Dorothea Olkowski's exploration of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze clarifies the gifted French thinker's writings for specialists and nonspecialists alike. Deleuze, she says, accomplished the "ruin of representation," the complete overthrow of hierarchic, organic thought in philosophy, politics, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as in society at large. In Deleuze's philosophy of difference, she discovers the source of a new ontology of change, which in turn opens up the creation of new modes of life and thought, not only in philosophy (...) and feminism but wherever creation is at stake. The work of contemporary artist Mary Kelly has been central to Olkowski's thinking. In Kelly she finds an artist at work whose creative acts are in themselves the ruin of representation as a whole, and the text is illustrated with Kelly's art. This original and provocative account of Deleuze contributes significantly to a critical feminist politics and philosophy, as well as to an understanding of feminist art. (shrink)

Olkowski proposes a model of phenomenology, both scientific and philosophical, that helps make sense of reality and composes an ethics for dealing with unpredictability in our world.

Drawing on the work of De Beauvoir, Sartre, and Le Doeuff, among others, and addressing a range of topics from the Asian sex trade to late capitalism, quantum gravity, and Merleau-Ponty's views on cinema, Dorothea Olkowski stretches the ...

The essays presented here by Olkowski and Weiss attempt to situate Merleau-Ponty in the larger context of feminist theory, while impartially evaluating his contributions, both positive and negative, to that theory.

The chapter on temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception , is situated in a section titled, “Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World.” As such, Merleau-Ponty’s task in the chapter on temporality is to bring these two positions together, in other words, to articulate the manner in which time links the cogito (Being-for-Itself) with freedom (Being-in-the-World). To accomplish this, Merleau-Ponty proposes a subject located at the junction of the for-itself and the in-itself, a subject which has an exterior that makes it possible for others (...) to have an interior. This analysis will take Merleau-Ponty to an impasse where, on the one hand, there appears to be an objective world and the time of objects in that world, and on the other, there is the subject’s notion of events and the passing of time. Referring to Bergson’s notion of time, this essay proposes that there must be a temporal interval between perception, feeling and action in order for the subject to be “temporal by means of an inner necessity,” as Merleau-Ponty prescribes. (shrink)

: Luce Irigaray is often cited as the principle feminist who adheres to phenomenology as a method of descriptive philosophy. A different approach to Irigaray might well open the way to not only an avoidance of phenomenology's sexist tendencies, but the recognition that the breach between Irigaray's ideas and those of phenomenology is complete. I argue that this occurs and that Irigaray's work directly implicates a Bergsonian critique of the limits of phenomenology.

Luce Irigaray is often cited as the principle feminist who adheres to phenomenology as a method of descriptive philosophy. A different approach to Irigaray might well open the way to not only an avoidance of phenomenology's sexist tendencies, but the recognition that the breach between Irigaray's ideas and those of phenomenology is complete. I argue that this occurs and that Irigaray's work directly implicates a Bergsonian critique of the limits of phenomenology.

This book demonstrates how Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the continuity of inner and psychological life (interiority) and the material world (exteriority) ...

The contributors to this international volume take up questions about a phenomenology of time that begins with and attunes to gender issues. Themes such as feminist conceptions of time, change and becoming, the body and identity, memory and modes of experience, and the relevance of time as a moral and political question, shape Time in Feminist Phenomenology and allow readers to explore connections between feminist philosophy, phenomenology, and time. With its insistence on the importance of gender experience to the experience (...) of time, this volume is a welcome opening to new and critical thinking about being, knowledge, aesthetics, and ethics. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze takes up the challenge to create a philosophy of the interesting, the remarkable and the unusual. He does this in what Alain Badiou calls the ‘‘Grand Style’’, the style of Descartes, Spinoza and Kant whose philosophies arise in relation to developments in the natural sciences and mathematics. Grounding himself in the molar-molecular pair, Deleuze sets out a new image of thought. He conceptualises an immanent but still relatively closed, deterministic, atomistic and reversible system that is not immediately reduced (...) to entropic equilibrium because its processes take place on the molecular level, at speeds which he hypothesises are beyond the speed of light. He postulates a manifold, a sphere of immanence that is the entire universe and not merely the Earth or our solar system. It is a system governed by sensitivity to initial starting points and unstable boundaries, thus although it is chaotic as well as probabilistic, it remains a mathematically formal, deterministic system. (shrink)

