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Profile: Douglas Lavin (University College London)
  1. Must There Be Basic Action?Douglas Lavin - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):273-301.
    The idea of basic action is a fixed point in the contemporary investigation of the nature of action. And while there are arguments aimed at putting the idea in place, it is meant to be closer to a gift of common sense than to a hard-won achievement of philosophical reflection. It first appears at the stage of innocuous description and before the announcement of philosophical positions. And yet, as any decent magician knows, the real work so often gets done in (...)
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  2. Goodness and Desire.Matthew Boyle & Douglas Lavin - 2010 - In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--201.
  3. 10. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Pp. 634-638). [REVIEW]Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Douglas Lavin, Rachana Kamtekar, Joshua Gert, Elijah Millgram, David Copp & Stephen M. Gardiner - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3).
     
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  4. Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.Douglas Lavin - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):424-457.
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  5.  83
    Action as a Form of Temporal Unity: On Anscombe’s Intention.Douglas Lavin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):609-629.
    The aim of this paper is to display an alternative to the familiar decompositional approach in action theory, one that resists the demand for an explanation of action in non-agential terms, while not simply treating the notion of intentional agency as an unexplained primitive. On this Anscombean alternative, action is not a worldly event with certain psychological causes, but a distinctive form of material process, one that is not simply caused by an exercise of reason but is itself a productive (...)
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    Forms of Rational Agency.Douglas Lavin - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:171-193.
    A measure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard has broad application. Compare the external breed standards arbitrarily imposed at a dog show with the internal standards of health at work in the veterinarian's office. This paper is about practical standards, measures of acting well and badly, and so measures deployed in deliberation and choice. More specifically, it (...)
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  7. Other Wills: The Second-Person in Ethics.Douglas Lavin - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):279-288.
    Other wills: the second-person in ethics. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.941907.
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  8. Review of Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability[REVIEW]Douglas Lavin - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
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  9.  79
    Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity.George Pavlakos, Niko Kolodny, Ulrike Heuer & Douglas Lavin - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378.
    This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos.
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    Über Das Problem des Handelns.Douglas Lavin - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (3):357-372.
    “On the Problem of Action” contrasts two conceptions of the task of action theory: the dominant conception, which I call the decompositional approach, and an alternative, non-decompositional approach that is implicit in the tradition of action theory descending from Aristotle. Decompositionalists seek to characterize intentional action as a composite of something inward and something outward, bound together by some generic kind of causal relation. I show that this approach is committed to characterizing action in terms that treat the agent’s own (...)
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