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Douglas N. Husak [54]Douglas Husak [54]DouglasN Husak [3]Douglas Neil Husak [1]
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Douglas Husak
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
  1. Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law.Douglas Husak - 2009 - Oup Usa.
    Husak's primary goal is to defend a set of constraints to limit the authority of states to enact and enforce criminal offenses. In addition, Husak situates this endeavor in criminal theory as traditionally construed. This book urges the importance of this topic in the real world, while most Anglo-American legal philosophers have neglected it.
     
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  2.  65
    The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays.Douglas Husak - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Does criminal liability require an act? -- Motive and criminal liability -- The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility -- Transferred intent -- The nature and justifiability of nonconsummate offenses -- Strict liability, justice, and proportionality -- The sequential principle of relative culpability -- Willful ignorance, knowledge, and the equal culpability thesis : a study of the significance of the principle of legality -- Rapes without rapists : consent and reasonable mistake -- Mistake of (...)
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  3. Legal Paternalism.Douglas N. Husak - 2003 - In LaFollette H. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 387--388.
  4.  59
    Retributivism In Extremis.Douglas Husak - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
    I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples (...)
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  5. Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting.Douglas Husak - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):199-218.
    Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited (...)
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  6.  73
    Paternalism and Consent.Douglas Husak - 2015 - In Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. Springer Verlag.
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  7.  57
    The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing That Intentions Are Irrelevant to Permissibility.Douglas Husak - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70.
    I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal).
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  8. Why Punish the Deserving?Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):447-464.
  9.  30
    The Criminal Law as Last Resort.Douglas Husak - 2004 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2):207-235.
    In this article I examine one condition a minimalist theory of criminalization might contain: the criminal law should be used only as a last resort. I discuss how this principle should be interpreted and the reasons we have to accept it. I conclude that a theory of criminalization should probably include the (appropriately construed) last resort principle. But this conclusion will prove disappointing to those who hope to employ this principle to bring about fundamental reform in the substantive criminal law. (...)
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  10.  58
    On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse.Douglas Husak - 2005 - Law and Philosophy 24 (6):557-594.
  11.  34
    Social Engineering as an Infringement of the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of Corporate Criminality. [REVIEW]Douglas Husak - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):353-369.
    I examine how deferred-prosecution agreements employed against suspected corporate criminality amount to a form of social engineering that infringes the presumption. I begin with a broad understanding of the presumption itself. Then I offer a brief description of how these agreements function. Finally I address some of the normative issues that must be confronted if legal philosophers who hold retributivist views on punishment and sentencing hope to assess this device. My judgment tends to be favorable. More importantly, I caution against (...)
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  12. Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions.Douglas N. Husak - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (1):43-80.
  13.  44
    Vehicles and Crashes.Douglas Husak - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):351-370.
  14.  52
    [Book Review] Drugs and Rights. [REVIEW]Douglas N. Husak - 1995 - Criminal Justice Ethics 14 (1):63-72.
    This important book was the first serious work of philosophy to address the question: Do adults have a moral right to use drugs for recreational purposes? Many critics of the 'war on drugs' denounce law enforcement as counterproductive and ineffective. Douglas Husak argues that the 'war on drugs' violates the moral rights of adults who want to use drugs for pleasure, and that criminal laws against such use are incompatible with moral rights. This is not a polemical tract but a (...)
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  15. Is Drunk Driving a Serious Offense?Douglas N. Husak - 1994 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1):52-73.
  16. Paternalism and Autonomy.Douglas N. Husak - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1):27-46.
  17. Four Points About Drug Decriminalization.Douglas Husak - 2003 - Criminal Justice Ethics 22 (1):21-29.
  18.  35
    Philosophy of Criminal Law.Douglas Husak - 1987 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    This volume collects 17 of Douglas Husak's influential essays in criminal law theory. The essays span Husak's original and provocative contributions to the central topics in the field, including the grounds of criminal liability, relative culpability, the role of defences, and the justification of punishment. The volume includes an extended introduction by the author, drawing together the themes of his work, and exploring the goals of criminal theory.
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  19. Recreational Drugs and Paternalism.DouglasN Husak - 1989 - Law and Philosophy 8 (3):353 - 381.
  20.  21
    Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry.Douglas Husak - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically.
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  21.  65
    Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on 'The Transfer Principle'.Douglas Husak - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):399-410.
    Gideon Yaffe is to be commended for beginning his exhaustive treatment by asking a surprisingly difficult question: Why punish attempts at all? He addresses this inquiry in the context of defending (what he calls) the transfer principle: “If a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized.” I begin by expressing a few reservations about the transfer principle itself. But my main point is that we are justified (...)
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  22.  39
    Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes.Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas - 1992 - Law and Philosophy 11 (1):95-126.
  23. Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of Criminal Law,”.Douglas N. Husak - 2002 - In Stephen Shute & Andrew Simester (eds.), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part. Oxford University Press. pp. 13--46.
     