Philosophie de la structure, philosophie de l’événement La critique deleuzienne de la phénoménologieDans son essai sur la peinture de Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze affirme résolument que le corps vécu de la phénoménologie est trop faible pour être à la mesure de la puissance presque incroyable du “corps sans organes”. “L’hypothèse phénoménologique est insuffisante” parce qu’elle n’invoque “que le corps vécu”, écrit-il, alors que le corps sans organes, lui, se porte à la limite même du corps vécu. Cette thèse semble nous (...) inviter à choisir entre deux conceptions du corps, celle de la phénoménologie et celle de Deleuze : un corps vécu et un corps presque incroyable. Mais sur quelle base pouvons-nous choisir ? L’une de deux thèses est-elle clairement vraie et l’autre fausse ? Nous verrons que Merleau-Ponty use d’un modèle fondé sur la mécanique des ondes systémiques, et que le modèle classique ou newtonien de Deleuze construit l’image d’une réalité physique absolue et pose ensuite que les structures perceptives sont simplement des manifestations ou des projections de cette fondation ontologique fondamentale. Mais le concept phénoménologique de “forme” indique que, même si les lois de la réalité physique ne conceptualisent que le monde perçu, la référence à ce monde perçu reste néanmoins essentielle à la connaissance du monde physique.Filosofi a della struttura, fi losofi a dell’evento La critica di Deleuze alla fenomenologiaNella sua analisi della pittura di Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze afferma risolutamente che il corpo vissuto della fenomenologia è insignificante, rispetto al potere quasi invivibile del corpo senz’organi. L’ipotesi fenomenologica è insufficiente perché si limita al corpo vissuto, mentre il corpo senz’organi sorge al confine estremo del corpo vissuto. Questa rivendicazione ci invita apparentemente a scegliere tra le due concezioni del corpo: quello di Deleuze e quello della fenomenologia, un corpo vissuto ed uno pressocché invivibile. Ma su che base possiamo compiere questa scelta? Un corpo è evidentemente vero, e l’altro falso? Vedremo che Merleau-Ponty utilizza un modello derivato dalla fisica quantistica, e che il modello classico, o newtoniano, di Deleuze costruisce invece l’immagine di una realtà fisica assoluta e proporremo poi che le strutture percettive siano semplici manifestazioni o proiezioni di questo fondamento ontologico essenziale. Il concetto fenomenologico di forma indica, al contrario, che per quanto le leggi della realtà fisica concettulizzino il mondo percepito, il riferimento almondo percepito è essenziale e preliminare alla conoscenza del mondo fisico. (shrink)

