How can we establish a political/legal order that in principle does not require the human flourishing of any person or group to be given structured preference over that of any other? Addressing this question as the central problem of political philosophy,_ Norms of Liberty_ offers a new conceptual foundation for political liberalism that takes protecting liberty, understood in terms of individual negative rights, as the primary aim of the political/legal order. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue for construing individual rights as (...) metanormative principles, directly tied to politics, that are used to establish the political/ legal conditions under which full moral conduct can take place. These they distinguish from normative principles, used to provide guidance for moral conduct within the ambit of normative ethics. This crucial distinction allows them to develop liberalism as a metanormative theory, not a guide for moral conduct. The moral universe need not be minimized or morality grounded in sentiment or contracts to support liberalism, they show. Rather, liberalism can be supported, and many of its internal tensions avoided, with an ethical framework of Aristotelian inspiration—one that understands human flourishing to be an objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, social, and self-directed activity. (shrink)
The first part of this project deals with the more recent historical discussions of the topic, Most of which focus on the views of aristotle and j s mill. These two authors turn out to be the focus of attention of most writers who wish to consider the major historical reflections on happiness, Ones that have shaped our thinking on the topic. The second part of this project deals with contemporary original thinking about happiness. Yet here, Too, The major themes (...) on the topic tend to hark back to either the aristotelian or the millian line of analysis. In this section various putative components of happiness or philosophical topics and methods related to understanding happiness are discussed one by one. The paper concludes with some reflections of the authors about the merits of a eudaimonistic conception of happiness. (shrink)
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better known (...) for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the “moral sense” school of thought. (shrink)
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better known (...) for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the “moral sense” school of thought. (shrink)
A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applic- able the ideal of higher friendship (...) is to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited. (shrink)
As each individual abandons himself to the solicitous aid of the State, so, and still more, he abandons to it the fate of his fellow-citizens. Wilhelm Von Humboldt, On the Limits of State Action.
This book is a clearly presented and, within its frame of discourse, a well argued effort to do precisely what its descriptive title suggests. The first two chapters attack universalism in ethics in both its intuitionist and respect-for-persons forms. The teleological alternatives of rule utilitarianism and contractarianism are considered in the following chapter. There is no chapter devoted specifically to skepticism, but the author endeavors to show throughout how his theory steers clear of that alternative.
In 1981, the People's Publishing House in Beijing published a collection of controversial writings on alienation and humanism entitled Man Is the Starting Point of Marxism. Edited by the philosopher and journalist Wang Ruoshui, the collection included contributions by twelve different authors, including two by an obscure associate professor of philosophy and former "bourgeois rightist" from Lanzhou University by the name of Gao Ertai. Together, in 1983, Wang and Gao were criticized by name in a Central Party Circular for having (...) used Man Is the Starting Point of Marxism to propagate the politically suspect philosophical notion that alienation is no less common under socialism than under capitalism, and that humanism transcends class interests. (shrink)
Whether or not Strauss's observation is historically accurate, it does suggest two sets of questions for philosophical examination. (1) Is Strauss correct to view natural duties and natural rights as the same type of ethical concept? Do they serve the same function? Do they work on the same level, and are they necessarily in competition with each other? (2) Does saying that the individual human being is the center of the moral world require that one reject the idea of a (...) human end, or telos? Does accepting the ethical centrality of a human telos require that one reject ethical individualism? Are they mutually exclusive?Footnotes* For criticism, we are grateful to the other contributors to this volume and to its editors, as well as Paul Gaffney. (shrink)
DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL expresses agreement with David Kelley's thesis in A Life of One's Own that the welfare state is not a good thing both for moral reasons and for its practical consequences. But the relationship between the moral and the political is more ambiguous than might first be imagined. The main questions explored are twofold: Is Kelley presupposing the truth of his own position in criticizing another and does this alter the presentation from argument to rhetoric?; and secondly, (...) is Kelley's approach to the moral issue the only one that can be used to criticize the welfare state? (shrink)
It could be said that the book considers consensus in two basic ways: cognitively and socially. The latter would include ethics, value theory, political philosophy, and communication. The former considers the role of consensus in seeking and understanding the truth and would thus include epistemology and science. In all cases, consensus is a form of agreement. In the epistemological realm it emerges as some form of shared understanding, while in the social we see it as like-mindedness regarding procedures or principles. (...) Of course, there can be no radical separation between the social and the cognitive regarding consensus, because consensus is an inherently social concept. This is reflected in the actual organization of the book. The first chapter is entitled "Consensus, Rationality and Epistemic Morality," suggesting how the social and cognitive are necessarily linked. That chapter is followed by five chapters dealing primarily with cognitive questions, while the last few chapters concern social issues. The two dimensions are neatly connected by a middle chapter on axiology. (shrink)
Central to Amartya Sen's understanding and defense of political orders that promote equality is his appeal to human capabilities. However, he fails to provide a basis for their selection, weighting, and value. Moreover, the account of ethical reasoning by which he does attempt to respond to basic challenges is highly problematic. It not only conflicts with a view of human flourishing that is individualized, agent-relative, and self-directed but also offers neither justification for nor principled limitation of state imposed solutions.
