This volume, including sixteen contributions, analyses ancient and medieval theories of intentionality in various contexts: perception, imagination, and intellectual thinking. It sheds new light on classical theories and examines neglected sources, both Greek and Latin.
The article purports to show that the preference of theôria in Nicomachean Ethics X 7–8 does not represent Aristotle's definitive conception of the best form of life, because it is compatible neither with his overall conception of happiness in the EN nor with its political framework. The critical chapters rather recall an early contribution of Aristotle's to a controversy on the best form of life in the Academy, attested to in Politics VII 2–3; its central point is resolved in Politics (...) VII 13–15 in a sketch of the life of leisure that combines both politics and philosophy. (shrink)
The philosophers and scholars of the Hellenistic world laid the foundations upon which the Western tradition based analytical grammar, linguistics, philosophy of language, and other disciplines probing the nature and origin of human communication. Building on the pioneering work of Plato and Aristotle, these thinkers developed a wide range of theories about the nature and origin of language which reflected broader philosophical commitments. In this collection of nine essays, a team of distinguished scholars examines the philosophies of language developed by, (...) among others, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and Lucretius. They probe the early thinkers' philosophical adequacy and their impact on later theorists. With discussions ranging from the Stoics on the origin of language to the theories of language in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the collection will be of interest to students of philosophy and of language in the classical period and beyond. (shrink)
Though the two-world interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is no longer uncontested the question of the expendability of the physical world still predominates current discussions. Against this tendency the article suggests that Plato neither intended to dispose of sensory evidence altogether nor to locate the Forms in a separate realm of pure understanding. The Forms should rather be understood as the ideal principles determining the proper function of each entity. Such a 'functional view' of the Forms is discussed explicitly in Book (...) X of the Republic, but it can easily be extended to account for Plato's use of the Forms elsewhere. (shrink)
THE CLAIM that even Plato could not say everything at once nor could have thought or worked out everything at once is, of course, a platitude. It is generally acknowledged that there is development in Plato's thought. But what the development is, is still a much fought-over question. For in spite of all scholarly efforts this intriguing question cannot be regarded as settled in a satisfactory way. This is due not only to the fact that we all look at Plato (...) through different eyes. There are just too many unknowns: We do not know when the dialogues were written nor in what order. We do not know what Plato himself regarded as the result of each of the dialogues nor how they are supposed to hang together. We do not know to what extent Plato himself is in agreement with what he lets Socrates say--or any of his partners. Nor do we always know what, precisely, the text itself says. And we do not know when Plato put the dialogues into the form in which they have come down to us. (shrink)
In his attempt to redirect philosophy, Rorty recruits some allies to his cause. The present paper contains a critical discussion of his attempt to interpret heidegger and davidson as holding an "above battle" position in the realism/anti-Realism controversy. Although neither heidegger nor davidson fit into the regular mold of either position, Neither does rorty's nietzschean portrait of heidegger nor his pragmatist one of davidson do justice to those two philosophers but, Rather, Betray the "textualist's" hand.
Some contemporary philosophers of action have contended that the intentions, decisions, and actions of collective social agency are reducible to those of the individuals involved. This contention is based on two assumptions: that collective agency would require super-minds, and that actions presuppose causes that move our bodies. The problem of how to account for collective action had not been regarded as a problem in the history of philosophy earlier.The explanation of why ancient Greek philosophers did not see joint agency as (...) a problem is not, as sometimes assumed, that they had no, or only a weak, sense of individuality. Nor is it because they simply overlooked the difference between individual and collective agency. It is, rather, as Aristotle’s conception of humans as ‘social’ or ‘political’ animals indicates, that the aims and ends of actions, and the means to bring them about by acting together, is the result of practice from early on. Without the acquisition of language and moral habituation humans would not become humans. There is, then, a shared understanding about common agency from infancy on. Individuals may disagree about some particular aim and action, and act only because it is a decision of the majority. But no super-minds are required to explain the communality of wishes. That Aristotle ignored the fact that all motion starts in individual bodies is explained by the difference between motions and actions: moves that are not determined by their ends are mere motions, not actions. So what moves an individual body can be the wish to bring about a joint action with another person or with a collective of persons. (shrink)
The last several decades have witnessed an explosion of research in Platonic philosophy. A central focus of his philosophical effort, Plato's psychology is of interest both in its own right and as fundamental to his metaphysical and moral theories. This anthology offers, for the first time, a collection of the best classic and recent essays on cenral topics of Plato's psychological theory, including essays on the nature of the soul, studies of the tripartite soul for which Plato argues in the (...) Republic, and analyses of his varied arguments for immortality. With a comprehensive introduction to the major issues of Plato's psychology and an up-to-date bibliography of work on the relevant issues, this much-needed text makes the study of Plato's psychology accessible to scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, classics, and history of psychology. (shrink)
The author's project is an ambitious one: Not only does he dedicate a whole monograph to the centerpiece of Plato's metaphysical thought as it is contained in the similes of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the Republic, he also points out connections between Plato's "greatest doctrine" and some highlights in the work of other European metaphysicians such as Kant, Fichte, the young Wittgenstein and Heidegger. As Ferber sees it, although their answers to the question of the ultimate foundation of (...) philosophic truth may vary, their questioning calls for a foundation whose archetype is that of Plato's notion of the Form of the Good as what underlies both Being and Thought, the tertium quid that transcends all thought and being, the "epekeina tes ousias." In falling short of providing such a foundation that transcends the subject-object dualism, Ferber claims, the later philosophers have all fallen short of attaining the level of Plato's philosophizing : If philosophy is ever to be grounded adequately, then a "trialism" of the Platonic kind will have to be worked out. (shrink)