Philosophie de la structure, philosophie de l’événement La critique deleuzienne de la phénoménologieDans son essai sur la peinture de Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze affirme résolument que le corps vécu de la phénoménologie est trop faible pour être à la mesure de la puissance presque incroyable du “corps sans organes”. “L’hypothèse phénoménologique est insuffisante” parce qu’elle n’invoque “que le corps vécu”, écrit-il, alors que le corps sans organes, lui, se porte à la limite même du corps vécu. Cette thèse semble nous (...) inviter à choisir entre deux conceptions du corps, celle de la phénoménologie et celle de Deleuze : un corps vécu et un corps presque incroyable. Mais sur quelle base pouvons-nous choisir? L’une de deux thèses est-elle clairement vraie et l’autre fausse? Nous verrons que Merleau-Ponty use d’un modèle fondé sur la mécanique des ondes systémiques, et que le modèle classique ou newtonien de Deleuze construit l’image d’une réalité physique absolue et pose ensuite que les structures perceptives sont simplement des manifestations ou des projections de cette fondation ontologique fondamentale. Mais le concept phénoménologique de “forme” indique que, même si les lois de la réalité physique ne conceptualisent que le monde perçu, la référence à ce monde perçu reste néanmoins essentielle à la connaissance du monde physique.Filosofi a della struttura, fi losofi a dell’evento La critica di Deleuze alla fenomenologiaNella sua analisi della pittura di Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze afferma risolutamente che il corpo vissuto della fenomenologia è insignificante, rispetto al potere quasi invivibile del corpo senz’organi. L’ipotesi fenomenologica è insufficiente perché si limita al corpo vissuto, mentre il corpo senz’organi sorge al confine estremo del corpo vissuto. Questa rivendicazione ci invita apparentemente a scegliere tra le due concezioni del corpo: quello di Deleuze e quello della fenomenologia, un corpo vissuto ed uno pressocché invivibile. Ma su che base possiamo compiere questa scelta? Un corpo è evidentemente vero, e l’altro falso? Vedremo che Merleau-Ponty utilizza un modello derivato dalla fisica quantistica, e che il modello classico, o newtoniano, di Deleuze costruisce invece l’immagine di una realtà fisica assoluta e proporremo poi che le strutture percettive siano semplici manifestazioni o proiezioni di questo fondamento ontologico essenziale. Il concetto fenomenologico di forma indica, al contrario, che per quanto le leggi della realtà fisica concettulizzino il mondo percepito, il riferimento almondo percepito è essenziale e preliminare alla conoscenza del mondo fisico. (shrink)

In Creative Evolution, Bergson argues that life, the so-called inner becoming of things, does not develop linearly, in accordance with a geometrical, formal model. For Bergson as for classical science, matter occupies a plane of immanence defined by natural laws. But he maintains that affection is not part of that plane of immanence and that it needs new kind of scientific description. For Deleuze, affection does belong to the plane of immanence whose parts are exterior to one another, according to (...) classical natural laws. Out of this may be cut the closed, mechanical world with its immobile sections that Bergson attributes to cinematographic knowledge. Thus, in place of a science of creative evolution, Deleuze has substituted external relations, blocs of becoming and ultimately, a theory of extinction. (shrink)

According to Gilles Deleuze, the underground world of Alice in Wonderland has been strongly associated with animality and embodiment. Thus the need for Alice's eventual climb to the surface and her discovery that everything linguistic happens at that border. Yet, strangely, in spite of the claim that Alice disavows false depth and returns to the surface, it seems that it is precisely in the depths that she finally wakes from her sleepy, stupified surface state and investigates the deep structures, the (...) rules of logic. In this investigation, Alice questions many formal structures, such as causality, identity, reference and the rules of replacement. She discovers that Wonderland does not generate consequential conduct; in fact, it generates no conduct whatsoever! In other words, when it comes to consequences, Wonderland may not be all that wonderful. Yet, we do not live in Wonderland and therefore, our actions have consequences. The question this poses is, why organise language so as to escape causal relations and why choose the little girl as emblematic of this organisation? (shrink)

Philosophy's traditional "man of reason"—independent, neutral, unemotional—is an illusion. That's because the "man of reason" ignores one very important thing—the woman. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic collects new and old essays that shed light on the underexplored intersection of logic and feminism.

The collection also contains a comprehensive bibliography of feminist thinkers who are enacting French philosophy in English, German, and French.

Distinguished feminist philosophers consider the future of feminist phenomenology and chart its political and ethical future in this forward-looking volume. Engaging with themes such as the historical trajectory of feminist phenomenology, ways of perceiving and making sense of the contemporary world, and the feminist body in health and ethics, these essays affirm the base of the discipline as well as open new theoretical spaces for work that bridges bioethics, social identity, physical ability, and the very nature and boundaries of the (...) female body. Entanglements with thinkers such as Arendt, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Deleuze are evident as they reveal new directions for productive philosophical work. Grounded in the richness of the feminist philosophical tradition, this lively volume represents a significant opening to the possible futures of feminist phenomenological research. (shrink)

