How can we establish a political/legal order that in principle does not require the human flourishing of any person or group to be given structured preference over that of any other? Addressing this question as the central problem of political philosophy,_ Norms of Liberty_ offers a new conceptual foundation for political liberalism that takes protecting liberty, understood in terms of individual negative rights, as the primary aim of the political/legal order. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue for construing individual rights as (...) metanormative principles, directly tied to politics, that are used to establish the political/ legal conditions under which full moral conduct can take place. These they distinguish from normative principles, used to provide guidance for moral conduct within the ambit of normative ethics. This crucial distinction allows them to develop liberalism as a metanormative theory, not a guide for moral conduct. The moral universe need not be minimized or morality grounded in sentiment or contracts to support liberalism, they show. Rather, liberalism can be supported, and many of its internal tensions avoided, with an ethical framework of Aristotelian inspiration—one that understands human flourishing to be an objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, social, and self-directed activity. (shrink)

CHARLES TAYLOR, IN TWO IMPORTANT ESSAYS, offers both a refutation of what appears to be the foundations of liberalism as well as an alternative “third way” to the liberal-communitarian debate. In this paper we are broadly interested in the role of community within a liberal framework, and for that reason the Taylor essays are a useful way to begin such an exploration. There is, we believe, much in Taylor with which to agree. If liberalism somehow fails to accommodate any meaningful (...) conception of community or somehow manages to undermine the possibility of community, that would be a serious strike against it. “Atomism” is one of those concepts inherently linked by thinkers such as Taylor to liberalism. It is the sort of concept meant to evoke, if not describe, a perspective on human association that is at least problematic to community-building, if not directly undermining it. Taylor’s first essay with the title of “Atomism” explores this idea and levels the charge of anticommunity against liberalism. The second essay, “Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” builds upon that charge but seeks to moderate the apparent antiliberal stance of the first. Our position is that liberalism is not opposed to community and that “atomism” when applied to liberalism is something of a myth — a caricature rather than an integral part of liberalism. Our specific theses will be the following: “atomism” as used by Taylor is a confused tool and one whose uses for understanding liberalism are extremely limited, if applicable at all; the applicability of “atomism” is ironically more consistent with certain forms of collectivism than with liberalism; and Taylor’s own proposed way of navigating the difference between liberalism and communitarianism is in the end a form of communitarianism and not an alternative at all. (shrink)

A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applic- able the ideal of higher friendship (...) is to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited. (shrink)

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better known (...) for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the “moral sense” school of thought. (shrink)

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better known (...) for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the “moral sense” school of thought. (shrink)

This essay asks whether what is good for someone is distinct from her self-perfection, and whether it makes sense to understand either her good or her self-perfection in terms of the other. The essay adopts a traditional naturalistic understanding of perfection. It argues, however, that the conception of human nature that underlies the perfectionist view must be more individualistic than it is often taken to be. It goes on to distinguish individuative from generic features of human nature; because the account (...) includes both types of characteristics, the concluding vision of human nature, and hence human perfection, is deeply individualized. What is good for an individual is linked to the exercise of her nature rather than to desires individuals simply happen to have. (shrink)

In his book, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel Scheffler ends his last chapter in the following way.

Whether or not Strauss's observation is historically accurate, it does suggest two sets of questions for philosophical examination. (1) Is Strauss correct to view natural duties and natural rights as the same type of ethical concept? Do they serve the same function? Do they work on the same level, and are they necessarily in competition with each other? (2) Does saying that the individual human being is the center of the moral world require that one reject the idea of a (...) human end, or telos? Does accepting the ethical centrality of a human telos require that one reject ethical individualism? Are they mutually exclusive?Footnotes* For criticism, we are grateful to the other contributors to this volume and to its editors, as well as Paul Gaffney. (shrink)

In his book, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel Scheffler ends his last chapter in the following way.

As each individual abandons himself to the solicitous aid of the State, so, and still more, he abandons to it the fate of his fellow-citizens. Wilhelm Von Humboldt, On the Limits of State Action.

This book is a clearly presented and, within its frame of discourse, a well argued effort to do precisely what its descriptive title suggests. The first two chapters attack universalism in ethics in both its intuitionist and respect-for-persons forms. The teleological alternatives of rule utilitarianism and contractarianism are considered in the following chapter. There is no chapter devoted specifically to skepticism, but the author endeavors to show throughout how his theory steers clear of that alternative.

Central to Amartya Sen's understanding and defense of political orders that promote equality is his appeal to human capabilities. However, he fails to provide a basis for their selection, weighting, and value. Moreover, the account of ethical reasoning by which he does attempt to respond to basic challenges is highly problematic. It not only conflicts with a view of human flourishing that is individualized, agent-relative, and self-directed but also offers neither justification for nor principled limitation of state imposed solutions.

It could be said that the book considers consensus in two basic ways: cognitively and socially. The latter would include ethics, value theory, political philosophy, and communication. The former considers the role of consensus in seeking and understanding the truth and would thus include epistemology and science. In all cases, consensus is a form of agreement. In the epistemological realm it emerges as some form of shared understanding, while in the social we see it as like-mindedness regarding procedures or principles. (...) Of course, there can be no radical separation between the social and the cognitive regarding consensus, because consensus is an inherently social concept. This is reflected in the actual organization of the book. The first chapter is entitled "Consensus, Rationality and Epistemic Morality," suggesting how the social and cognitive are necessarily linked. That chapter is followed by five chapters dealing primarily with cognitive questions, while the last few chapters concern social issues. The two dimensions are neatly connected by a middle chapter on axiology. (shrink)

This collection of essays seeks to explore Tibor R. Machan’s philosophical ideas by considering some of the basic issues with which he has been concerned throughout his long and highly productive career.