to reconsider Metzinger's theory of the self and to propose an alternative conception that I will describe both at an epistemic and a (...)
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  8.  6
    Responding to Incomprehensibility: On the Clinical Role of Anonymity in Bodily Symptoms.Line Ryberg Ingerslev & Dorothée Legrand - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1):73-76.
    We are grateful to René Rosfort for his comment on our target paper Clinical Response to Bodily Symptoms in Psychopathology. Rosfort’s remarks lead us here to specify an important point which our initial proposal may have left too implicit. Within the realm of clinical practice in psychopathology, we argue that bodily manifestations can be offered an expressive space and that they can be listened to in the clinical encounter as being part of the patient’s speech whereby she, by way of (...)
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  9. Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
    This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form (...)
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  10.  8
    Clinical Response to Bodily Symptoms in Psychopathology.Line Ryberg Ingerslev & Dorothée Legrand - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1):53-67.
    In what sense can bodily manifestations in psychopathology be conceived of as modes of speaking? In which ways can a patient be listened to and responded to? In this paper, we consider these questions in the framework both of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. On the one hand, a phenomenological approach helps considering the body as expressive, but, we argue, more refinement is needed, and in particular, expression ought to be differentiated from communication, in the aim of better capturing the phenomenon of (...)
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  11.  25
    Close to Me: Multisensory Space Representations for Action and Pre-Reflexive Consciousness of Oneself-in-the-World.Dorothée Legrand, Claudio Brozzoli, Yves Rossetti & Alessandro Farnè - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):687-699.
    Philosophical considerations as well as several recent studies from neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics converged in showing that the peripersonal space is structured in a body-centred manner and represented through integrated sensory inputs. Multisensory representations may deserve the function of coding peripersonal space for avoiding or interacting with objects. Neuropsychological evidence is reviewed for dynamic interactions between space representations and action execution, as revealed by the behavioural effects that the use of a tool, as a physical extension of the reachable space, (...)
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  12.  54
    Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self–Consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press. pp. 204--227.
    This article examines the multi-dimensions of bodily self-consciousness. It explains the distinction between the self-as-subject and the self-as-object and argues that each act of consciousness is adequately characterized by two modes of givenness. These are the intentional mode of givenness by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects and the subjective mode by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects as experienced by him. It clarifies the relationship of these modes of givenness to the transitivity and non-transitivity of (...)
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  13. The Open Body.Dorothée Legrand & Joel Krueger - 2009 - In Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganti & Guiseppa Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Universita Della Svizzera Italiana. pp. 109-128.
    In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to characterize the constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: either the self is (...)
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  14.  33
    How Not to Find the Neural Signature of Self-Consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):544-546.
  15.  8
    Self-Consciousness and World-Consciousness.Dorothee Legrand - 2012 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
    Is self-consciousness intentional? Consciousness of oneself-as-object is, in the sense that the subject is there taken as its own object of intentional consciousness. Contrastively, it has been argued that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is not intentional, precisely in that it does not involve taking oneself as an intentional object. Here, it is rather proposed that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is tied to intentionality in that it involves being conscious of oneself as an intentional subject, i.e. as a subject directed at intentional objects (...)
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  16.  43
    Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.
    This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and empirical (...)
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  17.  49
    Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'.Dorothée Legrand - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
    The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about (...)
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  18.  17
    Being a Body.Dorothée Legrand - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (9):413-414.
  19.  58
    A Matter of Facts.Dorothée Legrand & Franck Grammont - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):249-257.
    We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual (...)
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  20. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1-2).
    In Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Evan Thompson defends the thesis of a “deep continuity of life and mind” according to which “life and mind share a set of basic organizational properties . . . . Mind is life-like and life is mind-like” . On the one hand, Thompson uncovers mind in life, by considering life and explaining how living organisms are organized in a way that involves the biological implementation of properties that are usually (...)
     
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  21.  27
    Clarifying the Self: Response to Northoff.Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (5):187-188.
  22.  11
    The Violence of the Ethical Encounter: Listening to the Suffering Subject as a Speaking Body.Dorothée Legrand - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 51 (1):43-64.
    How does the clinical encounter work? To tackle this question, the present study centers on the paradigmatic clinical encounter, namely, psychoanalysis, paradigmatic in that it is structured by the encounter itself. Our question thus becomes: how does the clinical encounter work, when its only modality is speech? By reading Jacques Lacan and Emmanuel Levinas together, we better identify how speech sets up as subjects those who address one another and how this subjectivation touches the suffering body specifically. In this framework, (...)
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  23.  19
    Objects and Others: Diverting Heidegger to Conceptualize Anorexia.Dorothée Legrand - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):243-246.
    According to Bowden (20121), anorectics’2 bodily experiences are characterized by a “corporealization,” which has notably been described as follows: “The exchange with the environment is inhibited, excretions cease; processes of . . . shrinking, and drying up prevail” (Fuchs 2005, 99). What is described here is melancholia, but a similar characterization would be applicable to anorexia. I think, however, that the notion of ‘corporealization’ is not fine-grained enough to capture the specificity of anorexic/pathological bodily experiences. To develop this point, I (...)
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  24.  31
    You Are Not What You Feel You Are.Dorothée Legrand - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):395-398.
  25.  1
    Objects and Others: Diverting Heidegger to Conceptualize Anorexia.Dorothée Legrand - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):243-246.
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  26.  8
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Iris van Rooij, Christina Behme, Liane Gabora & Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):659 – 680.
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  27. Critical Notices-Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind-by Evan Thompson.Dorothee Legrand - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1):67.
     
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  28. Review of Wisdom Won From Illness, Essays in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis by Jonathan Lear, Havard University Press, 2017. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
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  29. Unconsciousness Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis.Dylan Trigg & Dorothée Legrand (eds.) - 2017 - Springer Verlag.
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