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  24. Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction. [REVIEW]Douglas N. Husak - 2004 - Law and Philosophy 23 (5):437 - 493.
  25.  39
    Intoxication and Culpability.Douglas Husak - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):363-379.
    I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my view, (...)
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  26.  84
    Mistake of Law and Culpability.Douglas Husak - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):135-159.
    When does a defendant not deserve punishment because he is unaware that his conduct breaches a penal statute? Retributivists must radically rethink their answer to this question to do justice to our moral intuitions. I suggest that modest progress on this topic can be made by modeling our approach to ignorance of law on our familiar approach to ignorance of fact. We need to distinguish different levels of culpability in given mistakes and to differentiate what such mistakes may be about. (...)
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  27.  65
    “Already Punished Enough”.Douglas N. Husak - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):79-99.
  28.  9
    Vehicles and Crashes: Why is This Moral Issue Overlooked?Douglas Husak - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):351-370.
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  29. In Favor of Drug Decriminalization.Douglas Husak - 2014 - In Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 22--335.
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  30.  65
    Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes.Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III - 1992 - Law and Philosophy 11 (1/2):95 - 126.
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  31.  26
    Why Gun Control is So Hard.Douglas Husak - 2019 - Criminal Justice Ethics 38 (1):55-64.
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  32. The Complete Guide to Consent to Sex: Alan Wertheimer’s Consent to Sexual Relations. [REVIEW]Douglas Husak - 2005 - Law and Philosophy 25 (2):267-287.
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  33.  54
    Brudner, Alan . Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 256. $130.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Douglas Husak - 2010 - Ethics 120 (4):841-846.
  34.  39
    Conflicts of Justifications.Douglas N. Husak - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (1):41 - 68.
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  35.  56
    Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content? [REVIEW]Douglas Husak - 2008 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (2):99-122.
    I take it as obvious that attempts to justify the criminal law must be sensitive to matters of criminalization—to what conduct is proscribed or permitted. I discuss three additional matters that should be addressed in order to justify the criminal law. First, we must have a rough idea of what degree of deviation is tolerable between the set of criminal laws we ought to have and the set we really have. Second, we need information about how the criminal law at (...)
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  36.  71
    Omissions, Causation and Liability.Douglas N. Husak - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (121):318-326.
  37.  42
    Motive and Criminal Liability.Douglas N. Husak - 1989 - Criminal Justice Ethics 8 (1):3-14.
  38.  3
    Ignorance of Law: How to Conceptualize and Maybe Resolve the Issue.Douglas Husak - 2019 - In Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law. Springer Verlag. pp. 315-333.
    Under what circumstances should ignorance that someone is violating a moral or criminal rule preclude or lessen his moral responsibility and/or penal liability? In this chapter, I first construct a schema or framework for how to think about this issue. Quite a bit of confusion and uncertainty, I am sure, derives from a failure to understand exactly what this question is asking. I next defend some substantive views about how this question should be answered. If my defense is cogent, I (...)
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  39.  75
    Why There Are No Human Rights.Douglas N. Husak - 1984 - Social Theory and Practice 10 (2):125-141.
  40. Drugs and Rights.Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    This important book was the first serious work of philosophy to address the question: Do adults have a moral right to use drugs for recreational purposes? Many critics of the 'war on drugs' denounce law enforcement as counterproductive and ineffective. Douglas Husak argues that the 'war on drugs' violates the moral rights of adults who want to use drugs for pleasure, and that criminal laws against such use are incompatible with moral rights. This is not a polemical tract but a (...)
     
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  41.  49
    Rapes Without Rapists: Consent and Reasonable Mistake.Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):86-117.
  42.  14
    The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability: Douglas N. Husak.Douglas N. Husak - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (4):493-518.
    A rational defense of the criminal law must provide a comprehensive theory of culpability. A comprehensive theory of culpability must resolve several difficult issues; in this article I will focus on only one. The general problem arises from the lack of a systematic account of relative culpability. An account of relative culpability would identify and defend a set of considerations to assess whether, why, under what circumstances, and to what extent persons who perform a criminal act with a given culpable (...)
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  43. Beyond the Justification/Excuse Dichotomy.Douglas Husak - 2011 - In Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff (eds.), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff. Oxford University Press.
     
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  44.  73
    Legal Rights: How Useful is Hohfeldian Analysis?Stephen D. Hudson & Douglas N. Husak - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):45 - 53.
  45.  38
    The Presumption of Freedom.Douglas N. Husak - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):345-362.
  46. Criminal Law Theory.Douglas Husak - 2005 - In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell.
     
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  47.  3
    Already Punished Enough.Douglas N. Husak - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):79-99.
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  48. Strict Liability, Justice and Proportionality.Douglas N. Husak - 2005 - In Andrew Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict Liability. Oxford University Press. pp. 81--104.
     
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  49.  6
    A Theory of Freedom.Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Noûs 26 (3):400-402.
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  50.  11
    Addiction and Criminal Liability.Douglas N. Husak - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):655-684.
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