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Dorothy Edgington
Birkbeck College
  1. On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
  2. Vagueness by Degrees.Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.
    Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If you remove one grain from a heap of (...)
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  3. The Paradox of Knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.
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  4.  67
    Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey (...)
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  5. Two Kinds of Possibility.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):1-22.
    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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  6. Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.
  7. Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2006 - Mind.
  8. Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.
    Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual (...)
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  9. Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions.Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  10. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Critica 18 (52):3-39.
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  11. What If ? Questions About Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401.
    Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  12. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
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  13.  13
    I-Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.
    I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, which is a well-understood notion, does not function like uncertainty about matters (...)
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  14.  50
    Matter-of-Fact Conditionals.Richard Jeffrey & Dorothy Edgington - 1991 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 65 (1):161 - 209.
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  15. Conditionals, Causation, and Decision.Dorothy Edgington - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):75-87.
  16.  78
    Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - unknown
    We provide an introduction to some of the key issues raised in this volume by considering how individual chapters bear on the prospects of what may be called a ‘counterfactual process view’ of causal reasoning. According to such a view, counterfactual thought is an essential part of the processing involved in making causal judgements, at least in a central range of cases that are critical to a subject’s understanding of what it is for one thing to cause another. We argue (...)
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  17.  80
    Validity, Uncertainty and Vagueness.Dorothy Edgington - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):193 - 204.
  18.  59
    Wright and Sainsbury on Higher-Order Vagueness.Dorothy Edgington - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):193-200.
  19.  75
    Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):691-707.
    The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.
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  20.  28
    The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of Possibility.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 78:1-22.
    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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  21.  25
    The Presidential Address: Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):1 - 21.
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  22. Lowe on Conditional Probability.Dorothy Edgington - 1996 - Mind 105 (420):617-630.
  23.  98
    Indeterminacy de Re.Dorothy Edgington - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):27--44.
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  24. Truth, Objectivity, Counterfactuals and Gibbard.Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):107-116.
  25.  5
    What If? Questions About Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):380-401.
    : Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans. Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  26.  40
    Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Stephen Read & Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):47 - 86.
  27. Mellor on Chance and Causation. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433.
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also (...)
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  28. ``The Paradox of Knowability&Quot.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94:557-568.
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  29.  9
    The Metaphysics of Modality.Dorothy Edgington - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):365-370.
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  30.  39
    The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness.Dorothy Edgington - 2001 - Legal Theory 7 (4):371-378.
    Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. "There is no such point", is a natural thought: one color just shades gradually into the next.
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  31.  39
    Verificationism and the Manifestations of Meaning.Anthony Appiah & Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1):17 - 52.
  32. Conditionals, Truth and Assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
     
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  33.  91
    General Conditional Statements: A Response to Kölbel.Dorothy Edgington - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):109-116.
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  34.  14
    Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2005 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show how relevant it is to (...)
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  35.  6
    Logic and Philosophy: A Modern Introduction.Dorothy Edgington - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (81):406.
  36.  61
    Explanation, Causation and Laws.Dorothy Edgington - 1990 - Critica 22 (66):55-73.
  37.  34
    Meaning, Bivalence and Realism.Dorothy Edgington - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:153 - 173.
  38.  32
    The Mystery of the Missing Boundary. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):704–711.
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  39.  21
    X—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism.Dorothy Edgington - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):153-174.
  40. And Assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. pp. 283.
     
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  41.  22
    Is Prior to Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 230.
  42. Sorensen on Vagueness and Contradiction.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
     
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  43.  53
    The Logic of Uncertainty.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Critica 27 (81):27-54.
  44. Verificationism and the Manifestations of Meaning.Anthony Appiah & Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 59:17-52.
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  45.  84
    Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology: A Critique of the Method of Truth in Metaphysics.Brian A. Ball, Dorothy Edgington & John Hawthorne - unknown
    In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth (...)
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  46.  80
    The Applicability of Bayesian Convergence-of-Opinion Theorems to the Case of Actual Scientific Inference.Jon Dorling & Dorothy Edgington - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):160-161.
  47.  17
    The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. Viii + 220. £2.10.).Dorothy Edgington - 1972 - Philosophy 47 (182):375-.
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  48.  82
    Andrew Bacon: Vagueness and Thought. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (12):691-698.
  49. Analysis 52.4 October 1992.Dorothy Edgington - 2002 - In Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Vagueness. Ashgate. pp. 27--207.
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  50.  22
    Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles.Dorothy Edgington - 1992 - In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73.
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