Heidegger has shown how the subject-predicate structure of language and the substance-accident structure of things are both derived from the analysis of the "mere thing" into some matter that stands together with some form, a form always determined by the use to which the thing will be put. Regardless of what we try to say, discourse concerns itself with some subject related to some predicate in a manner indicating either that it is useful or that it is stripped bare of (...) usefulness. ;Therefore, within the law of contradiction, that is, insofar as "S is P," our thought is always already structured by this obscure origin. The system of discourse always signifies and represents, the appearance of the thing becomes constant, language becomes constant: form and matter, subject and predicate. ;All attempts to directly oppose the discursive system result in cooption. Yet, Kant and Hegel make way for the spatial and temporal, thus discursive counter to the significational system. They do this not by directly confronting it in order to produce yet another level of signification, but by opening up a space for thought. Kant discovers the acategorical "sublime," and Hegel dissolves the substantiality of the object, opening up the possibility of other logics and grammars. ;There emerged a surplus never completely enframed by discourse. Painting deliberately evaded the realm of non-contradiction, politely declined the positing of significations, the logic and grammar of an object with or without use. It has brought us to a confrontation with "stupidity," where there is nothing to know , and there is no history . There is only a great despair. ;Yet, this despair is thought facing its own dogmatism, recognizing that there is "something happening" rather than nothing, and seeking its orientation from this "it is happening," rather than from discourse dominated by a single logic, a single grammar, a single truth. (shrink)

The philosophy of Deleuze is as relevant to contemporary thought as it is obscure and complex. Deleuze at the End of the World guides readers through this maze by exploring the raw material that Deleuze took from thinkers in various fields of knowledge to construct his own concepts, some of them well known and some widely unexplored. At the same time, readers will gain access to Latin American perspectives on contemporary philosophy.

Dorothea Olkowski's exploration of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze clarifies the gifted French thinker's writings for specialists and nonspecialists alike. Deleuze, she says, accomplished the "ruin of representation," the complete overthrow of hierarchic, organic thought in philosophy, politics, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as in society at large. In Deleuze's philosophy of difference, she discovers the source of a new ontology of change, which in turn opens up the creation of new modes of life and thought, not only in philosophy (...) and feminism but wherever creation is at stake. The work of contemporary artist Mary Kelly has been central to Olkowski's thinking. In Kelly she finds an artist at work whose creative acts are in themselves the ruin of representation as a whole, and the text is illustrated with Kelly's art. This original and provocative account of Deleuze contributes significantly to a critical feminist politics and philosophy, as well as to an understanding of feminist art. (shrink)

In Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari maintain that nature is a process in which there is neither nature nor human being, except as a single reality produced in the processes of production, distribution and consumption, where distributions are immediately consumed and the consumptions immediately reproduced. In its historical realization, this is the process of capitalism, which must be an effect of such processes, processes of nature and human nature. This gives rise to this question: given the rules governing nature, (...) including human nature, how much contingency is there and how much determinism? And ultimately, is capitalism inevitable? (shrink)

Joseph Nechvatal 'La Beaute tragique: Olkowski, Deleuze, and the 'Ruin of Representation'' _Film-Philosophy_, Deleuze Special Issue vol. 5 no. 36, November 2001.

In Bodies That Matter Judith Butler reflects upon the relationship between women and materiality in the context of the history of philosophy. She points to the presumption of the material irreducibility of sex as the ground of feminist epistemology and ethics and analyses of gender. She also finds a similarity between Aristotle's principles of formativity and intelligibility and Foucault's discussion of how discourse materializes bodies. While Butler's analysis reveals much about the history of philosophy with regard to the discourse on (...) matter and women, nonetheless, she appears to begin with the notion of bodies as largely passive, even negative entities. Addition ally, her analysis also implies that principles of formativity and intel ligibility are historically contingent. This essay seeks to undermine those two positions in preparation for inaugurating a positive theory of fluid structures. (shrink)